

ABOUT THE PROBLEM OF MATERIAL

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Introduction

It is logical to consider the category of the material together with the category of the ideal.

In idealistic philosophies, the ideal is not defined, it is only indicated that the ideal is not material. But the ideal is considered as primary, exists outside of space and time, the ideal produces the material and controls it. This is consciousness, the psyche, the supersensible (transcendental) world mind, spirit, the world of ideas.

In materialist philosophy, before the emergence of Marxism, matter was represented 1) in a material form, 2) as external, 3) as an object of contemplation, perception, but not as an activity of an individual and society.

Accordingly, the ideal was represented as an image of the external world in the subject or as a manifestation of the spiritual activity of the subject.

Marxism defines the ideal as a reflection of the external world in the forms of consciousness and human activity as a social being, as a product and form of socio-historical practice.

That is, the "impressions" of the external world in consciousness not only correspond to the external world, but also depend on the totality of social relations.

In world philosophy, matter is understood as a substance that is different from the psychic and spiritual.

Democritus and Leucippus believed that the cause and essence of the universe are atoms and emptiness, atoms are matter that does not depend on consciousness.

The first abstractions did not go beyond the concrete properties of things, the essence of substances coincided with the directly perceived.

For Thales, the building material of the Universe is water, for Anaximenes, the first principle is air, for Heraclitus – fire, more precisely, some water-like, fire-like or air-like principles. Water generates stars, air gives movement, penetrates everywhere.

Empedocles combined water, air, fire and earth, the four elements.

A deeper abstraction is the apeiron of Anaximander, an infinite but indefinite matter, the parts of which change, but the whole remains unchanged. The apeiron is eternal, but it contains opposites that are interconnected, which determine the development of matter.

Similarly, one solved the problem of the one and the many, considering the presence of opposites as a source of development. Thus, natural philosophers laid the foundation for the doctrine of the struggle and unity of opposites.

What is characteristic: Anaximander was the first to raise the question of the origin of organic species.

"Originally, man descended from animals of a different species," he claims [1].

For the central figure of the Eleatic school of Parmenides, there is only matter, being, non-existence does not exist. For this, Aristotle called the Eleatics "immobile" and "unnatural".

The atomists Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius Carus made a step forward from the sensually observable to the essential. They believed that the cause and essence of the universe are atoms and emptiness, atoms are matter that does not depend on consciousness, but the understanding of the category of matter remained substantial.

The Stoic school that emerged in the IV century BC simultaneously with epicureanism allegedly rejected the general, the Stoics, Cleanthes, Ariston, Chrysippus, etc., argued that the general exists only through the individual, so there is no special sense to give a separate definition of matter. However, the Stoics saw the world changing every moment, fluid, like Heraclitus, following the Ionian school, they were looking for something stable in this fluidity. Considering objects as existing, they came to recognize "that which is under them as existing" [2]. The matter from which objects arise is called essence by the Stoics. However, the active principle in matter for the Stoics is not the opposite, but the logos, God, who also creates objects, the world and the logos are identical.

In Plato's "Timaeus", we find very interesting judgments: for the formation of fluid and changing things as copies of eternal and unchangeable ideas (eidos), in addition to the eidos themselves as a cause and things as a

result, a certain third principle, a third nature, the "receptacle" and "nurse of every birth", the "mother" of all things, is also necessary. Plato compares it with gold, which can take any shape and form any shape. In order for matter to take any form, it must itself be devoid of any form. Therefore, matter is a complete formlessness. But in this case it must be devoid of being, because that which has being is always either a form or has a form. Hence, matter is non-existence, but such non-existence that forms a possibility for all existence and is even necessary for the existence of things. Plato calls such non-existence "hora", a pure space that is unknowable, but which, however, is thought of as a necessary basis for becoming: "It is eternal, does not accept destruction, gives abode to everything that is born, but is itself perceived outside of sensation, through some illegal inference" [3].

It is hardly possible to directly apply these judgments to the models of the early Universe, but in Plato's formulation of the question one can see the course of reasoning of the later materialists.

We see almost the same thing in Aristotle. He points out that nothing arises from nothing, therefore every occurrence and every change requires the presence of a certain substrate, which, changing, loses some properties and acquires new ones. Primordial matter is the substratum of all substrates, has no form, is absolutely amorphous, therefore it is not reality-for every reality has a form - but a pure possibility and therefore there is non-existence, but non-existence is not absolute, but contains the potency of being [4].

Such views have reached the time of Hobbes, according to Hobbes, the essence of matter is the extension, the really existing matter is the "second matter", a concrete substrate of things of a certain kind. Primordial matter, matter in general, common to all things, is not a body different from all other bodies that fill the universe, but it is not one of these bodies, therefore it does not really exist. This really non-existent "matter without form" is only the idea of the body in general, as it appears to us when we mentally abstract from its form and other accidents, with the exception of quantity and extension [5].

One of the representatives of English materialism, Locke, following Anaximenes, adds density to extension. According to Locke, matter is a conceivable something that is the carrier of the primary qualities (accidents) of extension and density, although we do not know and cannot know what this something is in itself [6]. This is a conditional concept obtained by abstraction: if a body (substance) is a "dense, extended and formed substance" [7].

Hegel writes that matter is "the first reality, a existing for-itself-being; it is not just an abstract being, but the positive existence of space, as excluding another space." Hegel deduces the concept of matter from the opposition of the positive abstraction of space and the negative abstraction of time: "Matter is the unity and negation of these two abstract moments, the first concrete."

