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MODERN MARXISM. Part II

Philosophy and History

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He was subjected to reprisals both by the KGB before 1991 and by the FMB (former KGB) after 1991.
In the spirit of Marxism, the book analyzes some of the mistakes of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The reasons for the collapse of the USSR are analyzed. The law of value, the Asian mode of production, and the class – party relationship are considered. In the categories of Marxist political economy, it is proved that the capitalist mode of production prevailed in the USSR.

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Content

DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM

Introduction

In the 60-80s in Soviet philosophy, there was a discussion about the relationship between the laws of various forms of motion of matter. The idea of reductionism was proposed (Akhundov, Kedrov, etc.), that is, the reduction of the laws of biology to chemistry, and the laws of chemistry to physics. Reductionism proved to be untenable. The idea of subordination of the laws of lower forms to the laws of higher forms was also put forward, but it did not find development. Indeed, are the laws of biology, chemistry or physics in a person subject to his will, can he cancel them? On the other hand, for example, quantum mechanics in entangled states supposedly "cancels" the special theory of relativity, and in black holes - and the general theory of relativity, at birth from a vacuum in a strong gravitational field of pairs of particles, particles are able to fly away from a black hole due to CP-symmetry. But in this case we are not talking about the confrontation of laws, but about the imperfection of theories.

At the same time, the very imperfection of theories indicates a limited understanding of the relationship between regularity and chance, and the inconsistency of reductionism indicates the impossibility of programming higher forms. And this impossibility, as it turned out, is already inherent in physics.

It is obvious that social consciousness is determined by social being; historical experience convinces us of the presence of this connection by thousands of examples. We are talking about both social conflicts and such a social being when manipulation of mass consciousness is possible.

It is worth pointing out that concrete historical connection between objective reality and the subjective world, which they are so diligently trying to eliminate. Namely: the subjective creative world turns out to be surprisingly not unique, on the contrary, standard, completely determined by market social relations.

At the same time, a person cannot be free 1) from the laws of nature that act "from the outside" 2) from such laws of nature that take place in anatomy and physiology (with systemic quality), as well as biochemistry and biophysics of the organism. In the existing paradigm, in terms of the laws of physics, chemistry and biology, the concrete being of a person, including both himself and him as a system open to society, seems to determine his consciousness.

Is this true? As Epicurus objected to Democritus, it is better to believe in God than to live in such a rigid fatal predestination. Do quantum and stochastic uncertainties give free will, are they related to it?

Attempts are being made to make the laws of the lower forms of motion dependent on consciousness. In this case, the question arises: can any lower regularity be considered a regularity, if it depends on the different consciousness of different subjects. The main thing is different: is the influence of consciousness on experience natural?

Kant's determinism

I will cite one of the Kantian cosmological antinomies.

Thesis: "According to the laws of nature, causality is not the only causality by which all phenomena in the world can be derived. To explain the phenomena, it is also necessary to admit free causality. " Where "free causality" comes from, Kant does not specify.

Antithesis: "There is no freedom, everything is done in the world only according to the laws of nature."

A mechanistic, Cartesian view of human nature was formed even by Locke, in a systemic form - by the French materialists Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach. Descartes (Cartesius) and further Lametrie presented man as a complex machine. Descartes reserved for a person the right to have a living, feeling soul, an incomprehensible substance, La Mettrie delivered a person from it, including the soul in a nature comprehensible in the distant future.

In his thesis, Kant takes freedom beyond the laws of nature. That is, it makes it either a "particle" of an indeterminate deity, or assumes the presence of another extranatural.

Many Soviet philosophers did not go beyond the framework of Kant's antithesis. For example, we are talking about challenging the substantial understanding of activity. Therefore, it is incorrect, because it is impossible to deduce the materiality of the social process from activity, i.e. able to unfold independently - as the law of inanimate nature - from the consciousness of the subjects implementing it. "... V. Zh. Kelle and M. Ya. Kovalzon," writes Momdzhyan, "are convinced that the concept of activity itself cannot be considered as an

initial explanatory material, since activity itself needs to be explained, proceeding from no other substantial definitions, but from the essential connections of the social process itself. ... The authors believe that the materiality of the social form of movement cannot be understood (deduced) from activity as such, since it is a subjective phenomenon of social life, determined by its material factors (social relations). Hence the main argument of V. Zh. Kelle and M. Ya. Kovalzon: "Science cannot make a conscious purposeful activity the initial basis of social theory, because this basis must be something independent of the subject and his consciousness." it contains in itself all the basic processes and contradictions of social life.

The perestroika book "Dialectics of Social Development", published under the editorship of Kelle and D. A. Gushchin at LSU in 1988, also shows a lack of understanding of this problem; it is an eclectic mixture of mutilated Marxism with Western clichés about personal freedom, ecumene, etc. And even the drastic changes in the country in the late 80s added little to the understanding of social laws: economic laws, the laws of the relationship between the basis and the superstructure, the laws of communication between the mode of production and all other aspects of social life, the laws of the relationship between social life and social consciousness (I.I. Matveenkov), political laws, laws of the spiritual sphere, the so-called general laws that do not relate to either the basis or the superstructure, general historical laws operating in all spheres and all formations (V.P. Tugarinov), sociological - the laws of the structure, functioning and development of society (A.K. Ugledov), etc. [2]. 1991-1993 convincingly showed this.

How does Kant himself resolve his antinomy? As an idealist - in the regulatory application of reason. You can be afraid of electricity, but you can build a hydroelectric power station. In fact, it is a resolution into Hegel's conscious necessity, but taking into account practice. In a word, into Trotskyism-anarchism-quixoticism: in order to cognize and free oneself, it is necessary, as Mamardashvili put it in Cartesian Reflections, "to pass".

Hegel's determinism

Let us compare the Kantian point of view with what Hegel says: in its development, chance unfolds as a pattern, in turn, a pattern manifests itself by chance. In categories: the law is essential in the phenomenon. In the definition: "The kingdom of law is a calm reflection of the existing or emerging world" [3].

Further, in Hegel - "breaking off", in the expression of Lenin, and "twisting" of words and concepts in order to eliminate the absolutized, fetishized understanding of the law. Hegel opposes chance (external to reality) not immediately, but possibility (internal, potential reality). Opportunities are formal (everything is possible that does not contradict itself) and real. A real opportunity is almost the same as a necessity. In turn, the need is relative and real. Moreover, there can be only one real possibility, and not a variety of struggling opportunities (which, as social contradictions grow, are split into two camps). Hence the conclusion: everything that really is reasonable.

For Hegel, chance is only the outer side of reality. But this is just a detail. In fact, randomness is a necessary side of a regularity, "touching" the essence, as shown by stochastics, and in the microcosm - just an essence, as shown by quantum mechanics. Chance is not inherent in limiting consideration of the system. Such an accident, of course, disappears with the expansion of the consideration, it becomes a regularity. Randomness is a property of the substance itself.

I.e. the same event at each point is both random and natural, and not only in the sense of the development of events or in terms of expanding the boundaries of the system under consideration.

Consider, for example, an event such as a person hitting a car. On the one hand, the event looks completely random. It is hard to imagine that the confluence of the most varied little things that led to the catastrophe would be natural. If we deal with the so-called deductive method, with the help of which Sherlock Holmes discovered causal connections between phenomena, we will see, writes Svasian, that the chains of events were chosen by the detective quite by accident [4], which we will return to later. The reason in deduction is depreciated, becomes indistinguishable, coincides with the reason.

However, there is a statistical pattern that obliges passers-by to get hit by cars. Because there is a connection between passers-by and cars: they move in the same plane.

Now we will go beyond the "human-nearest environment" system and expand it with the "cars" system. In addition, we will take into account EVERYTHING in these systems. It seems that in the extended, refined system, hitting a car is inevitable.

For Hegel in the world, "everything is connected with everything" (he was not yet familiar with the special theory of relativity). Next, we need to expand it even more. Let's remember that the Universe can be closed. If the hypotheses of the multiverse are correct, there is still no way to compare.

What follows from this construction? Approximately the same conclusion as Hegel's: "Blind is a necessity only insofar as it is not comprehended in the concept ..." [5]. And freedom arises as the need is realized. A person in prison is imprisoned. But if he realizes the full gravity of his crime, then, according to Hegel, he will become free.

Spinoza

We return in time from Hegel to Spinoza because it was not Hegel, but Spinoza who brought the mechanistic understanding of determinism to its logical conclusion: "Possibility and chance are only shortcomings of our reason. … If people clearly knew the whole order of nature, they would find everything as necessary as everything that mathematics teaches "[6].

That is: having overcome the dualism of Descartes, Spinoza remains true to Cartesianism.

If Spinoza knew that the Universe could be closed, and that, in any case, its mass is not infinite, he would not have to turn to potential infinity, which a person, clearly, cannot fully cognize, not to mention the actual infinity. For Spinoza, the world contains an infinite number of things. But in order for everything in the world to move with absolute necessity, in the Universe "the same relationship between movement and rest is always maintained", nature preserves "an eternal, lasting and unchanging order" [Ibid., II, p. 514, 88]. And the Heraclitean "you cannot enter the same river twice," and the "deviations of atoms" recognized by Democritus do not concern Spinoza.

One ball moves because it is hit by another, and the other because it was hit by a third, etc., ad infinitum. Not only is a single cause not singled out in the chain of causes (hence, everything is accidental, Spinoza repeats Empedocles). There is also no connection between potential infinity and the singular. The main thing: the cause turns out to be only external, it does not lie in the substance itself.

Spinoza was accused of fatalism, but he fought a different fatalism.

Determinism in theology

I will cite the statement of one of the philosophers of the mystical direction in Hinduism, Ramacharaka (Atkinson): "... karma ... just a connection between cause and effect. ... A follower of Karma Yoga must first of all learn that a person is one of the units that make up the whole mechanism of life or its general scheme. ... We are far from being simple automata, of course, but our interests are connected with the interests of all mankind, and we touch all of mankind at some points. We must willingly put ourselves at the disposal of a Higher Power and we will make sure that such willingness can prevent friction and suffering. " [7]

Various religions, ranging from ancient Greek mythology (Moira, Tyukhe), ancient Roman mythology (Fortune), ancient Egyptian mythology (Termutis) and the concept of karma and Tao, adhered to the concept that the fate of man and the world is a foregone conclusion. Khayyam writes:

You and I are prey, and the world is a trap.
The eternal hunter is hunting us, driving us to the grave,
Himself to blame for everything that happens in the world,
He accuses you and me of sins.

This is how the world and the followers of Ibn Rushd understood the world, but determinism for them is not from God, but in nature, and since man is natural, his thinking and actions are rigidly determined, therefore, there can be no talk of any sin. (Curiously, for the Alawites or the Ismailis, on the contrary, free will is unlimited.)

In one of the teachings, the rabbi points out to his disciples a leaf that fell from a tree on a hot day and sheltered the ant from the rays of the sun. The rabbi claims that the Lord even cares for the ant. Although Maimonides bequeathed to recognize the existence of free will.

Nikolai Gogol was convinced that his fate was in the hands of God, but not doctors, and therefore refused to receive treatment: "If it pleases God that I still live, I will live ..." Theologian and historian Kartashev writes that Gogol "is repentant he rejected everything fleshly and starved himself to death in the exploit of spiritualism"[8].

In the views of Thomas Aquinas, fatalism reigns: not only man, but all things move at the will of a higher being.

For Luther, mechanistic determinism is absolute, free will is fiction.

The theologically-minded writer Clive Stays Lewis provides the reader with a mixture of subjective and objective idealism. On the one hand, he repeats Mach: "... we are not able to know anything, except for momentary sensations." He also repeats Kant: "you cannot grasp nature at all, you can only approach it, and even then not too much". On the other hand, it recognizes a person's ability to cognize the external world, but not in a scientific way. [9]. So, Aristotle believed that the soul is a property of the body, but denied this to the mind, according to Aristotle, mind is not the entelechy of the body, thinking is not the implementation, not the function of any human organ. Although even the Pythagorean Alcmeon considered the brain as the organ of thinking (today we can add that thinking is a somatic process as well). Of course, as a materialist, Aristotle recognizes that existence is thinkable, nature is displayed in a person, like a coin is imprinted on heated wax - therefore, being and thinking are identical. At the same time, Aristotle considers form to be primary.

Lewis ascribes to materialists-"natural believers" a lot of inadequate statements: "... no consistent naturalist can recognize free will". One thought becomes the cause of another because we see the foundation in it, he writes, denying that the connection between thoughts, the logic of the connection of thoughts is conditioned by the logic of the external world.

Lewis defines the writer (Dickens) as the creator of what is not in nature, his characters are only in the mind of the creator. For Lewis, there is no connection between Dickens's characters and nature. Lewis assigns the connection, logic, orderliness between human feelings, between natural phenomena to God and even considers quantum mechanics to be something extranatural [ibid., P. 155].

At the same time, not only Lewis, all idealistic philosophy rightly saw in the "dialectical" mechanism the weakness of the position of the materialists. She opposed the necessity of a changeable world, but completely subordinate to the laws of nature, not freedom of will, but freedom of choice. This is a tendency in modern religions, and an opportunistic one. In fact, the choice itself remains predetermined, ignoring the given choice is not encouraged. Of course, you can think of any activity as a choice. But in this case, emergence disappears, "inner anxiety" disappears, the non-existence of matter, discovered by Leucippus and Democritus, the world becomes mechanistic again.

Lewis even allowed man to have freedom of choice regardless of God's will.

Otherwise, it would be necessary, following Spinoza, again to mechanically lay inside matter itself, some activity, such as charge, spin, or, as for almost all particles, rest mass. It is even possible to lay down a "hidden" parameter, not in the spirit of finalism, but as a kind of potential possibility, on which idealistic thinking cannot decide.

Lewis cannot answer the question of where freedom in a person comes from. How this freedom unites with the material in man and outside of him. Look: as soon as we asked this question, we have already received the answer: if this "from where" exists, we immediately fall into the zone of determinism, the conditionality of freedom by some law of nature.

The ideologeme of choice does not get rid of the mechanism, since it is fictitious. In individual action, thinking does not construct several alternative, competing plans. On the other hand, the choice between two or more slave owners is not freedom.

Goethe and Toland

Opposing theological fatalism, Kant, like Spinoza, substantiated natural fatalism. Thanks to Spinoza, Galileo, Hooke, Newton, Laplace, Huygens, the dialectical Leibniz and many other geniuses, Cartesianism and mechanism spread throughout the world, to physics, chemistry, biology, society, and individuality.

Johann Goethe is considered in a sense to be the antipode of Kant - in the sense that, in opposition to the "mathematical" type of cognition, he proclaims intuitive cognition.

Nevertheless, Goethe was the same mechanist as Kant. His "intuitionism" is ahistorical. Here is Goethe's formula: "Nature! We are surrounded and embraced by it and can neither get out of it, nor penetrate deeper into it. …Its laws are obeyed even when they are opposed; even then they act in accordance with it when they want to act against it…» [10]

That is - quixoticism is also natural. Thus, we are all programmed, if not by God, then by nature.

Marxism is against crude objectivism, but Marx's objection is not formulated. It concerns only the laws of the social form of movement, to which we will return. Or is there no free will, but it is simply impossible in principle to predict his behavior? For example, in stochastics, at the very beginning of the movement, we immediately find ourselves either in the zone of predictive "determinism" or in the zone of "indeterminism".

But we obviously cannot change the laws of physics, chemistry, biology, we are completely subordinate to them. Even our resistance will be generated by the same laws. But here we find a phenomenon that completely contradicts this subordination: chemistry is not reduced to physics, biology to chemistry and physics, social dynamics to natural sciences.

The question is - what then is the pattern? Is the question correctly asked, is it not itself a reflection of our incorrect, crude understanding of nature, such as, for example, the question into which of the holes in the first screen a particular electron flew in before the interference pattern formed on the second screen? Do we have enough categorical apparatus?