Behind the obviously incorrect conclusion, it is worth noting the way Hegel obtained the definition.

For Holbach, matter is everything that acts on the senses, "a great whole, outside of which nothing can exist" [8]. And for Feuerbach, matter is given in sensations and, in contrast to Hegel, is not a stage in the development of a mental, abstract, super - natural idea. This is everything except the super-natural, this is nature and man, "since he is a being acting involuntarily and unconsciously", matter is objective, exists "outside of us", "independently of thinking".

The French materialists of the XVII century gave a mechanistic understanding of matter. Leibniz, Kant, and Schelling associate matter with interaction. Subjective idealists deny the existence of matter. Positivists, neo-positivists, postpositivists believe that the concept of matter is meaningless.

Engels, firstly, points the extreme limit (ultimate character) of the concept of matter: "Substance, matter is a set of substances from which this concept is abstracted; motion as such is nothing but a set of all sensually perceived forms of motion; words such as "matter" and "motion" are nothing more than abbreviations in which we encompass, according to their general properties, a variety of different sensually perceived things." Secondly, matter is accessible to cognition: "Therefore, matter and motion can be known only by studying individual substances and individual forms of motion; and since we know the latter, we also know matter and motion" [9].

A way to define

To define something means to see a set of interactions, to understand the main function. The universal properties of matter are: non-creativity and indestructibility; the eternity of existence in time; the determinism of all phenomena; reflection, the development of the property of reflection leads to the appearance of its highest form - abstract thinking; the qualitative inexhaustibility of the properties of matter.

Universal laws of the existence and development of matter: 1) the law of unity and struggle of opposites, 2) the law of the transition of quantitative changes into qualitative ones, 3) the law of the negation of negation.

To define something means to specify the most important attributes, just as Lenin gave the definition of classes. The attributes of matter, the universal forms of its being are motion, space and time, which do not exist outside of matter.

The forms of the motion of matter according to Engels are physical, chemical, mechanical, biological, and social forms.

To define something means to classify it as something similar. There is nothing similar in matter, except for matter itself.

V. V. Orlov repeats the idea of Engels and Lenin: to define something means to distinguish it from another. The universe, outside of which there is nothing but the Universe, can be distinguished only by comparing it with something special in the Universe. Such a special must be in a real relation to the essence of the Universe, therefore, this relation must have a universal character, and the special must be the universal opposite of the essence of the Universe. So special is the human consciousness. The material essence of the world can be defined through the opposition of consciousness arising at a certain level of development of matter [10].

For the first time, Lenin raises the question of the material within the framework of the main question of philosophy: matter is "...a philosophical category for denoting objective reality, which is given to a person in his sensations, which is copied, photographed, displayed by our sensations, existing independently of them" [11].

Lenin, like Engels, points out the limit of the concept of matter: "... the only "property" of matter, with the recognition of which philosophical materialism is associated, is the property of being an objective reality, existing outside of our consciousness" [ibid., p. 275].

Ideal

Dubrovsky and Narsky referred to the ideal only to the property of consciousness, the psyche of an individual, see, for example, [12].

Human consciousness, and with it the ideal, is not a property of the individual alone, since it arises only in society as a new systemic quality, as Marx states in the "Theses on Feuerbach", personality is a concrete set of social relations.

However, it is wrong to narrow the sphere of the ideal to the society, in particular, to deny the ideal in the consciousness of a particular individual.

"...trying to explain the ideal from the anatomical and physiological properties of the brain body is the same ridiculous idea as trying to explain the monetary form of the product of labor from the physics-chemical features of gold. Materialism in this case does not consist at all in identifying the ideal with the material processes that occur in the head. Materialism here is expressed precisely in understanding that the ideal as a socially defined form of human activity that creates an object of a certain form is born and exists not "in the head", but with the help of the head in the real objective activity of a person as a real agent of social production", - writes Ilyenkov [13].

Ilyenkov completely transfers the ideal from the consciousness of the individual to society. It is worth noting that it is the physics-chemical properties of gold that allowed this metal to become a universal equivalent. And thought can exist only thanks to a complex system of neurons in the brain. At the same time, thinking is not a quality of only one brain, it is a somatic process. Turgenev's brain weighed 1,5 kg, the brain of one cretin – 3,5 kg, there are more convolutions in the brain of a thrush. than in chimpanzee brain. If you remove one hemisphere of the brain, the second takes over the functions of the first, moreover, there was a patient who had a liquid – filled vacuole instead of a brain.

"A person, - continues Ilyenkov, - exists as a person, as a subject of activity aimed at the world around him and at himself, as long as he actively produces and reproduces his real life in forms created by himself, by his own labor. And this work, this real transformation of the surrounding world and of oneself, which takes place in socially developed and socially legalized forms, is precisely the process that begins and continues completely independently of thinking, - within which, as its metamorphosis, the ideal is born and functions, the idealization of reality, nature and social relations is accomplished, the language of symbols is born as the external body of the ideal image of the external world... The ideal always acts as a product and form of human labor, the process of purposeful transformation of natural material and social relations performed by a public person. The ideal exists only where there is an individual who performs his activity in the forms given to him by the previous development of mankind. The presence of an ideal plan of activity is what makes a person different from an animal... The fundamental difference between human activity and animal activity is precisely that no form of this activity, no ability is inherited together with the anatomical material organization of his body. These forms of activity (active abilities) are transmitted here only indirectly-through the forms of objects created by man for man. Therefore, the individual assimilation of a human-defined form of activity, i.e. The ideal as such exists only where the form of activity itself, corresponding to the form of an external object, is transformed for a person into a special object with which he can act in a special way, without touching or changing the real object, the external thing, the image of which is this form of activity" [ibid.].

Ilyenkov is not familiar with zoopsychology, an ideal plan arises in the brain of animals, monkeys construct primitive tools, crows to get a deep-lying object on the water, drop pebbles into the water so that the water rises, etc.

Ilyenkov insists: "... the difference and even the opposite between the fleeting mental states of an individual, which are completely individual and have no universal significance for another person, and the universal and necessary and therefore objective forms of knowledge and cognition of reality existing independently of him... The problem of ideality has always been an aspect of the problem of objectivity (truth) of knowledge, that is, the problem of those, and precisely those forms of knowledge that are conditioned and explained not by the whims of personal psychophysiology, but by something much more serious, something standing above the individual psyche and completely independent of it. For example, mathematical truths, logical categories, moral imperatives and ideas of legal consciousness, i.e. "things" that have a compulsory meaning for any psyche and the power to limit its individual whims. Here is this ... category of phenomena, which has a kind of objectivity, i.e. ... independence from the individual with his body and soul, which is fundamentally different from the objectivity of individual things sensually perceived by the individual, and was ... designated by philosophy... as an ideal in general" [14].

However, in the same article, Ilyenkov contradicts his own definition, pointing to the ideality of the individual's consciousness: "By ideal, materialism must mean that very peculiar and strictly fixed relationship between two (at least) material objects ... within which a material object, remaining itself, acts as a representative of another object, or more precisely, as the universal nature of this object..." [ibid.].

But the main thesis in the article is the proclamation of the ideal only as a social phenomenon: "... the ideal... is revealed and fixed only in historically formed forms of spiritual culture, in socially significant forms of its expression... the collectively created world of spiritual culture... and opposes the individual psyche... as an ideal world in general..."

The ideal understood in this way, writes Ilyenkov, "is constituted into a special sensory-supersensible reality... which is not and cannot be in each individual psyche taken separately" [ibid.].

I. e. Ilyenkov, like Plato, constructs a supersensible world of ideas that is found inside a certain collective mind. For example, language, syntax. That is, supposedly language is outside the individual psyche.

On the other hand, Ilyenkov does not notice the universal in the concrete. A work of art that reflects an "individual whim", reflecting the uniqueness of the artist, has no general meaning for Ilyenkov.

That is, since the ideal is the same for all individuals, then the thinking of all individuals is the same.

Ilyenkov records only that part of the individual consciousness that is subordinate to the social "average" consciousness.

Ilyenkov believes that philosophy is not interested in why the human brain is able to be the carrier of consciousness, why it is in the human pack that such a new systemic quality as thinking arises.

Denying the need to consider the neurophysiological - in general, biological, i.e., genetic-aspect, Ilyenkov denies the obvious fact: even in dogs, not only static, but also dynamic stereotypes are inherited. For Ilyenkov, the reflection of the world in the animal's brain is not ideal, that is, it is material, while the animal is unable to know such an objective reality as food.

Marx objects, pointing to the concentration of the ideal in the brain of an individual: "... the ideal is nothing but the material, transplanted into the human head and transformed in it" [15].

Finally, Ilyenkov returns to the world of Plato's ideas: "The ideal form is the form of a thing, but outside of this thing..."

To sum up: for Ilyenkov, logical categories, moral imperatives, etc. have a forced meaning for the psyche, have a special kind of objectivity, independence from the individual – this is the ideal in general. The problem of the world of ideas has nothing to do with the structure of the human body, especially with the structure of the brain. That is, everyone is the same, everyone has the same world of ideas. Historically formed and socially legalized ideas of people about the world are not material, but ideal.

Other Soviet philosophers also take the positions of Ilyenkov (and Plato), they focus on criticizing Dubrovsky's book. In June 1988, a round table on the topic "The anatomy of the ideal" was held in Sverdlovsk. Participants: Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, Professor A. N. Shimina (Voronezh), Candidates of Philosophical Sciences S. Z. Goncharov (Associate Professor of the Sverdlovsk Engineering and Pedagogical Institute), A. A. Sorokin (senior researcher of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow), I. M. Manuilov (associate professor of the Penza Plant-vtuz), A. A. Khamidov (senior researcher of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow Alma-Ata), V. I. Polishchuk (associate professor of the Tobolsk Pedagogical Institute), L. K. Samoylova (senior lecturer of the Kuibyshev Medical Institute), leading-scientific Secretary of the Ural branch of the Philosophical Society of the USSR, Academy of Sciences of the USSR V. A. Molchanov.

Sorokin: "So what is ideal? This is a form of things, but exists outside of this thing..."

Goncharov, "the Perfect is the form of things, but exists outside things, in man... work – the pearl of the philosophical works, is an example of how a philosopher party member, not flashy, with no claims to innovation in the breeze, with a clear position of the working class and armed with Marxist-Leninist dialectics worked for over 25 years over the Central problem of philosophy is to help the working class, the party of the right to understand pressing issues of our day from the standpoint of revolutionary thinking."

As for the party, we can still agree, but it is unclear how Ilyenkov's works helped the working class. After the shift, the workers do not go to the library, but to a run-down cafe near the factory passageways with a cheap snack and burnt vodka.