Spinoza did not bother to make even motion an attribute of matter. This was done after him by Toland: "I affirm that motion is an essential property of matter, in other words, it is as inseparable from nature as impenetrability and extension are inseparable from it ... I deny that matter is or has ever been an inactive, dead lump ... " [11].

In Ireland XVII-XVIII, it was not known that, say, an electron has no extension (this would contradict the special theory of relativity, an electron has a spin, it rotates, on the surface of an electron the speed would be greater than the speed of light), that the volume of atoms is basically, vacuum, all the more they did not know that vacuum is not emptiness at all. Note, however, that Toland has no first impulse, no deism, no God. No party, no order of the Swordsmen pushes matter from the outside. Bernstein, Lenin for a short time (in the only work "What to do"), the generalists of the Stalinist school, and even B. Porshnev in "Social Psychology", returned to the mechanism of Spinoza, they presented the working class as a motionless, unchanging lump, dark, inert matter for centuries. in need of a guide, a shepherd who brings political consciousness to her. Porshnev also absolutizes the role of the leader. As Ortega y Gasset put it in his book The Rise of the Masses, not everyone can rule, but only a special caste of people who "hear the underground rumble of history".

And we see how a person resists this mechanism - absenteeism is growing all over the world, not as a lack of citizenship, but as an objection to useless, discredited parties, as a natural desire of a person to learn about the world, to be different from an animal, to think and act independently, and not by party resolutions.

It would seem that Goethe is an idealist, an "intuitive" mechanist. " But it is Goethe, unlike Schelling, who brings into play the critical category - development. According to Engels, it is an ascent from simple to complex. Stalin adds: from the lowest to the highest. As opposed to transformism, as opposed to the version of the Ecclesiastes cycle implemented today in superstring M-theory.

Hegel, on the other hand, has something with which to correct Hegel.

For example, billiards with friction is a system where not only Newton's laws, but stochastics apply. The point is that small deviations from the initial conditions, even in classical systems, can lead to large deviations from the final design point. These deviations of the initial conditions can produce random perturbations, fluctuations. I.e. you cannot write an equation of motion that will unambiguously indicate the destination.

But we don't need to know if the deviation has occurred or not. After all, we are talking about determinism, causality, we can imagine a similar calculation of fluctuations. And so on to the quantum level, where the coordinate and momentum cannot be determined exactly at the same time. Nature is such that, trying to define it, we misunderstand nature, we ask the wrong questions.

In an experiment with interference, we fire electrons at a screen with two holes. There is another screen behind this screen, and an alternation of maxima and minima of the electron density appears on it. If we install a device that detects which hole the electron flew into, the interference pattern disappears. One maximum arises, the usual probability distribution of the electron density. Soviet philosophers at one time had a sharp rejection of such determinism, the "materialists" argued that with the development of science, mankind will know into which hole the electron flew. The impossibility of "knowing" and such an understanding of causality is incorrect because we proceeded from an unshakable, unchanging substance, and in Hegel's dialectic, due to immanent "inner anxiety," it changes from itself, not only under the influence of the external.

Social form

As we found out above, Hegel was mistaken in taking out the source of chance outside of substance. That is, I considered only one manifestation of randomness. Secondly, his understanding of freedom is contemplative, he ignores material historical practice. Historical materialism addresses it.

"Since Marx," Heidegger writes, "by comprehending alienation, penetrates into the essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history surpasses other historical theories. Since, on the contrary, neither Husserl nor, as far as I can see, Sartre recognize the importance of the historical aspect in being, to the extent that neither phenomenology nor existentialism reach the dimension within which a productive dialogue with Marxism becomes possible for the first time "[12]. That is why Lenin asserts: practice is higher than theory.

Is this assertion a return to Kantian regulation, to the use of regularity either for good, or for evil, or not? Does not the will, the individual "I" disappear at the same time?

The difference between the laws of the social form of motion of matter and the laws of physical, chemical and biological forms is obvious. The point is that parameters such as, for example, value are involved in the "mechanics" of society. But, unlike mass or charge, value, as Marx noted, is not an immanent, intrinsic property of a commodity. It is contained only in the heads of people. Accordingly, all social laws, as Engels wrote, are realized only through people, through their will.

Nevertheless, Marx, like Hegel and Kant, in their assessment of the laws in history proceeded from the Cartesian, Newtonian picture of the world, since there was no other. And only in the last quarter of the 20th century physicists apologized to the world community for misleading the world community with their mechanistic picture of the world.

In 1986, Sir James Lighthill apologized on behalf of his colleagues for the fact that "for three centuries the educated public was deceived by the apology of determinism based on Newton's system" [13].

Quantum mechanics, synergetics (stochastics, theory of singularities, theory of catastrophes) dictate quite rigidly the need to take a step forward from the materialistic understanding of determinism in history. It is about the opposite: to make the latest discoveries in the natural sciences the property of historical materialism. Such an agenda was formulated in 1995 (see, eg. [14]) several years before Wallerstein.

Moreover: it is necessary to understand what follows from the "non-materiality" of social law. So far, it is clear, at least, that the variability of the material social law is qualitatively higher than in quantum mechanics or stochastics - for the indicated reason of its existence only in the minds of people. After all, material conditions by themselves (tools, objects of labor, etc.) outside of society do not produce any laws. Under the perverted form of the tendency in physics to the primacy of geometry (see, for example, Wheeler's Geometrodynamics), one should see the need for a greater understanding of the ideal, the subjective.

How does social law work? For example, the operation of the law of supply and demand, as noted by Ricardo, is limited by a monopoly. Including monopoly (as in the USSR) limits the game of the law of value, for example, in relation to such a commodity as labor. The limitation is also imposed by the institution of life employment legally introduced by the state - in Japan, until 1991. Even this or that activity of the trade unions, as Marx emphasized in Capital, modifies the law of value.

Hobbes wrote that a person's "choice" is just a random combination of certain feelings that do not depend on the person. Following Hobbes, Marx states in the theses about Feuerbach: personality is the totality of social relations.

Schelling, constructing God from the categories of being, essence and existence, defined the essence of God as identity with being, the ability to contain the basis. And the existence of God is in distinction from the basis (see [15]). It is easy to see that in Schelling's definition Marx put man instead of God, and social being instead of abstract being.

It remains only, as if, in social life to distinguish between class-in-itself and class-for-itself, so that the "destruction of the working class" would lead not to disintegration, but to synthesis - "human society."

"The material of labor" (Engels) is not only "everything that exists", but man himself. This forms in him a non-biological need for labor (satisfaction of biological needs is a condition), if labor is creative, and the need to avoid labor (Marx), if labor is depersonalizing.

The contradiction lies in the division of labor, the driving force is the need to move away from depersonalization (for example, the strike in the United States against the conveyor system in the late 60s) and the need for creativity, which is limited by existing social relations. Both of them to this day are not manifested at the level of the universal.

However, it is clear that the definitions of Hobbes-Schelling-Marx are at the same time the essence of the definition of the social form of motion of matter, higher in relation to the lower, and any. For an individual, on the contrary, the definition should be inverted: the s i d e (not two or poly-essences!) Of essence - in *distinction* with activity, with social relations, and existence - in identity with social being.

Just a side - because the phenomenon of human uniqueness is still not revealed. And it cannot be revealed.

The point is not only that human creativity within the framework of dominant idealism is ontologically understood as a manifestation of the supernatural. In this case, life exists forever, it is she, as the highest form, in the spirit of Augustine that determines time (duration, according to Bergson), and the relation "subject - object" is understood in a finalist way, identical with the present historical moment.

Disclosure of uniqueness through "awareness of oneself", through self-awareness slightly adds to the distinction of human uniqueness (especially since self-isolation, the ability to self-organize exists not only in social, but also in biological, chemical and even hydrodynamic systems, which is described within synergetics by nonlinear equations of the Hadronov type).

The impossibility of disclosure is associated at least with the absence of phenomenological material in biology, where the difference between living matter and inanimate matter has not yet been comprehended, that is, the *previous* step has not been completed.

It is only clear that the uniqueness of the "I", which can influence social laws, but is unable to change the laws of its basis (they, if they change, then independently), is essential and cannot be understood within the framework of social, biochemical or physical determinism.

The second aspect is not freedom from the laws of nature - the impossibility for a person to change the laws of nature. Which, as indicated in the introduction, is being questioned. On the other hand, the inconsistency of the concepts of reality is emphasized. But this discrepancy is a law that by no means puts a ban on the scientific approach. "The approach of the mind ... to a separate thing, making a cast (= concept) from it is not a simple, immediate, mirror-dead act, but a complex, bifurcated, zigzag-like one, which includes the possibility of fantasy flying away from life; moreover: the possibility of transformation (and, moreover, an imperceptible, unrecognizable transformation by a person) of an abstract concept, an idea into a fantasy ... For even in the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general idea ... there is a certain piece of fantasy.)"[16].

"The most decisive refutation," writes Engels, "of these, like all others, philosophical quirks lies in practice, in experiment and in industry" [17].

"The question of whether human thinking possesses objective truth," emphasizes Marx, "is not at all a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice, a person must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute about the validity or invalidity of thinking, isolated from practice, is a purely scholastic question" ("Theses on Feuerbach").

At the same time, the question of the conformity of concepts to reality is by no means idle. Each concept is internal contradictory, it cannot be considered statically, the manifestation of the contradiction of the concept in scientific practice is a sure sign that the content of the concept will be replaced by a qualitatively new one.

If a person is a set of social relations, this means that a society consisting of machine people is doomed to follow its unchanging laws. In this case, a person acts as an abstract point of intersection of social lines, the word "concrete" does not distinguish a person with social relations.

The source of fatal predetermination is the dominant abstract content in labor, which also limits concrete labor.

Identity of thinking and being

It means that thinking reflects the external world, corresponds to it, that is, the world is knowable. Objective idealists also agree with this.

Let's note the obvious points. Of course, 1) thinking is ideal, therefore it is opposite to being; 2) thinking is not only abstract, but also intuitive.

At the same time, thinking is not identical with being in the literal sense. Landau and Peierls proved theoretically that two-dimensional crystals cannot exist because they are unstable. However, the experimenters then created graphene.

But cases of non-identity are natural. Consequently, the non-identity of thinking with being also has a general character.

For example, Ilyenkov, understanding law and determinism fatalistically (like Labriola, Plekhanov, D. Lukach, Stalin or Trotsky, but not Marx or Lenin), did not see the general content in the "insignificant" deviations, in their specifics.

But that's not all.

Thinking is not simultaneously identical with being, not in the Kantian sense of the thing-in-itself, not in the sense of imprecision (subjectivity) and not in the sense of ideality. In any process of abstraction, a new content arises, which both includes reality and does not include it, instead it includes something that does not seem to belong to reality. The classical equations of motion make it possible to predict reality, but they contain the reversibility of time and "travel to the future" that do not exist in nature. Namely: in those processes of which they are abstracts. Delayed and advanced solutions in these processes have a completely clear physical meaning, but they are a reflection of the deep general symmetry of physical laws. The contradictions that arise in connection with theoretical time travel are the sources of further development of the theory.

Secondly, thinking also reveals what has not yet been realized in the world, what it cannot display - not only actual, but also hidden in potency. Of course, thinking does this on the basis of the previous identity with being. "This supplying disclosure of everything can be carried out only to the extent that a person, for his part, is already involved in the extraction of natural energies in advance. If a person is involved in this, put on it, then does not a person - even more primordial than nature - belong to the being-in-existence? " - asks Heidegger [18].

But in this autopsy, there is something that was not contained in the basis. At least on the simple basis that subjective reality develops not only thanks to objective reality, but also, to a certain extent, independently.

Consequently, free will exists and is realized in thinking. And in activity?

Conclusion

Of course, free will is not something that is excreted, like the liver is bile, at the same time it is not something extra-natural. It is, like thinking itself, only the presence of a new systemic quality, limited by the lower forms of movement.

At the same time, embedding in the freedom of will in the Procrustean bed of regularity, including the quantum-stochastic one, is an incorrect task. For not just mechanism is limited, but on the whole "causality (causality, B.I.), which we usually understand, is only a small part of the universal connection. [19].

Abstract analysis is certainly important, but it is not the main task.

In science, Marx argues, there is nothing but its practical application. The task is not to explain, but to change the world. The practical conclusion, although trivial, has not yet been comprehended, for example, by representatives of political parties: freedom of will can be realized only when the abstract content of labor ceases to dominate in social relations.

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WHAT IS HISTORY? FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF A PHYSICIST

The revolution

Materials on conflict management (for example, E. V. Burtovaya "Conflictology") and political technologies speak of the obvious determinism of society, although discussions about determinism in history or its absence have been going on for centuries. New discoveries in physics give new impetus to these discussions.

Prigogine states (say once more): "In 1986, Sir James Lighthill, who later became President of the International Union of Pure and Applied Mathematics, made an amazing statement: he apologized on behalf of his colleagues for the fact that" for three centuries the educated public was deceived by the apology of determinism based on the Newton's system, whereas it can be considered proven, at least since 1960, that this determinism is an erroneous position." [1].

Already in physics, a researcher is faced with the fact that the former Laplacian determinism does not work even in previously seemingly classical systems, like an ordinary pendulum or billiards. It turned out that there are ranges of parameter values when it is impossible to predict the behavior of the system. Obviously, all sciences, from chemistry to historical materialism, were forced to use the concept of determinism that developed precisely in physics. And this idea turned out to be critically inadequate. Although Marx sharply criticized the metaphysical (mechanistic, transformist) approach in science as crudely objectivist, the general understanding of determinism remained within the framework of the Newtonian approach.

"If we move the weight of the pendulum," Prigogine continues, "not far from its lowest position, then in the end it will return to its starting point — this is a point attractor. The chemical clock is a periodic attractor. Later, much more complex attractors (strange attractors) corresponding to a set of points were discovered. In a strange attractor, the system moves from one point to another in a deterministic manner, but the trajectory of movement eventually becomes so confused that it is impossible to predict the movement of the system as a whole - it is a mixture of stability and instability ... our environment, climate, ecology and ... our nervous system can be understood only in the light of the concepts described, taking into account both stability and instability. ... Recognition of instability is not surrender, on the contrary, it is an invitation to new experimental and theoretical research, taking into account the specific nature of this world. We just have to say goodbye to the idea that this world is our uncomplaining servant ... We must admit that we cannot completely control the world of unstable phenomena around us, just as we cannot completely control social processes (although the extrapolation of classical physics to society for a long time made us believe this)"[2].

Admitting "instability" is not a surrender of determinism. Because in the same way it is impossible to find out through which of the two holes in the screen the electron flew, if the aim of the experiment is an interference pattern. The electron is arranged differently, not as a particle, and the world is arranged differently, not in the same way as within the framework of the physicalist approach. "Causality," writes Lenin in his Philosophical Notebooks, "which we usually understand," is only a part of the universal connection."

For the overwhelming majority of physicists, qualitative transitions exist only as phase transitions, i.e. fit into the framework of the old Newtonian determinism, although already in quantum mechanics this type of determinism does not work. For most physicists, the chemical form of the motion of matter is reduced to a set of physical laws, living matter is not much different from inanimate matter, a person is not much different from an animal - simply by the degree of complexity. New discoveries in physics, breaking old ideas about determinism, have shaken the tradition of thinking of the physical community, it still considers qualitative transitions to be a kind of humanitarian and philological exercise. In the best case, they recognize the fact of the existence of qualitatively different objects, but, like Hawking, Feynman, Braginsky and others, explain this fact by divine intervention. Accordingly, physicists believe, someday the moment will come, and the Theorist will derive the quantum-fractal-stochastic equation of motion of human society.