Samoylova.- Since not everything ideal is mental, then not everything mental is ideal. But if we say that any phenomenon of the human psyche is ideal, then we will have to admit that this category is also applicable to the characteristics of the animal psyche, which has common features with the human psyche. The logic of D. I. Dubrovsky's reasoning leads to this conclusion. This approach leads to a dead end in solving the problems of public consciousness both in theoretical and practical terms.

Works of Ilyenkov did not help CPSU. The economic catastrophe of 1991 led to a crisis of science in Russia, and it did not bypass philosophy. This can also be observed by the level of discussion of the problem of the ideal.

Professor UrFU Klassen questions the translation from the German of Marx's comparison of Hegel's method and his own. For Hegel, the process of thinking is the demiurge of reality, while Marx's method is the opposite. "The reality already covered by human activity... - writes Klassen, - Marx preferred to call it a socio-historical practice... this known world is ideally placed in the aggregate human head. And no material grafting into this head is required".

The abyss of thought – and indeed, what has already been transplanted does not require that it be transplanted again. However, scientists are only busy repeating already proven facts. But what about what has not yet been transplanted?! What follows is a set of phrases that are discouraging with their illiteracy and stupidity:

"Pluralism of opinions gives the right to... Being itself does not want to know any logic, any law of identity (thinking and being, B. I.). The system of knowledge turns out to be richer, more meaningful and closer to the

truth than reality itself, because reality ... does not contain any concepts, laws, or logic... There was no geometry on the sand plane before Euclid... and there was no logic of movement from the abstract to the concrete in the history of bourgeois society before Marx... things become relations, ideas and begin to behave like people with a reified consciousness..."

It turns out that Klassen is familiar with people whose consciousness is reified, Klassen's geometry has nothing to do with nature, and reality is not reality, because "further" from the truth (!!!) – electrons in atoms emit, as God puts it on the soul, sodium reacts not with chlorine, but with iron, bacteria sometimes conspire not to share at all, black – eyed people are constantly born, trees grow sideways, the Moon tries to turn the other side to the Earth, and night is replaced by night. But Klassen's subjective reality is like paradise! Everything is logical and magical in it.

Finally, Klassen formulates how to translate a quote from Marx's work: "... the ideal is nothing but the material that is repositioned and translated in the human head."

That is: everything is already contained in the head, it remains only to move from place to place and translate it into something, into footcloths, into rubles or into Japanese. The entire other material world for Marx, according to Klassen, is not subject to any transplantation into the head.

After formulating his insanity, the professor boastfully concludes: "Such a reading ... is closer to Marx's worldview and philosophical culture... it allows us to overcome the contradictions that have divided Russian thinkers for half a century... to create a full-fledged concept of the ideal, which will entail a rethinking of a number of ontological and epistemological problems" [16]. Yes, it will also increase the yield of potatoes and increase milk yield.

Public consciousness

Stephen Priest, an employee of the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Oxford, believes that matter is a substance with an atomic and subatomic structure, which consists of physical objects, that is, all those objects that are in space and time. There is no independent phenomenon of "matter", because everything that can be said about the world can be said in terms of physics (physical objects, events, structures of physical objects, relations between them), so the category of matter as a substance of physical objects is superfluous, since it does not explain anything; materialists have not presented evidence of the existence of matter, matter (as a substance of physical objects) cannot be fixed empirically and it is impossible to define it in empirical terms [17]. Priest simply does not understand the essence of the issue, he argues from the positions of nominalism and positivism that have long been overcome.

However, the materialists are also in the blinders of dogmatics.

Ilyenkov's mistakes are so characteristic that they allow us to understand exactly how to approach the problem of the material: "... while the question of the relation of the ideal to the real, - he writes, - is understood narrowly psychologically... another such separate soul automatically falls into the category of everything else, that is, material, real, moreover, the whole set of such souls organized into a single spiritual formation..." [10].

But from the point of view of the "collective mind", another "collective mind" is also material.

So, is the subjective reality of one individual material for another individual? After all, it is an objective reality for this other individual and is given in sensations. What's the matter here? Is it possible that the same thing can be both ideal and material? Perhaps the contradiction arises because these concepts are marginal and therefore have a special, unusual character? For example, in mathematics, the concept of an infinite set is of the extreme limit. Such sets have strange properties, for example, sets that have the power of a continuum may not be separable.

The creator of set theory, Cantor, pointed out the inconsistency of his theory by using the extreme limit (ultimate) set of all sets. In Russell's formulation, the paradox sounds like this: Let K be the set of all sets that do not contain themselves as their element. Does K contain itself as an element? If so, then, by the definition of K , it should not be an element of K -contradiction. If not, then, by the definition of K , it must be an element of K -again a contradiction. There is no such contradiction in the axiomatized theory of Zermelo-Frenkel sets, but in this theory the extreme limit (ultimate) character of concepts is lost.

"Are there any broader concepts," writes Lenin, " with which the theory of knowledge could operate than the concepts: being and thinking, matter and sensation, physical and mental? No. These are extremely broad, the

broadest concepts, beyond which, in fact (if we do not always keep in mind possible changes in the nomenclature), epistemology has not yet gone" [11, p. 149].

Below we will see that the extreme limit of the concepts of the material and the ideal is not here.

Let us return to the relation of the consciousness of one individual to the consciousness of another individual, to the relation of the consciousness of an individual to the social consciousness.

S. L. Rubinstein, V. P. Tugarinov believed that individual and social consciousness can be an objective reality in relation to another individual consciousness, on which they do not depend and are given to this other consciousness in sensations [18, 19].

It is obvious that, for example, the objectivity of public consciousness is secondary, since first public consciousness is determined by social being. Engels defined this dependence as a dependence "ultimately" [20]. Plekhanov points to this, but denies the objectivity of public consciousness:

"From the point of view of Marx, it is impossible to contrast the "subjective" views of the individual with the views of the "crowd", the majority, etc., as something objective. A crowd consists of people, and people's views are always "subjective", since these or other people's views are one of the properties of the subject. It is not the views of the "crowd" that are objective, but the relations in nature and society that are expressed in these views are objective. The criterion of truth lies not in me, but in the relationships that exist outside of me" [21].

The idea expressed by Tugarinov and Rubinstein indicates that the material does not necessarily have a thing (real, goods) form. Stress it.

Value does not belong immanently to the product, it is contained only in the heads of people. But it exists objectively, independently of the individual's consciousness and is given to the individual in sensations. Social consciousness is secondary to social being, this relation has the same character as the relation of matter to consciousness. Lenin writes: "...Social existence is independent of the social consciousness of people" [11, p. 345]. But the public consciousness is not ideal, as Ilyenkov believes, it is material.

Newspaper fetishes, Marx explains, are no less material than a table or a chair [22].

The independence of social consciousness from the individual is of the same nature as the independence of the external material world from the individual's consciousness, although the dialectical interpenetration of individual consciousness into the social is much deeper than the interpenetration of the ability to reflect the movements of matter into biological or physical forms – moreover, the latter is absent altogether.

It is thanks to this interpenetration into the social consciousness that the change of the mode of production, the social system does not occur fatally, but with the most active participation of individual consciousness, the idea, Lenin writes, taking possession of the masses, becomes a material force.

"Material, economic relations, "writes Lenin, in contrast to ideological ones," are formed without passing through consciousness " [23]. Economic relations "do not pass through consciousness" in the sense that people in their activities never fully realize what material relations are formed in this case, never (including under socialism) completely "do not realize according to what laws they develop, etc." [11, p. 343].

They pass through consciousness, but they are not realized, if they are realized, then not completely. The same can be said about established ideological relations.

The relevance of the old definition of matter

It is obvious that the opposite of matter is not a special case, not consciousness, but the ideal.

Ilyenkov completely deprives matter of the ideal outside of man: "To speak," continues Ilyenkov, " about any ideal where there is no man with his human head, is unacceptable and absurd from the point of view not only of Marx's materialism, but also of any materialism... the ideal exists only in man... but man is understood not as a separate individual with his brain, but as a real aggregate of real people..." (ibid.). Matter is also understood accordingly.

V. Bybler asserts that " the objective content of the philosophical concept of matter is not a "general sign" of existence outside of consciousness, but a complex, contradictory process of determining consciousness by being in the course of human practical activity"[24].

Lenin defines matter through its opposite, consciousness. Matter is something that exists outside of consciousness. Was there an objective reality when there was no consciousness?

In Lenin's definition, objective reality is a property that arises together with consciousness, i.e. it does not exist until the appearance of a "knowing subject".

The definition of matter is given in relation to its property, which does not arise immediately, this definition has a temporary binding, that is, it is limited. In fact, consciousness in its rudimentary form exists in inanimate nature, consciousness is the ability of matter to reflect in a developed form. That is, it becomes possible to define matter through its opposition to reflection. In this case, the interaction of a quantum particle and its recording device becomes non-trivial in a philosophical sense.

Lenin gives a limited definition of matter, nevertheless objects to both Ilyenkov and Bibler: "... It is logical to assume that all matter has a property essentially related to sensation, the property of reflection..." [11, p.91]. But such a property as reflection, it would seem, also does not arise immediately, but only with the appearance of structures that can reflect (display).

The concept of existence is broader than the concept of matter, both material and ideal, both objective and subjective realities exist. The unity of the world, E. Duhring believed, consists in its existence (being). The Soviet philosopher Melyukhin agrees with Duhring: "Interaction and coexistence are more fundamental attributes of matter than objectivity in relation to consciousness. Objectivity itself appears as a concrete form of their manifestation, but only at the highest stages of the development of matter, when a cognizing subject appears, distinguishing himself from all nature and contrasting nature with himself as something objective in relation to him" [25].

Engels objects to Duhring and Melyukhin:

"The unity of the world does not consist in its being, although its being is a prerequisite for its unity, for the world must first exist before it can be united. Being is generally an open question, starting from the border where our field of vision stops. The real unity of the world consists in its materiality, and this latter is proved not by a couple of conjuring phrases, but by a long and difficult development of philosophy and natural science" [20, p. 43].

Existence is not the basis, the basis is the essence, it is identical to the existing being (phenomenon), but at the same time it is opposite to it. As Marx noted, if the essence and the phenomenon coincided, science would have nothing to do. The separation of essence from existence, from the forms of existing being, leads to an imaginary essence, which Marx designated as a transformed form.

The contradiction between essence and existence is resolved into reality. Hegel defines reality as " the unity of essence and existence; an essence devoid of an image and a phenomenon devoid of stability are expressed in it. The identity of essence and phenomenon in cognition is achieved only in the process of ascending from the abstract to the concrete. Thus, the category of existence is not more fundamental than the category of matter. Similarly, such an attribute as motion, in which the contradiction between content and form is resolved, cannot be used as the basis for the definition of matter.