But if in physics there are ranges of values of the parameters of a system where the prediction of its behavior is in principle impossible, one must try to understand what is the impossibility of using the known types of determinism in the description of social processes. Let's do this on the example of an unstable, unstable situation in society - a revolution. The classical formula "the upper classes cannot govern in the old way, the lower classes do not want to live in the old way" proceeds from the following provisions: 1) the presence of a crisis - for one reason or another (war, senile insanity of the leadership, external aggression, systemic reasons); 2) the impoverishment (or oppression in any form) of the masses above the usual, 3) the exceptional activity of the masses, 4) hegemony in this activity of the proletariat. The third point is special, it depends on a gigantic number of factors, including the level of education of the masses. Ernest Mandel devoted a whole book to these factors (alas, with a lot of significant gaps and errors) [3]. An important point in the theory of revolution is tactics. In 1917, it consisted in the recognition of the revolutionary character of the peasantry and the need for a political alliance between the working class and the peasantry. The most critical moment in the concept is the concept of the avant-garde and the presence of a "subjective condition" - with numerous reservations - of the ruling party.

Alas, since Lenin formulated this theory, practically nothing has been added to it. On the contrary, technical issues, the so-called "technologies", primarily related to the manipulation of mass consciousness, began to be passed off as a theory, starting with "Mein Kampf" and "Prison Notebooks" and ending with modern publications about "colored" pseudo-revolutions. SG Kara-Murza believes that Gramsci created a new theory of revolution, "urban", as opposed to Lenin's, "rural", while claiming that "Gramsci denied such mechanistic analogies that are attracted by historical materialism" [4]. In fact, Gramsci, in his Prison Notebooks, did not change anything in Lenin's concept of revolution. He only included a layer of the technical intelligentsia in the proletariat, and he placed this enlightened layer as the hegemon over the working class. Gramsci was not alone, but in this he did not invent anything new either.

Kara-Murza states: "The theory of the Gramsci revolution is being developed by many authors, even textbooks are written on its basis. These include, for example, J. Sharpe's book From Dictatorship to Democracy. Conceptual Foundations of Liberation ". It was published in 1993 and is a textbook for the activists of the "orange revolutions". The doctrine of controlling the consciousness of the masses and the ideology of exporting democracy underlying this text have clearly manifested themselves in the Georgian and Ukrainian events that have already taken place ... In the logic of Gramsci's teachings, the hegemony of socialist forces in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe was undermined in the 70-80s ... Mass "molecular" aggression into consciousness was carried on continuously and undermined the cultural core. "It is impossible to carry out and even prepare a revolution by learning phrases at demonstrations, phrases like" we love you "or methods of group resistance to the police - if there is no soil in the country, that is, there are no objective conditions. But the collapse of the system in the USSR is not a revolution. demonstrations and rallies, nor the procession of miners to the capital, could not have had much influence if the government, represented by the CPSU elite, as the most organized force, would not itself be interested in a coup - to legalize itself as a government by converting capital in the form of an administrative function into capital in the form of money.

As for the "orange" revolutions, the so-called "molecular aggression" is just an external expansion using the "fifth column", known since the time of the conquests of Tutankhamun or old Scotland. The powers-that-be always have more means for "molecular blurring" than the opposition. Therefore, no amount of "molecular aggression" from below can prepare a revolution. But it is possible to establish a farce if the "molecular aggression" is well paid from the outside. So, in 2004, in Ukraine, the US State Department paid Yushchenko's

supporters $ 300 each, and Yanukovych paid the miners $ 40 each. Obviously, such an expansion cannot be called a revolution either, and its technologies can be used as a predictive method, which is a mechanistic approach, against which Prigozhin objects - together with Marx, Engels, Lenin.

What other approaches, besides Sharpe's textbooks, are there to the formation of a predictive apparatus in history? Maybe some kind of theory of uprisings, because revolution is one of the variants of uprising? Alas, there is no such theory. Although the name is there. For example, Bergflet's theory of uprisings. According to Bergflet, "there is no essential contradiction between the Marxist and the purely liberal understanding of production. Marx only considers the question of distribution differently than the capitalist economists, and the problem of production itself is not touched upon by either side. In this regard, Bergflet writes: "Marxist criticism of political economy remains a captive of capitalism, since it (like capitalism itself) is based on the assertion of the unlimited development of productive forces, both technical and scientific, as well as on the radical exploitation of natural resources, which logically follows from development of productive forces. It is precisely because of this fact that all systems that actually existed until recently, based on the teachings of Marx, did not represent any genuine alternative to capitalism. Their "socialism" was actually just a kind of "state capitalism"[5].

Bergflet correctly defines the social system in the USSR, but traditionally confuses Marxism and "A Short Course in the History of the AUCPb". It was from the point of view of Marx and Engels that the system in the USSR was state capitalism (see, for example, "Antiduring"). It was Marx who repeated Adam Smith when he spoke of the monotonous, stupefying, depersonalizing labor of the worker.

How does Bergflet himself understand production? "In isolating the fundamental principles of anti-economics, Bergflet refers to the concepts of Georges Bataille, his intellectual teacher. Bataille in his fundamental work "The Damned Part" formulated a completely new approach to the study of the problem of material production in human society and its initial motivations. Bergflet summarizes Bataille's ideas in the following words: "The fundamental discovery of Bataille is that all traditional societies exist by squandering surplus in ritual or festive procedures." That is, Bergflet and his teacher Bataille have a feudal-slave-owning understanding of production, and it makes no sense to take Bergflet's "teaching" seriously about insurrection as classless.

According to Bergflet's plan, "the uprising should be aimed against the most powerful force, radically hostile to the element of life. In the face of the enormous lethal potential of our era, the Rebellion should not be distracted by pseudo-problems such as the Marxist class struggle or the trade union struggle for cash. " Bergflet protests against technocracy, which destroys the surrounding nature, but does not notice what Marx saw: technocracy destroys human nature. For Bergflet's man is an abstraction, while the conveyor belt destroys the nature of a very specific class - the worker.

We find the "general theory of uprising" in the book of the conspiracy theorist Alexander Dugin. There is no theory in it, there is a remark that the origins of aggression are in the desire to expand one's capabilities at the expense of someone. In pursuit of the divine.

Dugin does not understand that for a socialist revolution as an act of aggression, the expansion of opportunities due to the bourgeoisie (redistribution) is of an auxiliary nature, its goal is to "shed the snake skin", the transformation of the working class from a class-for-itself into a class-for-other, disappearance of not only the bourgeoisie, but also the working class.

It is obvious that Dugin considers development only in an extensive plan, for him, as well as for physicists, there is no qualitative leap forward. In forecasting, Dugin's "theory", executed in a Nietzschean-existentialist spirit, cannot be used, for example, such a fundamental statement that "a hammer blow cannot kill, just as it cannot revive the clean morning air full of ozone." The statement precedes the statement that "These fields and trees do not really exist. They left long ago with the dogs torn to shreds. The dogs took them with them, into the funnel of eternity, turning the landscape inside out."

Bergflet and Dugin have something in common. They, like Gramsci, think in a liberal spirit, because for Dugin the most important thing is special people, the vanguard of the hegemon, a kind of "order of the sword" that Stalin dreamed of: "agents of the Inner Continent".

Classes and strata

The Marxist theory was created in the second half of the XIX century. However, already at the beginning of the XX century, it became clear that the social structure of society was evolving somewhat differently than

Marx had predicted. Instead of being simplified to two polar elements (bourgeois - proletarians), it became more complex and multi-layered. Political life has also become more complicated. The class model of its subjects began to look too general and simplified, although Marx also pointed out that within classes there are many independent groups (professional, regional) with their own interests that differ from those of the general class. In addition, class analysis explains the change in socio-economic formations, which does not happen every century, and Marx himself wrote that feudalism replaced slavery by no means through class struggle. It is difficult to interpret with the help of class analysis the less global dynamics of political conflicts, the rapid change of political situations within the framework of local historical periods.

Marx discovers tendencies - but these tendencies are not obligatory, rigid.

Therefore, at the beginning of the XX century, American sociologist and political scientist Arthur Bentley proposed the concept of "interest group", which is still used in political and conflict analysis. This concept denotes the unification of people on the basis of a community of interests and actions in a specific political situation. They take on the functions of representing the interests of their members in interaction with political power and, accordingly, are involved in political conflicts. Among such interest groups, as a rule, business associations, trade unions, youth and veteran organizations, unions and societies of farmers, scientists, culture, religion, environmental, feminist and other movements and organizations. According to A. Bentley, the interaction of such groups and the state is the core of the political process. Moreover, even the state institutions themselves can be regarded as an official group of interests. Therefore, they should be considered the real subjects of political activity and conflicts in this area.

Ultimately, politics is a way of reconciling the interests of various social groups in conflict. In their dynamics today, two oppositely directed tendencies are noted. The first, more traditional, is expressed in the consolidation, aggregation of political interests by two or three leading political forces. Soberly assessing their real opportunities to break through to power, relatively small interest groups consider it good to support one of the powerful political groupings that have real power. In this case, a small political conflict is, as it were, absorbed, dissolves into a larger one, which in principle contributes to the stability and stability of the political system as a whole.

Another trend in the modern dynamics of political interests has the exact opposite meaning: it consists in the diversification of political interests, that is, in the growth of their diversity and the increase in points of intersection. This is explained both by the "loosening" of the former rigid social-class structure, and by the growth of "heterogeneity of the spheres of life" (R. Dahrendorf's term). The latter means that more and more people find themselves in situations where certain common interests in one of the spheres of life (for example, interest in preserving the environment) can coexist quite peacefully with the difference of interests in other spheres (for example, labor). People no longer consider themselves rigidly belonging to any specific socio-political group, but change their "orientation" depending on which of the many problems seems to them to be the most important today. All this, of course, complicates the overall picture of political conflicts and makes it multidimensional.

Thus, modern interest groups are quite justifiably recognized as real subjects of political conflicts. But formal political institutions (president, government, parliament) have no less reason to claim this role. Indeed, in addition to group interests, there are also national interests - ensuring sovereignty, security, law and order, the implementation of large-scale economic projects, etc. They cannot be decomposed into group components or, at least, are not completely reducible to them. In addition, government agencies, despite all their social and group engagement, still have to perform arbitration or mediation functions in resolving conflicts between competing groups. Indeed, even within the dominant groups, contradictions may arise (for our exporters, for example, a cheap ruble is beneficial, and for importers, on the contrary, an expensive one; both of them will not fail to lobby their interests in state structures). Moreover, contradictions and conflicts can arise within the state structures themselves (a clash of the executive and legislative branches of government, for example). So, political institutions should also be recognized as full subjects of political conflicts.

It is argued that in the middle of the XX century, the dominant stratification order was based not on classes and private property in the sphere of production, but on the state and various organizational systems (corporate, professional, municipal, etc.). Accordingly, the nature of intergroup conflicts has changed: they have become smaller, but more diverse. The subjects of conflicts are more and more groups not only "social", that is, created on the basis of belonging to a social and professional category, but also target or initiative groups, that is,

uniting people in accordance with a specific task that they solve (environmental, consumer, human rights). The unevenness of the social development of the modern world adds to the diversity of the fabric of intergroup conflicts: in some countries, conflicts of the traditional type, determined by class and even tribal structures, prevail; in others, more "advanced", new social movements set the tone.

In fact, all "target" conflicts "are imposed and are designed to channel class conflicts into a channel that is safe for the authorities. The theory of strata reduces the number of attributes of a social group, moreover, it throws out the most essential - the attitude towards the means of production.

Different determinism. Lack of revolution

The standard comparative method in the scientific community was not used in the most interesting place: a comparison of the revolutions of the late XIX and early XX centuries. The pioneer was the engineer of the Yaroslavl Engine-Building Plant N. N. Kovalev, who in 1986 led the first major legal strike in the history of the USSR against black Saturdays and Sundays, which did not end with repression. His brochure, published by samizdat in 1989, did not find a reader.

Let us compare the development of the understanding of determinism in the natural sciences with the understanding of determinism in history.

Today, the opposite question is relevant: not why revolutions occur (we do not consider theories of the origin of social conflicts due to magnetic storms or original sin), but why they do not occur. In [6], well-known historical examples of the passivity of the masses with a sharp increase in oppression in various countries are given: "The British deliberately ruined the Indian textile industry of a competitor of British textile workers. As a result, in 1769-70, famine broke out in the main center of Indian cotton production in Bengal, which took away a third of the population - 7 million people, and according to other estimates, all 10 ... In the 80s - 90s, the tragedy in Bengal repeated itself and died out of hunger already half of the population - 10 million people Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, as the power of the British spread throughout India, mass famine has become common place in the country. According to British official data in British India, 1800- 25 1 million people died of hunger, in 1825-50 - 400 thousand, in 1850-75 - 5 million people, in 1875-1900 - 26 million people ... not counting small local episodes or the "holy Islamic war" of the Indian Wahhabis (started in 1823), ... the first serious act of resistance from ... the Indian population was the uprising of the Faraisites in Bengal in 1823, 60 years after the start of the mass famine. ... the Indians dying of hunger were not at all Buddhists, who fundamentally denied violence, but followers of Hinduism and Islam - militant (in comparison with Christianity) beliefs. ... However, since 1838, uprisings in India began to flare up regularly, in 1857 the famous uprising of the sepoys began, which turned into a national one"(p. 33).

Another example: "The first massive artificial famine was organized in Ireland by the British in the XVI century. It was the result of the tactics of ousting the indigenous population from the lands belonging to them, which was carried out in the form of military operations: the British destroyed crops, stole livestock, robbed property, burned buildings, physically exterminated those who did not know (or could not) escape to the forests and mountains. ... The extermination of the Irish by starvation lasted two decades before the first major rebellion broke out ... of the northern clans led by Shan O'Neill (1559-67). True, since that time, the uprisings in Ireland followed one after another, and in the XVII century a nationwide Irish uprising (1641-52) even broke out, which essentially turned into a national liberation war, which almost ended in victory (by August 1649, when in Cromwell's troops landed in Ireland, the British held in their hands only Dublin and Londonderry). In the XIX century, history repeated itself. After the suppression of the Irish uprising in 1798 .... the British authorities imposed ... high duties on the export of Irish woolen goods to England and abroad and thus destroyed the most dynamically developing branch of Irish industry. ... Workers from ruined factories turned into super-cheap labor ... In 1845, the disease of the potato (the staple food ... of the Irish population) caused famine in the country ... in 1846 the "grain laws" were abolished in England, which caused a sharp drop in the price of bread and prompted ... landlords in Ireland to drive out peasants from the land and reorientation of the country's agriculture from agriculture to pasture animal husbandry. The famine took on the character of a national tragedy. Over the course of several years, over 1 million people died of starvation in Ireland ... An attempt at an uprising led by the "Irish Confederation" in July 1848 failed. Scattered disturbances in the spring and summer of 1848 in Ireland were easily suppressed. The predominant reaction of the Irish was not resistance, but flight ... "(p. 37).

Here, in parentheses, one can note the fatalistic, dialectical attitudes of various political leftists: "The bourgeois revolution in England was objectively progressive ..." Or: "Thanks to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mankind avoided a global nuclear war ..." Or: "US expansion in Yugoslavia, Libya, Iraq, etc. - a manifestation of objective globalization, "and so on. So, if the starving Irish destroyed Cromwell, they would have acted from the position of backward production? Regression is an inalienable and in particulars (which may later turn out to be decisive) moment of progress, progress is not complete without blood. But the cutlets must be separated from the flies, progress is not identical with regression, the bombing of Hiroshima or Belgrade is a crime.

(An interesting remark from Engels: "I understand that capitalism develops the productive forces, displacing the non-competitive (i.e., not only by force, but also by the price or quality of the goods, B. I.), ... but I don't want to participate in this".)