On the other hand, matter is opposite to its property, reflection, which is ideal, but at the level of elementary particles it is impossible to define matter through the opposite, using the concept of interaction, because when interacting its sides are equal, the interaction does not distinguish the relationship "primary – secondary".

Finally, the interaction can be defined attributively, since there are only 4 types of interaction, all others, pressure, heat, etc., are derived. If we consider the interaction to be an extremely general property, then there should be an infinite number of types of interaction, which is not observed in the experiment.

At the same time, Lenin's definition of matter cannot be an absolute truth.

There is no doubt that consciousness is secondary, social consciousness is determined by social being. Consequently, all philosophical systems are determined by the existing political, economic and cultural relations. Consequently, the definition of matter given by Lenin is also tied to the capitalist mode of production, to the capitalist socio-economic formation.

How possible is a new definition of matter? Can theory outstrip socio-historical practice? To the same extent as the practice of revolutions was ahead of social theories, and was higher than the existing productive forces.

Lenin's definition is connected with the class struggle, with the struggle against idealistic views, it was ahead of the material level of society.

Lenin himself does not limit himself to his own definition, he complements it: "...In fact, it is impossible to give any other definition of the last two concepts of epistemology, "Lenin wrote," except as an indication of which of them is taken as the primary ..." [11, p. 149].

"In Marxist philosophy, the objective is defined as existing before, outside and independently of consciousness. The independence, or primacy, of matter appears in three main respects: 1) the independence of the external world that exists before consciousness; 2) the independence of highly organized matter (man) that has consciousness; 3) the independence of the external world, as a rule, from its mental representation", - says V. V. Orlov [10]. Thus, he additionally includes in Lenin's definition that matter arose before consciousness. Orlov hasn't replaced the attitude of subordination with the attitude "to and then" only, he identifies the primacy of the external world, the ego with independence from consciousness. But his interpretation of the concept of "objectivity" is incorrect. Hegel proves the objectivity of thought, thought is not a stranger, alien to the world, it is not external to the world, it corresponds to the world.

There is no need to shy away from the fact that the subjective reality of one person acts as an objective reality for another person. Moreover, it is cognizable in the same way as the thing-in-itself – through manifestations. This fact does not negate the fact that this objective-subjective reality is generated by matter, and is determined by the material.

Such a property of matter as consciousness exists objectively.

The simple definition of Lenin is incomplete, there is no indication of the genesis of the matter, the secondary nature of subjective reality, the impossibility of its separation from the material carrier, the obedience of the subjective to the objective in it.

How relevant is the new definition of matter?

First, it should be noted that Lenin's definition is still relevant to this day. Religion has been reanimated in physics, and V. B. Braginsky and A. A. Grib are attracted to God to explain the physical nature [26]. It must be recognized that:

- matter is primary, consciousness is secondary; matter is not created by an idea, spirit or god, but matter creates an idea;
- the world exists outside and independently of human consciousness; the laws of physics, chemistry, biology cannot be canceled by consciousness;
- consciousness adequately reflects the external world, the external world is cognizable, thinking is not only opposite, but also identical to being.
- The property is inseparable from the carrier, consciousness, thought are not separable from the body, there is no information without a carrier.

It is necessary to reject the subjective-idealistic interpretation of quantum mechanics given by von Neumann, Schrodinger, etc., which places the observer in the axiomatics of the theory. This interpretation leads directly to subjective idealism, to the dependence of physical experiment on human consciousness, and to the recognition of God. Quantum processes in the early universe and in quantum systems like atoms in the modern Universe proceeded and are proceeding without any observer.

In the new millennium, science is returning to the most primitive forms of idealism, to subjective idealism, positivism. Professor of Moscow State University Yu. S. Vladimirov is engaged in direct interparticle long-range action, he is interested in experiments in which the properties of the modifier are transmitted to the metal melt not by placing the modifier in the melt, but at a distance, "informatively". Professor Gut from Omsk claims that, perhaps, the activity of consciousness in physical experiments manifests itself here. The late Professor Mensky (FIAN) believed that our consciousness is active in relation to the choice of alternatives within the framework of a multi-world interpretation of quantum mechanics.

One of the axioms of modern political science is an idealistic understanding of the dialectical relationship "practice – theory" and, accordingly, the relationship "class" - party". Materialism is considered the primary determining practice, but the upper strata of society prefer to consider themselves the demiurge of history.

The party is secondary in relation to the class, but modern ideological constructions are guided by Bernstein's situational thesis raised into a concept about the introduction of political consciousness by an enlightened party into the dark, stagnant, inert matter of the working class.

Not only for the bourgeois parties, but also for the left-wing parties, the subjective party factor has turned into an objective one, moreover, into the most important one.

Lenin, in his polemic with the anarchists, allowed a repetition of Bernstein's thesis in the work "What to Do" about the role of the party as a spiritual shepherd leading the flock of proletarians, allegedly the struggle of the working class is limited to economism. This thesis directly contradicts the historical facts: the creation of the Paris Commune and the organization of Soviets by the workers themselves, as Lenin himself said: "The dictatorship of the proletariat is expressed in the form of Soviet power, a form found by the workers themselves."

Lenin also made a mistake in his polemic with the German Social Democrats in his work "The Infantile disease of Leftism in Communism", he dismissed the question of the relationship between class and party and put forward the historically incorrect division of the working class into the vanguard and backward strata.

Both of these works of Lenin are outdated.

The statement of Marx, repeated by Lenin, is not outdated: "Socialism is the living creativity of the masses." The masses, not the parties.

Independent thinking of the worker, outside of party resolutions – that's what Ilyenkov fears, that's what he wants to stifle, depriving the individual consciousness of the ideal.

The new definition of matter is relevant, at least in two ways:

- in terms of the evolution of the Universe and the prospects of life in this evolution; all modern physics is built on the principle of a minimum of potential energy, on the laws of conservation, on the idea of dissipation, on the law of increasing entropy, such physics can only predict the death of life in the universe.

Philosophy is based on private sciences, therefore, the definition of matter based on a flawed physical paradigm is flawed;

- in terms of whether or not there is free will, which is declared in a number of religions and postulated in a number of bourgeois ideologies in the form of freedom of choice, which in reality is not freedom.

The fact is that thinking is both identical (in the materialistic sense) and not identical with being. In addition to the "material, transplanted into the head and transformed in it", consciousness has not just its own world, but a unique "I", different from everything external, On the one hand, in addition to following the dialectic of the external world, social relations, subjective reality has its own laws, but its internal quality, like all matter, is randomness, which is wider than probabilistic or quantum forms. On the other hand, the act of will is not completely determined by chance.

Existentialism only declares freedom, separates it from activity, as well from social practice, as from physical, chemical, bio-social necessity. Hegel explains that the ordinary understanding of freedom is absurd, he connects freedom and necessity into one, but necessity is "transformed into freedom" if necessity is "understood", freedom is gained as a result of cognition, the return of the spirit to itself. Practice is rejected by Hegel. Kant emphasizes that the freedom of one is achievable only by limiting the freedom of the other.

Mechanicism (under the banner of Marxism) turns language, logic as elements of social consciousness from an instrument of knowledge into the fetters of individual reason. Existentialists, even Sartre, put the individual outside of practical solutions.

Only under communism does concrete labour become universal, creativity becomes totally socially necessary, while existentialism buries the problem of the uniqueness of the human "I".

No less common is the definition of matter through its property that matter (substance), as Spinoza formulated, is the cause of itself, there are no external or otherworldly factors generating it.

At the same time, Spinoza's formula is limited, Hegel points out that in his formula substance is a kind of negative power that absorbs all content, devoid of an active principle that changes, moves, develops from the simple to the complex, not as distinguishing itself" [27]. It is necessary that "Spinoza's substance, - writes Hegel, - should be understood not as immobile, but as an intelligent (intelligible, B. I.) substance, as a certain form that necessarily acts within itself, so that it is the creative principle of nature..." [28]

However, the Hegelian premise is also limited, since it is idealistic. First, he does not deny Fichte's subjective principle in substance, defined in the spirit of finalism, he only complements it. For Hegel, as for Kant, chance is not inherent in substance, it is something external to it. Thirdly, Hegel writes that "objects exist, but the truth of this being is their end" [ibid.]. But regression as an obligatory moment is not included by Hegel in the process of ascending from the lowest to the highest. The Hegelian substance contains only contradiction as a source of movement.

Substance is the unity of being and non-being, it contains the source of its change, which repels its own other from itself [27, p. 192].

Hegel embodied in his teaching the position of the Pythagorean school and the atomists Democracy and Leucippus about the existence of being and non-being and the position of Heraclitus of Ephesus about the identity of being and non-being.

The "inner restlessness" of a substance, its non-identity with itself, may seem to be a more suitable property for defining matter than reflection. However, dialectical development is inherent not only in substance, but also in subjective reality, and this development is not obliged to follow the movement of the external world.

A new definition of matter

So, Lenin links the definition of matter with a special case of the ideal - consciousness.

In his definition, Lenin fixes only the independence of physical, chemical, biological, and social laws from consciousness – in a polemic with subjective idealists.

The concept of the ideal is broader than the concept of "consciousness". Consciousness - arises at a certain level of development of matter.

The total mass of living matter in the biosphere is estimated as $2,42 \times 10^{15}$ kg. The maximum biomass within the Solar system can increase by 2 orders of magnitude, up to 10^{17} kg.

The number of possibly habitable exoplanets in the Milky Way galaxy is 3×10^8 , habitable planets mean the presence of microbes, plants and animals on them, but not necessarily civilizations or other intelligent life. The number of galaxies in the Universe is 10^{11} , respectively, the total total biomass in the Universe can be estimated at 7.26×10^{34} kg, in the future – about 10^{37} kg. The mass of the Universe is 10^{53} kg, if we take into account the mass of dark matter and dark energy, the total mass is about 20 times larger, 2×10^{54} kg. The amount of biomass is vanishingly small in comparison with the mass of the Universe, less than about 10^{20} times, for comparison, a hydrogen atom is about 10^{20} times smaller than the Sun in size.

It is impossible to define matter through its $1/10^{20}$ part of the matter in the universe.

Note that the ratio of the masses of the biological and the rest of the Universe shows that such a form as life on Earth is only a special case of the biological form of the movement of matter.

Accordingly, the line of development of matter leading to society is also a special case.

The concept of reflection goes back to the concept of reflection in Hegel and the French materialism of the XVIII century, Diderot argued : " the ability of sensation is a universal property of matter or a product of its organization" [29] Information, sensation and consciousness are assumed to be particular and specific forms of reflection. See also [30].