The flip side of crude objectivism is the idea of society as a mechanical system. Namely: in order to change anything in society, it is assumed that an organized force is needed. Further, the wrong conclusion is drawn from the correct premise: this organization must be a party. Self-organization is replaced by the party, the activity of the lower classes, including in the economy - by voting for the organization. It is understood that this organization has the ability, by pressing some levers, to manage society. Let us even assume that the party is trying to go not ten steps forward, but one step away from the practice of the labor movement. But one way or another - only the party generalizes, but this is not given to the workers. In this case, there is no question of any consciousness. Obviously, the class-party relationship cannot be maintained the same as it was in 1917.

Third example: "According to various estimates, in the process of the conquest of America ... from 90 to 120 million people were exterminated ... with the conquest of America and the establishment, for example, in the Spanish possessions of a stable colonial regime, the genocide of the Indians did not stop. It just took on a different form of classical exploitation ... In Peru ... 100% of the workforce was killed in mercury mines, 80 out of every 100 workers in silver ... It is believed that over 8 million Indians died in the mines of Peru during the colonial period. ... At the beginning of the conquest of Peru, up to 10 million Indians lived on the territory of the viceroyalty, and according to the census of the 90s of XVIII century, there were no more than 600 thousand in them ... Of course ... it was a process stretched out in time and territorially, and the behavior of the Indians is by no means fatal humility. But it is still obvious that the scale of the resistance of the Indians as a whole did not correspond to the scale of the genocide against them"(p. 39).

Eduardo Galeano wrote about this back in 1971 - in the book "Opened Veins of Latin America". An estimate using the Verhulst equation turns out to be 15 million destroyed using the official data on the initial number of Indians and 103 million using data on the real number.

"The European Middle Ages," the author further writes, "in general was a period of not sporadic, but constant famine. ... But if you read the Russian chronicles, then the same thing there ... According to A. Ya. Shevelenko's calculations, in Europe in the Middle Ages "hunger strikes happened on average every 6 years and often led to catastrophic consequences." In Russia, where the climate is harsher ... happened every 3 years until the XX century. ... In Italy, the XIV century was a century of crop failures, associated with hunger and an extraordinary increase in social oppression, ... burdened by the plague. From 1300 to 1450, the population of Italy decreased from 11 million to 8 million. Life expectancy has declined over the course of a century from 40 to 20 years. ... We ... can count serious acts of resistance on one hand ... the uprising led by Dolcino in 1304-7, the Cola di Rienzo uprising in 1347, the clothmakers uprising in Perugia in 1371, the chompi uprising in 1378, the Tukin uprising in 1386-87. … If we turn to the era of slavery, then the picture there is even more bleak."(P. 40).

The helots' obedience to Sparta is similar to the behavior of their Messenian neighbors. However, the Messenians, like the Hindus, rebelled only a century after the seizure in the VIII part of Messenia by Sparta and the compulsion to give 1/2 of the harvest (the 2nd Messenian War). 120 thousand Egyptian fellahs resignedly died during the construction of the Suez Canal, etc.

Revolution is a type of social conflict. A similar "revolutionary situation" is needed for social conflict. It could be argued that a certain level of development of the productive forces is required for the development of a conflict, which the Indians or Indians did not have.

However, the closure of factories in Russia in 1992, mass layoffs, and a double jump in mortality did not cause any resistance from workers.

On the other hand, accelerated and violent collectivization since 1928, famine in the Urals, Transcaucasia and other regions of the USSR in 1932- 1933, together with dispossession of the middle peasants, instantly provoked tens of thousands of peasant uprisings.

It is noted in [6] that the statement "increased oppression leads to an intensification of social struggle" is not even grossly sociological, but simply has nothing to do with science. It is clear that in modern Russia the price press does not connect, but separates people. Let us add that Lenin's formula for revolution does not work either: the upper classes cannot, the lower classes do not want, plus a sharp deterioration in the position of the masses above the usual. The author is looking for the reasons for passivity in the psychology of the philistine, the philistine, in egoism, which, of course, does not add anything to the laws of history. Of course, each and every generation has a choice, because we are dealing with a human society. However, in the examples set forth in [6], something quite different can be traced: ultimately, uprisings do occur, and the period of their "preparation" - to be precise - self-organization depends, rather, not on the accidental birth of a leader or a leading group, but on technical means communication, uniting production base and other objective factors.

The exalted appeal in [6] to weapons and "subjective efforts" ("... the country has no new leaders and new ideas that could inspire people to fight ... new ideologies are not developed in a couple of years") is traditional for Moscow the public. It leaves aside the practice of the masses themselves (social creativity) both in protests and in the development of an ideology that can arise only from this very practice of the masses, but is not invented by any leader or group of theoreticians. Such a "romantic" approach is an insurmountable wall in front of many researchers.

But in [6] there is a serious confusion: in the case of the Indians and Indians, there is no increase in oppression, there is an invasion of the enemy forces, far superior in technology. Cases of famine or plague are a completely different area, but even here there is no personalized increase in oppression, it is pointless to raise an uprising against the virus or crop failure.

Today there is a necessary process of mastering the mass of property relations from scratch (for more details see [7]), it is impossible to skip it, as they tried to do after 1917 by legal abolition of private property. Not to mention the fact that today not only an armed uprising, but also an all-Russian strike is unattainable for the workers, although there were plenty of subjective efforts. At the same time, despite all sorts of explanations, their classification and some practical conclusions, the question remains of which factors should be considered the main ones at a given point in space-time, which are insignificant, how social dynamics occurs under the influence of these factors and what is meant by social dynamics.

For example, the replacement of historical dynamics by class struggle, which at one time turned out to be extremely productive, means not only the exclusion of relatively independent ethnic dynamics from the integral process, but the reduction of the general to the particular. Evolution is declared a vegetation period, a preparatory period, development is made in strict dependence on the so-called historical necessity ("Darwin needed Darwin was born"). A criticism of this reduction will be developed below. On the other hand, deliberate inattention to the struggle of classes is only an attempt to pass off wishful thinking. Ethnicity has now been supplanted by class, for example, it is difficult to call the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, Yugoslavia or Chechnya national conflicts, these conflicts are not caused by national oppression, the leaders of national groups play the role of puppets in the hands of the United States and its satellites.

However, the use of classical Marxist schemes runs up against the rudimentary nature of the historical method. History as a science, in the words of Mark Blok, is too young, its logic is less developed than the logic of natural sciences or literature. Although Marx (and modern researchers) drew a semblance of theory even from illustrations (for example, "The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," which strikingly anticipated the events of 1991 and 1993, as if confirming the method of analogies).

The transfer in the spirit of Freud (i.e. the spread of the ideas of psychiatry to sociology) of the methods of the natural sciences into history also does not determine the historical-mathematical equation, that is, its own, independent logic of history. Although the connection between natural science methodology and social dynamics is obvious, and they interpenetrate (Marx writes that in the future the science of man will include the natural sciences just like the natural sciences, human studies, it will be a single science).

Criticism of the method

It is obvious that the general pattern, which would seem to be visible from a number of examples, can be questioned and requires clarification. The fact is that in [6] the time frame is not limited by anything, therefore, if the degrees of influence on the masses are comparable, then the state of the masses and the conditions in which they were found are significantly different, and in general the events turn out to be incomparable. (In general terms, on the one hand, we have no right to talk about the nature of the protest, having a short period of time at hand, and on the other hand, to transfer macroscopic regularities to a microscale.)

The Hegelian interjection "history repeats itself twice" or Marx's addition "the second time in the form of a farce" is confirmed by events in Russia, the USSR is a vivid example of the cyclical nature of social development with repetitions of the features of feudalism (A.B. Razlatsky, 1975) and the Asian mode of production. However, the idea of cyclicity comes from the scheme of dialectical development from opposition to synthesis, then to the denial of the synthesized, i.e. to the return on a different level of what was removed in the process of synthesis. First, the sides of the future contradiction are distinguished, then their opposite arises, then its aggravation to a contradiction. In this diagram, it is not clear what is the source of the movement from discrimination to opposition and further to contradiction. Also a contradiction? (F.F.Vyakkerev, 1966).

Dialectical determinism assumes that if there is a contradiction in the system (which drives history), then its mechanics - the divergence of sides into opposites and further synthesis - makes it possible to predict. If the system disintegrates in the course of removing the contradiction, then, Hegel writes, there were no forces in the system that kept the opposing sides in unity. Moreover, at what point in time decay or synthesis will occur, it is not known, forecasting in this case is impossible.

B. Porshnev, L. Gumilev, A. Fomenko and G. Nosovsky tried to comprehend the temporal scales of history. (Let us cut off in advance the direction of searches in the spirit of Kozyrev, see, for example, a number of works in [8], trying to reduce physical time to biological processes or to find a special biological time.) If A. Fomenko, despite many mistakes and outrage on linguistics, raised the question of the reliability of chronology (it turns out that astronomical data do not confirm historical data; secondly, if history was rewritten in the twentieth century, then it was previously distorted by the authorities), if Porshnev pointed to the acceleration of history, then Gumilev discovered the structure of history, described by fractals, which describe other forms of motion of matter. (The phenomenology of ethnic dynamics with an assessment of the maximum life span of an ethnos is, of course, important, but the introduced concept of passionarity is akin to the phantoms of caloric or phlogiston). The point is that when the historical scale is reduced, the forecast may change to the exact opposite. For example, a wind direction factor that is not taken into account on a larger scale can change the outcome of the battle (the wind helps the commander to hear the enemy's approach, the troops deploy and repel the attack).

Nechaevism stood aloof both from the social democratic trend and from other social movements. In The Possessed, Dostoevsky clearly distorted the history of the strike at the Neva paper mill (Plekhanov writes about it in a completely different way), but it was nechaevism that manifested itself in the future as a general feature of the Stalinist regime (see M. A. Bakunin's letter to S. G. Nechaev June 2, 1870, where he actually agrees with Nechaev regarding the management of society by a narrow group, [9]). Becquerel accidentally puts photographic plates in his pocket with radioactive samples, resulting in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not without the help of the Einstein-Hilbert theory. Obviously, no class struggle would have led to such a result in science.

The situation can be compared not with the lack of model parameters, say, in the theory of catastrophes (such as a fold, where the "parameter" of the photographic plate slowly changes), but rather with supercritical instability: a weak disturbance breaks away from the roughness of the pipe, a vortex, which is maintained due to the type of vortex by the main current, since it is so arranged, the vortex grows and soon becomes the main current itself. Lydia Ginzburg believed that Stalinism was precisely this type of disaster: "Even a child, playing with matches, can burn a city if the city is wooden."

Is this true? Was it possible to avoid totalitarianism by replacing the superstructure with a democratic one, as representatives of the Trotskyist trends think? For example, blood flows through our veins at a speed exceeding the critical one, but turbulence does not arise precisely because of the absence of roughness. However, what scale should the historical roughness be? Is it possible to take into account all their types when gradually refining the search scale?

On the contrary, a larger shot allows you to detect patterns and make predictions that are not visible when trying to take into account absolutely all factors. That is, with a large number of events, it becomes possible to track something in between, just as in thermodynamics we are doomed to ignorance of the trajectories of all

particles, but due to their large number, we can determine some average characteristics of the system and find a connection between them.

Obviously, the larger plan already implies generalization. The circle has closed: in order to deduce a pattern, we need to determine the time scale, but to do this, we need to know it. For physics, this situation is standard when it comes to choosing not a scale, but a number of factors: at some step it is necessary to interrupt the reasoning, to limit the problem, and the limitation looks less fair than the objection to it. So, Newton, unlike Giordano Bruno, broke the chain of reasoning, presenting space-time as independent of material bodies, but got a working theory. As far as the choice of scale is concerned, reductionist-finalist concepts are preserved in physics in this respect. In particular, it is assumed that the same laws apply in the models of the early Universe as in the modern world. It is allowed to change the world constants, but the types of connections remain unchanged, the Friedman model is projected onto the era of inflation.

There is another form of reductionism, which runs like a red thread both throughout physics and throughout society. If the moon falls from above, we are looking for a button with the inscription "destroyer of moons". In physics, nobody knows what a charge is. This is a button that must be pressed to explain a limited number of phenomena (electrodynamics is not meant, but, for example, hypercharge or color). It is only known that mass is a qualitatively different button in comparison with a charge, since it can be split, there is no unit mass, and, therefore, the equations with mass cannot be made dimensionless, in contrast to electrodynamics, where it is possible to measure the charge in the charges of an electron, and the speed - at the speeds of light. There is no button in thermal phenomena either. A charged electron can interact as a unit with a vacuum. You can enter a test charge or mass. But, just as it is impossible to write down the law of conservation of thermal energy (the first law of thermodynamics) in differential form or to connect it through the Hamiltonian formalism with the homogeneity of time or symmetries of space, so it is impossible to represent the heat charge. Caloric does not exist, no hidden parameters or summation of energies will give a qualitative difference between a thermodynamic system and a mechanical one, for example, irreversibility of processes.

According to the definitions given by R. von Bertalanffy (1973), a system is a complex of interacting components, or: a set of elements that are in certain relationships with each other and with the environment. In the standard definition, a system is a set of elements in relationships and connections with each other, which forms a certain integrity, unity.

The definition of F.I.Peregudov and F.P. Tarasenko also adds little: a system is a set of interrelated elements, isolated from the environment and interacting with it as a whole.

In these definitions, the system remains undefined, because these definitions include, except for some elementary particles, literally everything in the Universe, starting with baryons and ending with stellar superclusters. Consequently, the so-called systems approach, systems analysis based on these definitions are meaningless verbiage.

To a certain extent, this approach is brought to life by the development of electronics, endowing electronic circuits, in particular robots, with human qualities - a kind of religion that brings the best qualities of a person outside of a person and places these qualities in heaven. Electronic systems are important for the observer, but from the point of view of the development of the Universe they are not systems, their structures are not distinguished. As we remember, Aristotle, in the spirit of teleology and rain, attributed the goal to moisten the soil for the harvest.

The main drawback of systems theory is an attempt to combine heterogeneous spheres that are described by different sciences, while the understanding by specialists in the field of systems analysis that there is a system in physics, chemistry, biology, especially in a society divided into classes, is completely absent, not let alone the fact that these sciences themselves are still far from united.

It would seem that synergetics describes physical, chemical, and biological processes, however, like the theory of probability, it describes only one side of the phenomena. Synergetics distinguishes self-organizing processes, the theory of probability operates with many of the same repetitive events. At the same time, in understanding systems, it is necessary to highlight their functional side - but not in the utilitarian-subjective sense, not for the observer. Substance - system № 1, decaying system, water cycle in nature - a process in a conserved system, № 2, coacervate - developing from simple to complex system, type №3.

Let's give a new definition: a system is understood as a set of objects that has a SIGNIFICANT quality that is absent in a single one outside the given system (for example, a structure in the sense of G. Birkhoff) in a manifested form, which determines a specific type of functioning.

It is clear that the quality of statistics is inherent in the singular, but it manifests itself only in the system. However, this quality is different from the mass-charge quality. In the system of electrons (or their qualities, for example, spins), it is not a new "electronic" quality that manifests itself, but only the same statistical nature manifests itself. (In experiments of the early 80s, it was proved that Bell's inequality does not hold, therefore, hidden parameters do not exist, although disputes over inequality and the search for hidden parameters continue to this day, if only because of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox, therefore, not manifested qualities cannot be hidden parameters.)

And yet, in physics, until now, in many cases, it was decided to repeat the experiment, which in history is present in a very controversial version, only as a comparison of different countries in similar conditions or as a repetition of the same schemes of mass suggestion, which, by the way, often leads to opposite results. (As for the Universe as a whole, which is also unrepeatable, unique, the method of research is the extrapolation of the quotient into the whole, corrected by astronomical data.) But repeatability does not mean anything yet. Analysts at Kommersant-Daily are fond of plotting and evaluating the correlation coefficients R within the framework of regression analysis, even when it comes to detecting some connection between the electorates of various politicians using the R coefficient. Is it legal?