The property of reflection is manifested in the ability of material forms to reproduce the certainty of other material forms in the form of changes in their own certainty in the process of interaction with them.

"The concept of reflection... is a materialistic version of Hegel's concept of reflection. If in Hegel the spirit reflects itself, being reflected in the external, objective world, then in Marxism nature is reflected in itself ("nature" in the ultimate sense, including people, human society)" "nature" in the ultimate sense, including people, human society)" [31].

The evolution of the forms of reflection goes from the initial form, irritability, the ability to react, to the second form - the ability to feel, to the initial form of the animal psyche, then to the third form – perception, then to the fourth - to the active action of the subject, finally to the fifth form – the activity of the subject as an element of society.

Note that even in higher primates, abstraction and synthesis exist at the level of the first signal system. What distinguishes a person from an animal is consciousness as self-consciousness.

According to Lenin, all matter has a property that is essentially related to sensation, the property of reflection. A trace on the sand, an impression of a coin on molten wax (Aristotle's comparison), a crater on the Earth's surface from a meteorite hit are the phenomena of reflection.

During the reign of Stalin, the opinion took root in philosophy that the ideal is peculiar only to the reflection in the human consciousness. But the footprint of a shoe on the sand is also ideal – since it is identical to a shoe, you can determine the size of the shoe, the weight of a person by the footprint, but the footprint does not have any of the properties of the shoe, is not made of rubber, has no weight, etc.

The materiality of elementary particles lies in the fact that, being in a vacuum and interacting with it, they interact with each other due to their own qualitative certainty, in the fact that this interaction has the character of a regularity, and randomness is only its subordinate side. Particles cannot interact with each other in any way, and secondly, the regularity of interaction has an internal, not external character.

In modern physics, there is an idea that the essence of particles is ideal, for example, an unobservable spin is ideal, but its manifestations – projections-are material.

On the contrary: the materiality of particles is also in the fact that spin does not depend on interaction with a macroscopic body and is given in projections in which the entity is.

It would seem that the ideal is absent at the level of elementary particles, on the contrary, the recognition of the ideal at this level leads to idealism.

It would seem that the ideal becomes, it occurs only in complex systems of many particles, so it is impossible to determine matter only through the ideal.

Of course, elementary particles "reflect". They reproduce the certainty of other material forms – but without changing (and preserving) their own certainty.

Let us analyze the concept of the ideal in the system of properties of matter. Such a special thing as a property is broader than the concept of the ideal.

The charge of an electron is a property of an electron, there is no charge outside the electron. The property is not separable from the carrier. The electron "determines" the charge, but not the charge "determines" the electron. At the same time, the charge determines the movement of the electron.

Consciousness as a property of matter, ideal as a property of matter-is created by matter, and does not arise simultaneously with it. Such a property of an electron as a charge does not occur after, but together with the electron. Another property, mass, arises due to the Higgs mechanism, the same can be assumed about the spin of elementary particles.

The property of substance - exists objectively, independently of consciousness and is given in sensation. In this case, the substance depends on its properties. But the external world does not depend on consciousness, it is thanks to this that knowledge of the world is possible.

On the other hand, consciousness cannot influence social existence in the same way as a charge affects the movement of an electron. It is thanks to consciousness that social laws change from epoch to epoch, while the laws of the physical form of matter in a given period of the Universe's life are unchanged.

Reflection at the electron level does not change the electron, the nature of elementary particles is unchanged, does not depend on interactions – they are identical to themselves, despite all possible interactions. The reflection resulting from the exchange of virtual photons or gluons should assume the presence of a particle structure.

Reflection at the level of a multiparticle system preserves only the physics-chemical-biological substrate, but changes the shape of the substance.

In order for the ideal to exist, the structure that reflects the external must be stable and must preserve the "impression".

Within the framework of the Standard Model, fermions exchange virtual bosons, despite the emission and absorption of bosons, fermions do not change their structure at all. Probably, this picture will change in the future, but in this model it is not necessary to talk about reflection as the preservation of any trace.

Reflection as the preservation of an altered structure appears in the course of the development of the Universe in view of the ability of elementary particles to form multiparticle structures, atoms, polymers, amorphous bodies, etc. That is, in view of the emergence of a new quality that is not manifested in individual particles. Such elementary particles as a neutrino, proton, photon, electron are stable, while a neutron made up of the same quarks is unstable. At the same time, the particles do not retain any "impressions" during interaction.

At the same time, it is possible to determine the particle that interacted with this particle by the behavior of this particle. This behavior stores the "fingerprint" of an unknown particle, although there is not a single characteristic of an unknown particle in the behavior itself. This is the form of the ideal at the level of elementary particles.

Thus, the concept of matter can be quite defined not through a special case of the ideal, consciousness, but through the ideal as a dialectical opposite.

Accordingly, matter is an objective reality given in sensations, generating the ideal as a reflection. However, the principle of development is not inherent in the definition of matter.

How does a qualitatively new type of reflection – human consciousness-arise? To solve this question, they switch to the use of non-philosophical categories, for example, to the principle of feedback, since human consciousness is self-consciousness. At the rudimentary level, the principle manifests itself through Newton's 3rd law, the Le Chatelier principle, the Pauli principle, and quantum entanglement. But the animal's psyche is already a qualitatively new level, it is impossible to determine a person's consciousness without determining the animal's consciousness. There is already feedback at this level. That is, the reflection of the reflection. The universe is biting its tail.

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