Consider the samples: the sizes of audiences and the average sizes of the ears of students in the classrooms. The machine will plot the dependence and, if R is close to one, it can be assumed that there is a connection. However, R can be randomly close to unity, with a sufficiently large number of experiments the machine will show R close to zero. By itself, the Kolmogorov version of the theory of probability assumes the existence of a stable frequency with an infinite number of experiments. But another example: NMR spectra are taken in the laboratory. A shift in the spectra was found. It can be seen that the more flies in the room, the greater the shift. With a large number of experiments, the machine will show that there is a physical connection between the number of flies and the magnitude of the shifts, the correlation coefficient is close to unity. Although there is no correlation, there is a correlation between the number of flies and the temperature in the room and between the increase in temperature and the malfunctioning of the device.

In the sense of the methodology of science, it is interesting to cite as an example the experiments of S. E. Shnol, carried out over thirty years. Initially, a connection was found between colonies of bacteria, separated by an impenetrable partition, one colony was inoculated with the disease, the second showed signs of the same disease. Then the colonies were smashed - one in Pushchino, the other in Kiev. Then the experiment was repeated with chemical systems. Then with radioactive samples. If the Geiger counters were turned on simultaneously, then the deviations from the Gaussian energy distribution of electrons in Pushchino and Kiev coincided. True, not at all seasons. Attempts by Eidus (Institute of Biophysics in Pushchino) to find a connection with the location of stars or any global atmospheric and geological factors ended in failure.

The existence of a Gaussian and other distributions, as Shnoll himself explains, means the existence of a special connection between objects (some researchers believe that this is a non-physical connection, and statistical physics, therefore, is not physics at all). It follows from the above experiments that there is another connection, which is not described by the apparatus of the theory of probability.

It is possible that Shnol, through many experiments, discovered space-time inhomogeneities in various positions of the Earth in the Solar System, since the theory of probability reflects the symmetry of space, but this is a different matter.

Such a connection is not exclusive: for example, causally unrelated electrons in the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment turn out to be dependent on each other. The most general formulation was given by Lenin in the Philosophical Notebooks: "The causal connection, which we usually understand, is only a part of the universal connection." (The reversal of time, the hypothesis of which is considered by some researchers, actually retains the type of the causal structure of the world). The lack of the necessary repeatability arising from the causal structure makes it impossible to formulate the concept of "experiment" not only in biology, but even in pharmacology. Timofeev-Ressovsky said about the same: "Nature cannot be an automaton with a single formula, where a person has nothing to do," about the same Goethe: "In life, it is about life, and not about some of its goals."

Thus, natural sciences indicate that attempts to formalize historical determinism in mathematical form are incorrect.

Laplace's determinism in society

The impossibility of reducing biology and history (Akchurin, seeking in mathematical models suitable for describing biological systems, Bonifatius Kedrov, covering chemistry with quantum mechanics, etc.) or attempts to use the methodology of biology in history led to the revival of sensationalist ideas. A kind of intuitive determinism in the spirit of Bergson reappears, where the phenomenon is understood by ideation (Husserl), or meditation, a process inherent in the teacher (mahatma). An exceptionally strong objection to rational knowledge from the standpoint of materialist dialectics can be found in K. A. Svasyan [15]. Such phenomena as the psyche, the state of a person, partly expressed in art, through which history is manifested, can be comprehended, as Bakhtin believed, only in communication, therefore, in cognition of subjective reality, one cannot in principle do without a teacher.

Alas, predictions based on idealistic ideas, as a rule, do not come true, a vivid example is Spengler's prophecies. The forecasting of the leading economists, Galbraith or Friedrich Hayek, does not justify itself either. The various facts about the ability to predict during sleep are realistic, but they are not history. "Predictions" of Nostradamus, Blavatsky, or modern soothsayers like Paul Globa, invented by the journalists of Edgar Cayce's or Vanga's prophecies in actual fact - media falsifications - in comparison with the impressionist Marxist (phenomenological, based on the logic of communist movements) prophecy, revolutionary Trotsky, who in 1938 predicted the collapse of the USSR.

A number of economic problems can be formulated in the old statistical paradigm, for example, as optimization of the preparation and transportation of concrete in a probabilistic description of the process [10]. Today, models of this type, as well as the theory of catastrophes, are successfully applied in local problems of stock exchange games. Previously, the English school of statistical methods dominated in economics (Pearson, Fisher; see also [11]. Today, there are known attempts at computer analysis of options for the development of the industry (Leontiev, USA) and the territorial economic complex (A. Raskopin, G. Kashevarova, Perm). Unfortunately, in their models there is only a certain zoological mechanism of self-development of production, without taking into account social dynamics, and A. Raskopin considers his models not as an obligatory formula for the life of an urban planning complex, but only as a tool for determining a number of options, and understands that the elimination of social dynamics is The criticism of the method is given, for example, in the works of B.G. Ploshko [12], S.M. Sargsyan, G.B. Yuzbashyan [13], B.G. Mirkin [14] and a number of other authors.

Sargsyan and Yuzbashyan note: "Before the implementation of the interregional optimization of the country's development model, it is impossible to determine the closing costs for each type of product for each region. on the bottom ... "(" Identification and formation of options for the dynamic development of the intersectoral complex in the national economy "," Integer formulation of the model of optimal territorial planning for the development of the economy of the region, divided into districts "). That is, we have the same picture: for the formation of a model, a limitation is necessary, but for a limitation, a model must be assumed. Try to build a model of the dynamics of the country's economy without the dynamics of the intra-regional one, but the intra-regional dynamics is understandable only if the dynamics of the whole are known. We return to the fact that we do not know the essential factors of historical development.

On the other hand, "the interpretation of the mathematical concept of sampling, writes Mirkin, as a collection of randomly selected objects, is not always obvious and accurate." The point is that "the random mechanism must be modeled by the researcher himself" (p. 217). Mirkin gives an example of an incorrect forecast of the results of the presidential elections in the United States before the war: the opinion poll was conducted using the telephone book, so the event could not be accidental. The fact that the event is not accidental can only be verified after the experiment. Let the sample be random, but testing statistical hypotheses about socio-economic observations in canonical terms of confidence significance levels in many cases does not make any sense (the example of flies, B.I.) ... all the same, the question of the dependence of signs is decided by a willful way.

The key to understanding is not an increase in the number of experiments, but culture, defined as the possession of a physical projection of the logic of nature. Only a necessary connection, a tendency, makes sense. Understanding this, which, in our opinion, is absent from the developers of evolutionary computer models, allows us to approach a more specific formulation of the problem of determinism in history.

Statistical approach

Let's take a closer look at physical determinism in history.

The social system, like many physical systems, is sometimes statistical. Examples of using the theory of probability in describing the mechanism of Mendel's genetic inheritance and the work of a telephone exchange can be found at least in P. Whitl [16]. According to probabilistic laws, psychiatric hospitals are filled, there is a statistical regularity of citizens getting hit by cars (since there is a physical connection, both of them move in the same plane, plus inattention, ignorance of traffic rules by both, drunkenness and those, and others. These are conditions that do not oblige a citizen to get hit by a car. He gets there according to a different law. An accident is the intersection of endless logical chains).

The fact of the applicability of the theory of probability in sciences other than physics, gave rise to the assertion that thermodynamics is not physics in general, like the equation of heat conduction. It has the first derivative with respect to time, while in all other fundamental equations of physics, the second derivative appears. In any case, the existence of the heat conduction equation indicates the identity of time in various forms of motion of matter and testifies against the assertion of the non-physicality of statistics (and also against a special biological time: statistical time and physical time are related by a system of equations, and there are no experimental data where the identity of times would be violated. Although the second law of thermodynamics itself does not have derivatives with respect to time. This point is an obstacle, in particular, in the generalization of thermodynamics and gravitation. Schemes for formulating the second law of thermodynamics in terms of the Hamiltonian formalism have not yet yielded tangible results (see, for example, [17]).

Of course, for statistical purposes, symmetry is also necessary, symmetry of space (for example, in order for the distribution to have a maximum of 50%, the coin must be symmetrical). If we try to choose not two, but three or more possible options (or we poorly mix, say, seeds of red and yellow flowers before planting in a flower bed, then they will grow in spots, the size patterns of which are not described by the theory of probability), we get fractional dimensions in p-adic theories. It is curious that the p-adic integral describing Brownian processes corresponds to the SU(2) symmetry group. One could try, by analogy with mechanics, to connect the conservation law in thermodynamics with symmetry. However, as far as classical dissipative systems are concerned, the presence of spatial symmetry, which is only a condition for the conservation of momentum, still does not make it possible to use the variational principle.

The problem is similar to that arising in the generalization of gravity and quantum field theory (QFT), in particular, the standard temperature technique in the theory of many particles (see [18]). It cannot be resolved in supersymmetric models either. The gravitational field breaks the spatial symmetry: already in the special theory of relativity (SRT) in the 4-vector of displacement there is an additional time component. The classical theory of probability implies precisely spatial symmetry, for example, the symmetry of a coin toss. Consequently, the gravitational field violates the axiomatics of the theory of probability, and with it the logic of probabilistic determinism and modal logic in general. That is, there are difficulties in using statistical methods already within physics.

If we nevertheless assume a priori that there are a number of periods in history described by the theory of probability (with some kind of spiral symmetry), an event in history must be defined as the preparation of conditions Z and the effect <A> on object H under conditions of Z. Conditions Z should be an order of magnitude more severe than <A> and H: the experimenter should not be able to toss a coin so that it always falls, for example, in tails, i.e. should not know all the reasons affecting the coin, only in this case a statistical pattern will appear. So, roughly speaking, the event

$$E = Z + AH$$

If we know what will fall out, i.e. if we know how to toss, then we are talking about another event. If we talk about the result in an event (heads or tails), then it is necessary to supplement the result X with the method of tossing r, which splits into conditions Z and the type of tossing, which varies (with a machine or hand), therefore, only conditions Z can be considered. If Z are such that P (X) = 1, then we always have the same result and knowledge about Z is complete. The more knowledge about Z, and from a series of repetitive Z ', Z' ', Z''' ..., more and more identical Z are prepared, the more P (X) tends to 1.It is clear that the difference in Z is

limited if we understand by Z a set of state parameters that still need to be defined as parameters of the state of the socio-ethnic system.

If the difference in Z is comparable to Z, then we cannot even approximately indicate whether this or that result is possible, based on the theory of probability. In general, we must be prepared for the fact that only a limited number of phenomena are described by probability. "And, finally, since you do not think that every body / Smell and sound emits, then it comes out undoubtedly / That it is impossible to attribute sound or smell to everything." (Lucretius, "On the nature of things", 830). In this case, the concept of probability is meaningless, but this does not mean that there is no possibility of describing an event using other characteristics (quantitative or qualitative) of the random. For example, you can determine: for "approximately" equal, but rather rough (Z (i,j) - Z (m,n) << Z) and unknown to the experimenter Z in cases of the type of a coin P (X) = 1/2. Moreover, complete knowledge of Z is impossible, however, changing the experiment, recognizing Z, we abolish spontaneity, introduce a monopoly. Thus, returning to [6], in the study, in any case, whether the epoch is described by the probabilistic method or not, it is necessary:

I. Determine the necessary, essential points of Z (conditions). Note the neglect of conditions in Stalinism and Trotskyism. For the former, the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism are possible at any stage in the development of capitalism; the second complements the external conditions: a world revolution, but the level of productive forces is unimportant, the proletarian consciousness is assumed to be the determining factor. That is, it is not social being that determines social consciousness, but the socialist (dictatorial) superstructure governs social matter.

S. Smith argues that "Marx had no theory at all ... The goal of his forty years of work was not at all to establish a system of ideas that could explain the world" [19]. However, in contrast to himself, he writes: "The followers of Marx ... like the materialists of the XVIII century, presented the social world as a type of complex mechanism, the parts of which interact according to open laws. The revolutionary party knows the secret of these laws ..." Smith does not understand Marxism and identifies it with mechanism, which is the opposite and identity of the Trotskyist-Stalinist voluntarism.

II. Before entering the data into the table, it is necessary to highlight the assumed necessary connections (which we are going to establish and investigate). If we have in mind commodity-money relations, then it is obvious that knowledge of Z does not at all cancel the old division of labor. Secondly, the leader cannot know Z, because Z is formed by the entire socio-ethnic system: alienation is universal. In order to more fully embrace Z, the apparatus of owner-managers must grow. Further, in order to preserve himself as an elite, he must stop growth and push out echelons of candidates for managers. At the same time, mediating economic functions and, due to the impossibility of embracing Z, the apparatus collapses. This is exactly what happened in the USSR.

It is obvious that the presentation of history as a struggle of classes, which was the most effective generalization, nevertheless reduces the general to the abstract particular. The class struggle turns out to be divorced from evolution, while in evolution itself progress as an ascent from the simple to the complex and regression turn out to be indefinite. Despite the apparent (due to its extensiveness) technical progress, labor is still partial: professionalism as mastery of logic turns into "professional cretinism" in the process of de-objectification. And not only in the case of manual labor. The programmer begins to think like a machine, which makes it impossible to adequately assess the social situation. Only because of this it is impossible to talk about the coverage of all historical conditions by a narrow social (party) group. (Obviously, we are talking about this type of identity of phenomenon and essence, about which L. Tolstoy said: "In the future, literature will not be needed - life will be more interesting than books." Of course, the description of each atom in a crystal is not part of the traditional science, and this is impossible. However, imagine that each of them is a person.). It is easy to see that the "romantic" understanding of the qualitative transition (Trotskyism, anarchism, Stalinism) concerns only changes in working conditions, changes in social forms, but does not affect the qualitative change in the content of labor. This is the other extreme in understanding historical determinism.

It is possible, of course, to think that the nature of labor is being transformed in an evolutionary way, but in practice modern technologies not only lead to replenishment of the reserve army of labor, but produce an army of push-button workers with the same depersonalization and alienation of partial labor, and also displace skilled labor in service sector with labor degradation.

On the other hand, modern social democratic and liberal currents focus on changing the nature of labor from above, that is, a competent group followed by the masses, while the subjects of history are classes. Therefore, the conditions of the "experiment" are left aside. (We will return to the subject of history below.) Even Ilyenkov ignored the nature of conveyor labour, values of the highest order appeared ("Philosophy and Culture").

In fact, it is obvious that the content and nature of labor are related to each other. For example, creative work is not only obtaining something new with the need to define something new. It is associated with the involvement in the management of what is the planning of the whole, the general, in miniature, isolated in the planes of science or art. Or: to overcome the non-creative nature of labor, it is necessary to redistribute social funds.

It would seem that the content of labor rises from the abstract to the concrete, more and more creative. The share of living labor per unit of labor power is declining. The amount of required working time is reduced. But people don't change. On the contrary, the number of victims is growing from war to war, from ecology to ecology. The increasing complexity of the economic mechanism inevitably leads to an increase in the alienation of workers from management (to the polarization of the population, but not to the emergence of a middle class throughout the entire class), despite the increase in the number of workers with higher education in the 80s.

It should be remembered that the contradiction between labor and capital in material form fades into the background after October 1917. Although the upward trend in wages was clearly outlined in the last century, so the classics abandoned the thesis of the absolute impoverishment of the proletariat. It is removed within the capitalist mode of production - after the top could not manage absolutely impoverished workers who could not produce anything but low-quality non-competitive goods. The controversy was resolved through a reformist change in working conditions. And not with the filing of a group of competent economists - the "idea" of increasing workers' wages and improving working conditions and reproduction of labor was prompted by the same October (that is, someone's practical activity).

The contradiction is being transformed, even Bakunin wrote that the privilege of education is enough for the bourgeoisie to maintain its position.

Obviously, the antithesis between the growth of concrete labor and the growth of alienation from management and changes in the nature of labor intensifies to a contradiction. "The upper classes will not be able to," since the apparatus will not be able to cover all the wealth of economic ties, and will be forced to "share," "the lower classes will not want to," since the material form of exploitation in developed countries will soon be finally overcome. Reproduction of labor power increasingly requires a different nature of labor, therefore, overcoming alienation from management in order to change the nature of labor. This, in turn, requires universal higher education, the funds for which are forced out: in Canada, trade unions are fighting for universal education for workers, in France there are powerful demonstrations against elite schools to redistribute money for a higher level of universal secondary education, in Lebanon in December 1996, the protesters also demanded universal secondary education. The top may not be able to, but they cannot be willing to share. i.e,

III. it is necessary to understand that in the old scientific paradigm (namely: in the conditions of the old division of labor into those who think and those who do) it is impossible to encompass Z. It is only possible, having risen above clearly unknown conditions - after all, every single historical information has been obtained and presented by representatives of individual social groups, but not of the whole society as a whole, which, moreover, does not represent a whole due to the same division of labor, to find some "thermodynamic »Patterns in the past or take a step away from the old understanding of historical patterns. That is, there is no possibility of forecasting.

On the other hand, overcoming the anarchy of social life, we are trying to establish certain patterns, for example, how to live better, more profitably if we follow them, that is, cancel the accidental thing that is called individual independent thinking and action. Let us recall how Labriola, Plekhanov, Lukach and even Ilyenkov understood dialectics: as the most general laws of being and thinking, therefore, pouring out of a bath with water and a child - for a person it is the deviations from the abstract, averaged general that are important, on the contrary, the universal in a specific deviation, which Ilyenkov considered insignificant (see, for example, "Dialectical Logic" or "Art and the Communist Ideal"). Even worse:

IV. as we understood from the criticism of the statistical method, it is impossible to establish a pattern prior to experiment. It is established by will. The actual statistical (mathematical) regularity does not have to coincide with the historical necessary connection. Where is the exit?

About the so-called activity

Either we know how the social system moves, according to some objective laws that do not depend on consciousness, and therefore we cannot influence the situation (fatalism), or we bring something into the system of laws so that we get the opportunity to influence the movement of the system.

What are we bringing? Mathematically not formalized activity of the superstructure, consciousness, will.

The necessary conditions of the revolution are not canceled, the basis inexorably brings the superstructure into line with itself, instead of the world revolution, capitalism is legalized in the USSR.

Lenin, contradicting Kautsky, restricts: the introduction not from the side of the government "going to meet the proletariat", but into the government subordinate to the proletariat. In general, the role of Social Democracy is only to help organize the proletariat. As Marx emphasized: Communists can only ease the pain of childbirth for society, but they cannot give birth for society.

Obviously, the quality of the subjects of history is objective for the revolution - but not the activity of the working class.

If we focus on the primacy of social being, then the subjects of history and individual individuals cannot radically change anything. If the role of activity is reduced to facilitating the childbirth of society, then they can give birth even without active ones. If the appearance of active people in society is a pattern, then everything is natural. Therefore, everything is accidental.

The filling of the dialectical unity "natural - accidental" with the simplest specifics immediately leads romantics to a logical contradiction. The facts are that the old understanding of activity as a scheme "the party that understands the laws of motion the most, gives the program the masses penetrate and follow the program, the party comes to power and makes economic transformations" does not work. That is, it is necessary to reassess not only the role of the party, but also determinism in history - as in the natural sciences. Prigogine argues that the mechanistic understanding of determinism has migrated to all special sciences, and, consequently, to philosophy.

Society cannot take a step without planning, whether the plan is being implemented or not is the second question. Of course, Ilyenkov is right in particular: the most general laws of motion of the external world coincide with the laws of thinking. From the fact that it is light during the day and dark at night, it follows that the world cannot be arranged in any way. We shoot at the Turk, and the Turk is killed because he was hit by a bullet. Naturally, it was only possible to achieve such a brilliant result through long-term social practice. However, it is enough to ask the question: how does the eye form an image of a Turk (and the eye creates a lot of false images before sculpting an adequate one (see, for example, [20]), as well as which part of the Turk's body was hit by a bullet, and we return the previous reasoning, because the distribution of bullets over the target has a Poisson character.

The equation of social movement, including the laws of society, must answer the question of what will happen to the system, taken under certain conditions, after a certain period of time. If we introduce the activity of subjects, the equation should get the future that we would like to see. Then the inverse problem can be solved. It is necessary not only to determine the initial conditions for the desired future, but to change the real initial conditions so as to get the picture we need in the future.

Here we know at best the method of change, which, moreover, changes depending on the circumstances. Added to this is the expectation that the conditions will "ripen" (either on their own or with the help of subjects) until the moment in time when there is only "obstetrics" left.

Is the problem still correct? For example, in the inverse problem of scattering or heat conduction, when it is necessary to determine the initial conditions from the final result, the solutions are unstable, but they can be obtained in principle. The situation is different in society.

On the one hand, if history is determined in the Cartesian spirit, there is no point in predicting (divining, etc.). On the other hand, if there is an equation of history, and we have received a solution of what will happen tomorrow, and if it is negative tomorrow, then with the available information the subject is able to avoid it

tomorrow. So the social mathematical equation is false. History becomes non-deterministic. But only in the sense of mathematical formalization.

VI. Stochastic approach

A. Classification.

1) Laplace determinism: there is a point with initial parameters P (V, r, m, f). The future is derived from the present unambiguously.

2) Probabilistic-quantum: from P, regions of future values (V, r) are unambiguously deduced.

3) Intuitive-prophetic: from communication with something or an unknown way, the future is uniquely determined.

4) Cultural, civilizational (Toynbee), Marx: from the logic of a holistic culture (Marx includes the culture of production) a possible future is determined. Earlier it was assumed that physicists, for example, are not only "spontaneous materialists", but since they own a part of the logic of nature, which cannot be formal, thus also "spontaneous dialectics" (Ilyenkov, "Philosophy and Culture"). It was also assumed that dialectics brings together particular logics (A. Grigoriev, following Bibler et al., Preferred "polylectics", see [21]). Meanwhile, none of the logics is undeveloped, especially biology and history. Regarding the Marxian method, it should be noted that in the last century, the relationship between the subject of history (class) and the superstructure (for example, the party) was determined due to the underdevelopment of production in the spirit of Bernstein-Kautsky (for more details, see [22]). The idea of the last century about the physical impossibility of self-development of the working class, the need to bring the party (intellectual) consciousness (meaning the consciousness of the external social group) from "situational was raised to the rank of conceptual."

Therefore, it makes no sense to talk about modern unified logic, as well as culturology in its real meaning. The proof of this is the armada of political soothsayers.

5) Cluster approach in sociology.

6) Pluralistic approach. Yu. Olsevich [23] suggests looking for the logic of social science, in particular, economics, generally bypassing the specifics of correlating theory with reality. Proceeding from the fact that opposite doctrines appear in completely identical social conditions, Olsevich declares that "the pluralism of theories is precisely the locator that allows observing the internal multidimensional changeable space of the economic system." That is, pluralism itself is a reflection of reality, although in reality it is "unobservable", pluralism belongs to the elite. The rest of society is dictated by the media.

Olsevich counts Keynes and Walter Euken as his predecessors (Fundamentals of National Economy, 1940). Many theories are being investigated, the discrepancy between theories of reality is being questioned (and indeed the theory is built on the basis of empiricism and reflects the level of social development. Or its side). For example, the degradation of the Russian economy to a raw material appendage of the developed countries, according to Olsevich, should lead to the resuscitation of the parcels of physiocrats.

Is it permissible to ignore the connection between social theory and what really exists - with class interests? To mix into a single operator positions belonging to antagonistic social strata and to consider a specific theory as one of its eigenvalues, projections, which alone are, in contrast to the operator itself, observable?

In this case, the mechanistic understanding of determinism has led to the reduction of social dynamics to the group properties of a number of theories, known only to the degree of proximity of theorists to the elite. But Olsevich's idea is not interesting already because theories are mixed, firstly, dissatisfying practice, and secondly, deliberately built within the framework of the old understanding of determinism, while practice insistently advises us to come to a new one.

The anarchist and neo-positivist Paul Feyerabend argues much more transparently, from different positions and about the same thing (see [24]). The premise of his objection to "methodological coercion" is an objection to scientific bureaucracy: when choosing theories, only non-theoretical motives prevail, just the supporters of one theory by any means defeat the supporters of the other. Who exactly wins? Who is close to the elite. I.e. we are talking about an objection to liberalism and its identity - Stalinism: "Idealism believes that practice ... is only raw material, which is shaped by reason. Practice is capable of creating in itself the elements of reason, but only in a random and unsystematic way "(p. 470). Secondly, reason is ascribed to a narrow group of persons: "... we are gradually inspired that such theories (ie theories needed to solve social problems, BI) should be

developed by specialists, ie. intellectuals; intellectuals determine the structure of society, intellectuals explain what is possible and what is impossible, intellectuals tell everyone what to do "(p. 471).

At the same time, "problems are solved not by specialists ... but by interested persons," while the desired democracy "is a gathering of mature people, and not a bunch of fools, led by a small group of smart people." Therefore, Feyerabend, quoting Lenin abundantly, asserts that "theoretical anarchism is more humane and progressive than its alternatives based on law and order" (p. 142).

Feyerabend, unlike Olsevich, takes as a fact not the manifestation of class interests, but the very dependence of social theory on social interest, considering it as a phenomenon, but takes a step "for the fact", declaring it to be a reflection of the actual development of all science, not only social. Cognition as a whole, according to Feyerabend, is random, the development of science is chaotic. Moreover, he, like Olsevich, uses examples of correct "incorrect" hypotheses, but from the natural sciences. In fact, pluralism or anarchism is a reflection of something very different. The point is that in the course of dialectical development, society is not always at the points of revolution, i.e. in moments of exacerbation of contradiction, integrity (totality, in the words of Berdyaev). The working class of Russia in 1917 represented something unified, while today it is infinitely fragmented - for the anarchic period lasts, the period of accumulation of diversity.

Thus, Feyerabend, despite accurate observations, makes the mistake of denying determinism in history.

7) Synergetic, stochastic approaches, the approach of the theory of catastrophes.

For example, G. Bystray, D. Pivovarov [25], recalling that sociologists are unable to predict and even explain sharp changes in public opinion or the behavior of any social group, draw analogies in the behavior of a statistical ensemble described using the theory of catastrophes, originating from the general theory of systems by A. A. Bogdanov and L. von Bertalanffy. Social phenomena, the authors believe, like synergetic ones, are essentially non-linear, while most sociological models are based on the ideas of linearity and convexity. The authors believe that "in the methodology of sociological research, the theory of catastrophes and the principle of stochasticity should take their proper, if not leading, place" (p. 159). Of course, one cannot pose a bare problem: there is a method, so shouldn't it be transferred to the area of problems that are not native to him? But synergetics arose as a combination of problems that were not related to each other in physics (billiards, pendulums with friction), chemistry (Belousov- Zhabotinsky reactions) and biology. Quantum mechanics can be viewed as a method of group theory in describing the behavior of particles, and GRT - as a rewriting of Newtonian mechanics in the pseudo-Riemannian metric. Who is stopping the row from continuing?

B. Malinetskiy G.G. in his work "Nonlinear dynamics and" historical mechanics "[26], summarizing the research on this topic, notes that it is impossible to extrapolate the historical trajectory, since" the equilibrium is irreversibly violated. " It is unlikely that the latter can be considered a premise for thought: 1) there are laminar processes in history, 2) if the matter is only in the openness of the system, then sources can be introduced, 3) if the trajectory exists, then we need to talk not about extrapolation, but about finding patterns ... The leitmotif of Malinetskiy's work is obvious. He writes: "With the help of these concepts (historical materialism, the methods of Sartre, Jaspers, Popper; B.I.), it is not possible to build a bridge to the specific tasks that arise before the state and interstate associations in strategic planning ... After the meeting in Rio de "Janeiro, who showed that the concept of sustainable development, shared by the main historical actors, is absent, the need for such planning is difficult to question." I.e., services are offered to any political group. In fact, the concept was absent not only at the 1st "Global Forum" in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, but also at the 2nd in Manchester in 1994, and at the 3rd in Istanbul in 1996 ... For example, in Manchester there were over 1,500 people, of which only 600 were delegates. But Malinetskiy oddly identified the main historical subjects. Until now, subjects have been thought of as social strata or parties, but not their individual representatives.

As an argument in favor of the need to develop a unified formula for state (more precisely, party) programs, Malinetskii cites the work of A. Andreev and M. Lewandovsky [27], where "an analysis of the time series characterizing the strike activity ... process and identify the presence in this dynamics of a special period of chaos. "The work, as the authors themselves write, is "the first step in creating adequate mathematical models of the internal mechanisms of the development of social conflicts".

The statistics of strikes in the Vladimir province from 1895 to 1905 were studied. The following restrictions were introduced: 1) information is transmitted through personal communication without the participation of professional agitators (but there are workers who become agitators), 2) the constancy of the number of workers employed in production is assumed; 4) in a given locality; it is believed that the Vladimir region was not in the study period in a state of qualitatively accelerated development. The result obtained by stochastic methods is trivial: the authors noticed seasonal activity of workers. V. Ponomarev, researching the strikes of 1988-90 in the USSR, noticed the same thing without resorting to mathematical models), which "makes it possible to supplement the missing historical facts."

Does the repetition of the result by Ponomarev mean confirmation of the adequacy of the method? After all, the conclusion about the localization of the result within the Vladimir province suggested itself. There is no objection to the use of stochastic methods for the analysis of history. But if the climate has changed, or the workers, having learned about the Andreev-Lewandovsky method, decided to change their tactics?

Stochasticity, in contrast to the bifurcation of the transition from one limit cycle (an attractor, an equilibrium point near a pendulum or a circle, or a strange attractor in the three-dimensional case) and from a catastrophe, a sharp change with a known slow change in the parameter, means the fundamental unpredictability of the particle behavior. Small random deviations of the initial conditions lead to exponential divergence of trajectories. Beams of trajectories G1, G2, G3, G0 emerge from the region G0 - the origin of coordinates. Due to random deviations, a particle enters each of the beams with probability P1, P2, and P3, respectively.



Malinetskiy introduces jokers of the region inside G1, G2, G3 with Laplacian determinism. In G0 "the dominant role is played by volitional decisions that lead to paths with probabilities P1, P2, P3."

The scheme is somewhat similar to the one outlined in Mein Kampf. "Society is an amplifier," writes Malinetskiy, "of individual actions and thoughts." The proposed program is enough, and if you are in power, you can change the course of history. Society will strengthen. More precisely, the media will strengthen, the society, like an automatic machine, will repeat. Malinetskiy cites in confirmation the book by Ch. Snow "Two Cultures", where the author writes: "... one of the difficult problems is the selection and promotion of talented, energetic people to lead society at the top of the social hierarchy."

Also quoted is the work of the Trotskyist D. North [28]. North conducted a comparative analysis of the economic development of Spain and England, which, according to North, since the XV century have had similar economic indicators, and came to the conclusion that the organizational structures that "reflected at the time of the emergence of the traditions of society ... the alignment of political forces and the psychological state of the elite "(for Lenin:" the one who explains political actions by the character traits of a politician is a swindler ").

In order for the actions of a politician to be clear to the voter, it is possible to use the spin glass model. It allows one to take into account the influence of the media on public opinion, its polarization and consolidation,

as well as provide for mass sobering up when the influence of the media ceases (Malinetskiy quotes [29]). In a word, society is understood as a Cartesian system, which, like Kozma Prutkov's horse, if snapped on the nose, flaps its tail.

In fact, it is obvious that the influence of the media is possible only when the employee is alienated from the means of production and working conditions. In this case, the intermediary between them (capital) is free to substitute mass media fetishes for real relations between people.

In general, the meaning of such theories is obvious: a group of competent people determines how everyone will live. That is, the position of Ortega y Gasset [30], Keynes, modern social democrats, and finally, the CPRF, have been repeated without distortion. Obviously, it is necessary to reject the application of the "new thermodynamics" to the dynamics of society as unscientific, opportunistic.

You can also find a direct discrepancy: in order to get into the most acceptable region G (i), it is useless to write programs, a small deviation must be random, unknown. The main objection to the application of stochastics to history, in fact to the stochastic plan, is the fact of the collapse of the plan in the USSR, starting with the first and ending with the last.

As for the work of Andreev-Lewandovsky, to a positive example of which Malinetskiy refers, there is a suspicion that the authors, instead of finding new historical facts from extrapolation, threw out of consideration a lot of existing ones: they were based on a more complete analysis of V. Bavykin, L. Borodkin and Yu. Kiryanov strike movement in Russia in 1895-1913.

In addition, the criticism of purely mathematical models is given above and previously given by Mirkin, Sargsyan and Sargsyan. The factors determining the dynamics of strikes and the connection between them remained behind the scenes. The meaning of the work is absent, as well as the meaning of the machine's work to identify the relationship between the number of flies in the room and the shift of the NMR spectra. The authors explain the shortcomings of the model (overestimated figures) by the shortcomings of the source and the need to consider even smaller territorial units (the latter, on the contrary, see above the link to Sargsyan and Yuzbashyan, it is impossible without knowledge of the dynamics as a whole. That is, the explanation is an obvious excuse).

But Lewandovsky and Andreev object to scientism, oppose abstract history divorced from people. "Creation," the Whitehead authors quote, "is the actualization of potentiality, and the process of actualization is an event of human experience ..." It would seem that there is one step to Marx's thesis about Feuerbach (if we add to the thesis a change in history not by philosophers, but by the masses, following Marx's formula: socialism is the living creativity of the masses, and understanding by creativity not only political activity). Unfortunately, they also have a liberal attitude. The authors reduce the analysis of living history to Popper's logic of the situation: "For the historian, the actions, the history of which he deals with, are not spectacles given to observation, but a living experience that he must go through in his own mind; they ... can be cognized by him only because they are simultaneously subjective, that is, they are the actions of his own consciousness."

Of course, the authors would like to formalize historical causality, but they believe that 1) it is impossible to make predictions at a "critical point", since during this period a choice is made between different paths of development; 2) this choice is subjective, depends on one person or subject of history and can be analyzed only within the framework of the specific logic of the situation; 3) only tendencies can be formulated that include many paths.

The unsatisfactory transfer of the ideology of statistics or synergetics to society is explained by the well-known fact of the qualitative difference between the laws of society and natural science laws. Transference ideologists operate in the spirit of reductionism, although biology is not reduced to chemistry, and chemistry is not reduced to physics.

Let's say a mathematical model should be supplemented by the specifics of the situation. This is the understanding of many Marxists: the general scheme has already been discovered, it remains to fill it with the specifics of the moment. However, how exactly the choice takes place and whether the result is the embodiment of the will of the subject is not explained.

In addition, due to the disintegration of the productive forces, the most productive Marxist scheme has not been overcome, although it is based on the old understanding of dialectics, which brings together the logic of the sciences of a century ago. This is also manifested in the understanding of overcoming alienation by

reducing the necessary labor to a vanishingly small amount (Capital, Volume III), to equalization in the form of a change in labor (formal equality), and not by transforming the socially necessary labor itself.

Marx, unlike Popper (or Friedrich Schlegel), could hardly have reduced living experience to "experiencing the mind" or "actions of consciousness" instead of social practice. Or consider the general scheme unchanged. Let's say we supplement the diagram with a situation. If the result of the additive changes radically, then there is no scheme. If it is insignificant, then the Popper addition does not eliminate fatality. Meanwhile, it is not that the additive, but the random deviation from the general contains the essential, these are not small fluctuations over equilibrium, narrowed down to the law. The essence is in individuality, in deviation from the general. The thesis about Feuerbach, which contains the definition of the essence of a person, through the external, like the intersection of social lines, is contradictory, which reflects, rather, not a contradiction in the scheme noted by A. B. Grigoriev, but a social contradiction (Heidegger's "technicalization of the soul" or Marx's depersonalization abstract work as dominant, see [31]).

Marx is forced to state that by virtue of depersonalizing socially necessary labor, the party of the class is made up of representatives of other social strata (see [22]). However, the consolidation of situational thought at the conceptual level logically leads to the same Bernstein-Kautsky scheme: a group of competent people gives a program and forms a government "meeting the proletariat halfway."

This practice has become obsolete today, although the armies of the "active" have not yet realized that in the dialectical pair "class-party" the class is primary, the party is secondary.

On the relationship between changes in social conditions and the nature of work

In the aforementioned work "The strike movement of Russia in 1895- 1913. Bavykin, Borodkin and Kiryanov tried to establish a rigid connection between the structure, connections and development of industry and the change in the economic situation of the proletariat. " Although the very posing of the question of the level of economic development is positive - against the Trotskyist-Stalinist-anarchist romanticism with the denial of the necessary conditions for the revolution. Lewandovsky and Andreev move away from this specifics, wanting to distinguish their point of view from the work of Bavykin et al. [27].

However, in general, the mathematical formalization of history, the selection of essential factors run into the following difficulties:

1) Incomplete knowledge of events, from which researchers also exclude conditions.

1a) Lack of acceptable time coordinates, it doesn't matter if we want Laplace determinism, quantum, or whatever.

1b) The rudimentary understanding of determinism already in the natural sciences. The world is not arranged in such a way as to determine the future by owning the initial conditions. This is an incorrect formulation of the question, just as one cannot ask which of the two slits a particle will fly into if we want to have an interference pattern on the screen; a particle is not so arranged as to be considered structureless or with a structure identical to a macroscopic body.

The identification of statistical or stochastic patterns is impossible, because

2) historical and economic parameters are not immanent properties of objects (for example, the value of goods), as mass is a property of a particle. Unlike Toynbee or Gumilyov, Marx analyzed a holistic process, linking political and economic factors with historical ones, although he was far from economic fatalism.

3) For example, in a quantum experiment, the way the device and the subject change (under the influence of a particle) are unchanged. In the process of objectification-de-objectification, the subject of history becomes identical with the object (not in Popper's sense) and changes itself: classes arise and are destroyed.

4) Unlike electrons, which in the system must be identical to each other, despite the fact that individual consciousness depends even on the mass media, not to mention the primacy of production relations, from the beginning of the emergence of society there is a special parameter: the uniqueness of the "I". The growth of the creative principle in labor (the ascent of labor from the abstract to the concrete) means an ever greater uniqueness of the product of socially necessary labor. But there are no quantitative parameters to measure the uniqueness of the manifestation of "I". Does this mean that the emancipation of labor is a transition to the realm of free will, that is, the disappearance of any social determinism at all?

5) The consequence of paragraphs 2), 3) and 4) is the difference from natural science laws that these laws are objective, independent of the observer (although they change over time). In history, subjects change social laws. A regularity that does not depend on the subject exists only in periods between radical changes in social relations and productive forces.

It would seem that even the history of Peter I convinces of the opposite: nothing significant would have changed if he had not come to power. He only continued the traditional expansionist policy of Russia, and began with defeats in military campaigns in the same way as his rival Vasily Golitsyn, who, moreover, was going to abolish serfdom and allot land to the peasants (see at least [32]). In history, contingency, despite the ridicule of Marx and Russell, hastens after the Hegelian idea and unfolds like a fatal necessity. Is human life really predetermined, as in the physiological example given by Haken: if you simultaneously wave the fingers of different hands, placing them in parallel, then regardless of the will, with an increase in frequency, a jump occurs, the fingers, instead of parallel movement, will move towards each other.

Is Saint Augustine really right in opposing the skeptics who asserted the possibility of only probabilistic knowledge (now we can say - not Laplacian determinism) - no matter that the methodology chosen by Augustine for comprehending the truth is Holy Scripture or divine enlightenment ("Against the Academicians"). The point is in principle: is the world really arranged according to Tolstoy: "the worm gnaws the cabbage, but before it perishes" and "not by our mind, but by God's judgment"? Do I need to judge Annushka for spilling oil? If you do not put the restrictive second "shoe", a train accident can occur. And when it happens, it seems that all the little things begin to play a threateningly fatal natural role. All reasons wind up around one moment into an extraneous contradiction, which is presented as the main one. It turns out that the more holistic the research, the tougher the "primacy of the general over the particular" and the less room for chance. In the limit, infinite wisdom - Sophia - will always give an accurate forecast, and the probability, according to Locke, is just "the appearance of a correspondence based on not entirely reliable conclusions."

It would seem that with ignorance of the laws, everything is accidental, and, therefore, rigidly regular, fatal. But is it possible to derive historical categories when they have not yet matured in society? For example, Aristotle was unable to deduce the category of value with undeveloped commodity-money relations (see Ilyenkov, "Dialectics of the abstract and the concrete in Marx's Capital"). But this pattern cannot be such as to manifest itself independently of consciousness.

Fyodor Dostoevsky argued most strongly about the existence of a pattern in history.

First - an objection to the law standing above man, even if it comes from God, according to the principle of morality. Alexey Karamazov denies the existence of God (and his law!) If the law humiliates a person (depersonalizes, teaches, etc.) ("The Brothers Karamazov"). The existence of a lawmaker is illogical: "Let the consciousness be kindled by the will of a higher power ... and let it suddenly be ordered by this higher power to be destroyed, because there it is ... it’s necessary ... Can’t you just eat me without demanding praise from me that eaten me? Will anyone really be offended that I don't want to wait two weeks? I don't believe it; and it would be much more accurate to assume that my insignificant life, the life of an atom, was needed here to replenish some universal harmony as a whole, for some plus and minus ... how every day the life of many creatures will need to be sacrificed, without whose death the rest of the world cannot stand ... but ... if once I have already been given to realize that 'I am', then what do I care about the fact that the world is arranged with errors and that otherwise it cannot stand? " ("Idiot").

In essence, a person is not a "tablet" or "piano keys"; he does not need someone's will (or fate), but an independent desire. Sometimes whim or destruction, and not at all benefits and benefits. Moreover, one can theoretically talk about this problem ad infinitum ("Notes from the Underground").

That is, the next step should be the transition to a thinking and active electron, to changing the law in practical social activity. That is, the pattern can be found only in one's own social practice, primarily political, which corresponds to the Marxian scheme (not referring to bad practice).

Further, Dostoevsky's objection to the already impersonal, natural law follows: "... - Ugliness and chaos are everywhere, madam, you will find," said Lebedev's nephew, significantly, however, puzzled. - Yes, not like that! Not the same, priests, as you have now, not like that! - Lizaveta Prokofievna chimed in gloatingly, as if in hysterics. - Yes, will you leave me, she shouted at those who persuaded her, no, since you yourself, Evgeny Pavlych, have just announced that even the defense lawyer himself announced at the trial that there is nothing

more natural than to kill six people out of poverty, so it really is the last times have come. I haven't heard that yet. Now everything has been explained to me!" ("Idiot"). There is no talk of an objection to fatalism: Dostoevsky, as if on purpose outside of time, confronts objective and subjective causes, systemic and accidental, when the contradiction between them in society has not yet matured.

Of course, we are not talking about imagining free floating in the universe, where any desires are fulfilled, where thoughts create the world. It is necessary to imagine the universe of people with the presence of abstract labor with the ensuing laws. Another thing is that abstract labor, as determining at the level of the universal, must give way to the concrete, creative.

It remains to combine practice with consistent theoretical approximations, to follow Descartes' advice: in order to know, you need to "pass"? Or, according to Feyerabend, "connect reason with practice"? To create the predicted by force, if there is no power to predict before experience? True, but only not in the divided social strata according to Bernstein-Kautsky, but in the same subject of history. There is a prohibition against stealing fire from the gods alone. The point is not in collective creativity (collective intelligence does not exist) or in technical difficulties such as life expectancy, but in the impossibility of cognition by a narrow dependent social group in general.

Secondly, even God (king, general secretary or other owner) "does not foresee the future if we are endowed with will, or he is unjust if we are deprived of free will." (Lorenzo Valla, On Free Will). The prohibition can be formulated in the following anti-Gödel form: it is impossible, being outside the relations of the system, to cognize the system. Let's turn the Marxian thesis about Feuerbach: it is impossible not only to change the world outside of social practice, but also to understand and predict it (Augustine spoke about will, but a separate will is not enough to reveal the essence of man).

The second moment of non-participation, alienation, is a person's separation of himself from his activities; it is obvious that there is a return to animal beingness, "naturalness", identification of oneself with one's activity at a new level, the transformation of man into a kind of thinking-acting superman.) When the contradiction between the need to reproduce labor force in the process of creative production and its impossibility ripens the identification of patterns, in particular, in history can be considered formulated.

It's a paradox, but the mechanics are such that only a soldier can predict the outcome of a war.

P. S. The article was written in 1997, in a truncated form was published in the journal "CLIO" (St. Petersburg, 1998, № 1 (4), P. 16-24), criticism of the transfer of the philosophy of synergetics to society was given; a few years later, Immanuel Wallerstein came up with the idea of transferring. The article is published in full for the first time.

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HISTORIOSOPHY AND THE NEW POSTPOSITIVISM

The three categories of knowledge workers-scribes, experts, and writers - are developing simultaneously, or even at the same rate…
Raymond Aron, "The Opium of Intellectuals"

Introduction

Since law-abiding, well-meaning, and well-meaning individuals must necessarily be doing something, it had to happen sooner or later. Theologians were joined by those who describe how historians work.
Indeed, let us say in retrospect: if there is a philosophy of science, a philosophy of physics, a philosophy of law, a philosophy of agglutination reactions, and a philosophy of the game of the foundling fool, why not a philosophy of history.
"Oh!" said the individual, and the historiosophists were joined by an armada of film critics, musicologists, art critics, literary critics, and others. In a word, the intelligentsia multiplies, thought moves forward, and sooner or later it will find a secluded corner from which no one will ever have any opportunity to dig it out.
It would seem that only yesterday the subject of heated debate was the fashionable topic of the totalitarian regime. Only yesterday the archaic dictatorship of the proletariat and, of course, the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie were forgotten. But the individual wants to be different from the gray mass of protesters. No, he says. The totalitarian regime is only an emanation of the transcendental apperception, while in the existential installation of eudaemonism it is not a totalitarian, but an authoritarian regime! And then the individual gets honor, and respect, and a cutlet.

Pre-bourgeois period

The phrase "philosophy of history" was introduced in the XVIII century by Voltaire. However, the naive writer believed that the historian himself should not just describe political and military events, reducing the historical process to the presentation of facts or to politics, in Voltaire's understanding - to the activities of kings and generals, but philosophically comprehend, interpret the life of society and reflect on its existence in solitude.

Ideas about the cyclical nature of history, the cycle, are contained in religious myths, in late antiquity – in Polybius (the power of the king passes into tyranny, which is replaced by an aristocracy, the aristocracy is replaced by an oligarchy, which gives way to democracy, leading to ochlocracy, finally, tired peoples again put kings over themselves). The fall of empires is reflected in myths in the form of eschatology.

The idea of history as a development, from the animal pack to the human one, is found in Dikearchus, Democritus, and Lucretius Carus.

According to Plato (IV century BC), the history of mankind is the history of people endowed with thymos, ambitious people who risked their lives in a bloody battle with those who are weak in spirit, are not endowed with thymos and therefore are ready to become a slave. Like Delyagin, Plato considered justice to be the main principle of the ideal state, realizing that each social stratum fills this abstract concept with its own content.

Socrates criticized Anaxagoras for trying to explain everything in the world by mechanical causes, the interaction of water, air, etc., and argued that the reason for the world order is mind.

Aristotle (IV century BC) in "Politics" points out that the state did not arise immediately, but from the family and from the villages as an entelechy. However, this is where the historical development of Aristotle ends: "... the state exists naturally", the state is "the environment of a happy life". At the same time, Aristotle criticizes Plato's ideal state, in which the good of the whole is not the good of its parts, distinguishes between "right and wrong" types of states, but if Plato sees private property as the source of public evil, Aristotle is its apologist.

Herodotus (484-425 BC) presented history as a set of facts, instructive stories, over which the subjects of history are ruled by fate.
Let the predestined destiny be fulfilled, no matter how much a person resists it, says Aeschylus in the tragedy "Oedipus". The God is omnipotent, omniscient, and he determines the movement of all matter in the universe. God created man as he is. Therefore, Khayyam very logically argues, it is the God who is guilty of all human sins.

Unlike Herodotus and his religious colleagues, Thucydides (c. 460 - c. 400 BC) viewed history as a product of the choices and actions of people, not gods, in which he sought all causes and effects. Describing the story, he investigated the causes of the Peloponnesian War between the two Greek polis, that is, he is also a philosopher of history. More precisely-just a historian.
Nevertheless, archaeology was not yet developed, and the collapse of the slave system was still centuries away, so history as a science was out of the question.

In 1377, the Arab historian Ibn Khaldun presented history as a chain of political and demographic cycles.

In the seventeenth century, Condorcet put forward the idea of human progress as a linear movement towards a certain goal.

The mechanicists, Descartes, Lametri, Hobbes, Diderot, Helvetius, Holbach, and Spinoza gave rise to the understanding of history as a transformism, a movement without distinguishing between the higher and the lower, the simple and the complex.

The theologian I. G. Herder, who admired Shakespeare, tried to create a science that would not just describe the entire history of mankind, but would act as a philosophy of history ("Ideas for the Philosophy of the History of mankind", 1784).

But only the epoch of the first bourgeois revolutions marked the beginning of the scientific comprehension of history. In the eighteenth century, the idea of the historical movement as progress reappears, and this idea is reinforced by the Great French Revolution. In Russia, A. I. Herzen rejects fatalism and the teleological interpretation of history.

Positivism

Capitalism, which has replaced feudal relations, develops the productive forces, but also leads to the impoverishment of the masses, which caused negative trends in the philosophy of history.

In 1844, the founder of positivism and sociology as a science, Auguste Comte, in his work" The Spirit of Positive Philosophy", depicted society as a growing organism, passing through three stages in its development: childhood, youth and maturity. Not understanding the difference between the laws of society and the laws of physics or chemistry, Comte dreamed of creating a science of society that would be as accurate as the natural sciences.
G. Spencer, Mill, Spengler, in Russia – V. Lesevich and N. Mikhailovsky followed the Contour.
According to the Contour, the main factor in the development of society is the human mind, the three stages of the development of society are three stages in the development of the mind: theological, metaphysical and positive. The theological stage does not yet have explanations for the phenomena occurring in the world and uses fantastic images, religion dominates the mind. The metaphysical stage reflects the development of philosophy – a person explains the world through abstract constructions. The positive stage reflects the transition of the human mind to the scientific, that is, according to the Contour, devoid of philosophical abstractions type of knowledge of nature.

V. O. Klyuchevsky in the “Methodology and Terminology of Russian History” refers to the elements of the methodology as five historical forces: the nature of the country, the physical nature of man, the individual, society, and "historical continuity". Each of these forces, according to him, contributes to society its own stock of elements, which are the properties and needs of the physical or spiritual nature of man, their aspirations and goals, relations between themselves. The main character of its history was not an abstract "personality" or "individual", but society, or more precisely, the "masses". Klyuchevsky considers political, social, and economic factors to be historical factors.
The core of history is the relationship between society and the state. Klyuchevsky discards the analysis of "governmental mechanisms", but focuses on the social composition of government, explores the history of the ruling classes.

Klyuchevsky explains the specifics of Russia as a huge territory: "The area of colonization in Russia expanded along with its state territory. Now falling, now rising, this age-old movement continues to this day."
Klyuchevsky objects both to the Slavophile conception of history with the alleged unity of the people with the state, to the narodnik conception that the development of capitalism is not the Russian way, and to the Marxist theory of the struggle of classes.
Klyuchevsky follows the positivist view of the interaction of elements and social forces.

The era of revolutions, the collapse of the old elites caused a mood of decline, Spengler predicted the decline of Europe, Max Weber considered pointless attempts to search for historical patterns. The positivist Bertrand Russell argued: "History is not yet a science. It can only be made to seem like a science by falsifications and omissions."
However, positivism has many faces, and other positivists have followed Condorcet's hypothesis of progress. But, of course, in this movement, they assigned the main role to science, scientists, and intellectuals.

The period before the Second World War also caused an extreme crisis in the mindset, which led literally to psychopathologies. For example, the German expert on ancient history, Eduard Meyer, claimed that during many years of research, he failed to discover a single historical law, and he did not hear that others succeeded. The German Karl Jaspers wrote in the spirit of agnosticism: "History has a deep meaning. But it is beyond human comprehension."

The refusal to comprehend history brought to life cultural and historical relativism, represented by V. Dilthey, P. Sorokin, A. Toynbee, O. Spengler. The axiological approach is opposed class approach, culture is opposed Marxist socio–economic formation approach.
The central foundation of cultural-historical relativism " is considered to be the idea of axiological pluralism… Wilhelm Dilthey, the German cultural historian and idealist philosopher ... renounces a consistent historicism that knows no non-historical values. The theory of the multiplicity of value systems, according to Dilthey, is based on" relativity " without the exception of historical phenomena. The idea of axiological pluralism put forward by him contradicts the program of value theory, since it abstracts from the cultural and historical context. Representatives of relativism were against perpetuating a single, "genuine" system of values,

developed on the basis of the historical accumulation of views. Dilthey conducted comparative studies in the field of metaphysical and religious doctrines inherent in the humanities, and demonstrated the relativism of all historical views. According to his teachings, values and norms no longer claim to be universally valid in conditions when historical and contextual analysis has replaced their religious and metaphysical justification" [1].

Sorokin

The philosopher tries to replace historical materialism with historiosophy as a philosophy that studies society as a whole. He assigns a variety of value systems and divides it into three main ones: ideational, sensual, and idealistic. The first is alien to utility, instrumentality, the highest values-God, soul, truth, good, beauty.
The sensory system – hedonistic values, pleasure, enjoyment, eudomonism(the happiness of all life), utilitarianism. The idealistic system is a synthesis of the first two. Western culture-seeks to free itself from religion, it will perish, but Sorokin, unlike Spengler, considers this natural, both of the first systems are not eternal. The core of the revived system will be religion.
Sorokin's system is as disconnected from reality as possible, if only because all cultures are idealistic and sensuous at the same time, while the most idealistic cultures are the most culturally backward. In addition, the values of one people and one time may have no value for another people and time, relativism, appealing to the obvious fact of the difference between the values of different epochs and different peoples, ignores 1) the formation of values in the social natural being 2) the opposite of the values of the bourgeois and the working class.

Spengler

In his approach, Spengler develops the concepts of the book "Russia and Europe" by his teacher, N. Y. Danilevsky. Historical materialism has been replaced by cultural studies, different cultures are absolutely heterogeneous, unique and not interconnected: "... humanity is an empty word. ... Instead of a monolithic picture of a linear world history..., I see the phenomenon of many powerful cultures…So each of them imposes on its material – humanity - its own formula, and each has its own idea, its own passions, its own life, desires and feelings...". The process of history is a picture of " the eternal formation and change, the miraculous formation and death of cultures." Behind the trees, Spengler refuses to see the forest.
Spengler identifies 8 types of cultures: Egyptian, Babylonian, Indian, Chinese, Greco-Roman, Byzantine-Arabic, Western European ("Faustian") and Mayan culture. Culture means language, art, law, religion, philosophy, but not the culture of production. Each culture has not only different values, but also truths. Culture is supposedly destroyed by civilization, understood as the principles of rationality, rationality, calculation and profit, so rational Europe is dying.
There is no whole humalityl culture, nor is there a universal morality for all peoples. But Spengler denies the obvious interrelationship of cultures, though points out precisely the prevailing egoism of the elites in each nation.
Values according to Spengler cannot be imposed from the outside, but this principle is abstract, it will become relevant only in the era of globalization.
In any case, Spengler denies the formative approach and the development of society as an ascent from the lowest to the highest, cultures arise "with sublime aimlessness, like flowers in a field", and just as aimlessly leave the stage of history, leaving nothing behind. Socialism is not a humane system, but a system of power... "welfare" in the expansive sense… Everything else is self-deception."

Toynbee

In the mid-30s, Toynbee began his 12-volume work, where he described the history of 21 civilizations and concluded by comparison that civilization is born as a response of a particular society to a challenge from nature or other societies. The challenges are overpopulation, war, etc., the answers are social reorganization, technological breakthrough, etc.
Toynbee means civilization a closed society characterized by two main criteria: religion and the form of its organization, and the territorial feature, the degree of remoteness from the place where this society originally arose. The theory is clearly focused on the United States, not even on Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom, there is no isolation of societies, religion plays only a secondary role after the economic factor. Toynbee does not consider the method of production or the culture of production in principle. In Understanding History,

Toynbee writes that civilizations "flourished because of the successful response of societies to challenges under the leadership of wise minorities made up of elite leaders." That is, Toynbee adheres to the philosophy of caste. In addition, the USSR, where there was a struggle with religion, falls out of the list of civilizations, although other modern researchers tend to present the USSR as a civilization according to Toynbee.
In the end, Toynbee counted 36 civilizations. The nature of societies is so diverse and unique that Toynbee rejects the concept of the unity of history in favor of value and cultural pluralism, that is, immoralism-long before Feyerabend.

Wallerstein

In 1974, in the work "The Modern World-system", Wallerstein, appealing to the ideas of F. Braudel, discovered that the formation of the world market is associated with uneven economic development. That is, he invented the bicycle, since the law of uneven development of states was derived by Lenin.
Braudel, on the other hand, was merely repeating the ancient idea of the interconnectedness of societies, of having a center (but not centers) with a "super-city"; in the fourteenth century it was Venice, then Flanders and England, then, of course, New York. Braudel divided societies into secondary, but developed, and marginal peripheries, which are connected by trade communications in a single macroeconomic space.
Wallerstein's "world system" is a territorial-temporal space that encompasses many political and cultural units, but at the same time is a single organism, all the activities of which are subject to the same system rules.
World-system analysis, or world-system theory, supposedly examines the social evolution of systems of societies, and not individual societies, in contrast to previous sociological approaches, in which theories of social evolution allegedly considered the development of individual societies, and not their systems.
In the 70s, world-system analysis was developed by A. G. Frank, S. Amin, J. Arrigi, and T. dos Santos.
The so-called analysis consists of the following set: minisystems are primitive societies based on natural exchange relations; world-systems are complex agrarian societies; world – economies are systems of societies united by close economic ties, acting as certain evolving units, but not united in a single political entity. Since the 16th century, feudal Europe has been transformed into a capitalist world-economy. The entire modern world is a single world-system-the capitalist world economy. The capitalist world-system consists of the core (the most highly developed countries of the West), the semi-periphery (in the XX century-the socialist countries) and the periphery (the Third World). The history of the core is the history of the struggle for hegemony.
World-empires are characterized by the collection of taxes (tribute) from provinces and captured colonies.
According to Wallerstein, all pre-capitalist world-economies were eventually transformed into world-empires through their political unification under the rule of a single state. The only exception to this rule is the medieval European world-economy, which turned not into a world-empire, but into a modern capitalist world-system.
That is. The world-system, it turns out, is not only agrarian, but also capitalist. Secondly, the laws by which mini-systems become world-systems, and world-systems are transformed into world-economies, are not determined by analysis. The world-empires, such as, for example, the Golden Horde, the Roman Empire, Portugal, Spain, Great Britain or the United States, in the scheme of analysis – are generally outside of any evolution.
The analysis does not include the anti-colonial wars, the USSR, which was ahead of the United States in space exploration, militarily, culturally, the analysis unreasonably refers to the semi-periphery, and is powerless to explain the transformation of peripheral China into the "core". This analysis does not explain the collapse of the USSR, the economic rise of "peripheral" Japan, the war between the euro and the dollar, or the crisis in the United States.
The fact is that the world-system analysis is neither a theory nor an analysis, it is only a set of notations. This construction is introduced solely to counter Marxism, the formational approach, the history of mankind as a history of class struggle, that is, historical materialism and political economy, its purpose is to hide the antagonism of the working class and the bourgeoisie. Marxism also considers both systems of states and metropolises, or the tendency of world capital to centralize, which gives rise to globalization, but it does not need any additional designations for this.
The world-system analysis is just a systemic distortion of history. Thus, in his book "World System Analysis: an Introduction," Wallerstein writes: if "traditional anti-system movements focus on issues of state power and economic structure," then "the rhetoric of 1968 ... ignored both these topics, focusing on the problems of racial and sexual discrimination". Which, of course, is not true.

“Leninism is a mobilizing response to the situation of backwardness and shame for one's backward country”, - Wallerstein writes quite seriously in the article "Lenin and Leninism Today and the Day After Tomorrow". He rejects the fact of the historical regularity of revolutions, reduces Leninism to Lenin's calls to transfer all the most advanced things from the developed countries, and, throwing historical materialism out of Leninism, declares that "such a construction is not suitable for countries at the top of the world's geopolitical and power hierarchy".
Karl Popper acted in a similar way: instead of criticizing the essence, he designated the USSR as a "closed society", and this was the whole "theory" of Popper.
Without knowing Marxism, Wallerstein declares that in Marxism-allegedly "the linear nature of social processes".
First, it bypasses Lenin's law of uneven development of countries. Secondly, Wallerstein ignores the Marxist position of regression as a necessary moment of development. But the main thing is that by "linearity" he rejects the understanding of historical development as an ascent from the simple to the complex, from the lowest to the highest.
Along with the world-system analysis and in addition to the "theories" mentioned above, the task of creating white noise around Marxism is performed by the theory of modernization, which appeared in 1991, the demographic-structural theory of Jack Goldstone, based on neo-Malthusian theory, as well as the pseudoscience of geopolitics, formulated by the fascist Haushofer. Despite the fact that the provisions of geopolitics do not correspond to history, the very name "geopolitics" is widely used in Russia in the academic environment.
In the presentation of Yu. I. Semenov, the relay-stadium approach is a modified Marxist-formational approach, but in one way or another it is the theory of the relay transfer of the torch (light) from one people to another, from one region to another, and from one social system to another.
This approach absolutizes one of the sides of history – cultural and scientific-technical exchange, while ignoring the complete disappearance or total destruction of some cultures, despite the "unity" of humanity. The connectedness of human communities is seen as something unchangeable in quality.
Neo-positivism and postmodernism deny the possibility of an objective interpretation of history, the existence of laws in history and the existence of scientific methodology in it. Popper identified these patterns with fatalism and proclaimed the complete freedom of man in the creation of history-which clearly does not correspond to history itself.
An adequate British historian, Edward Hallett Carr, argued that the West "no longer speaks" of "historical laws", that the very word "cause" has gone out of fashion.

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The other side of the idealistic understanding of history was the attempt in the XIX-XX centuries to reduce historical laws to biological ones. Sociodarvinism was based on the ideas of Comte and on the constructions of Thomas Malthus in 1798, in his opinion, the factor determining the development of mankind is, because of excessive reproduction, there will necessarily be a shortage of food for all mankind. Therefore, people will fight for existence in the same way as animals, natural selection will occur and the strongest will survive, as Herbert Spencer put it: "This is neither more nor less than a Christian expression of that universal law of nature, under the action of which only life could rise to its true height - the law on the basis of which he who does not have sufficient energy to find a means of life, is doomed to death" [2].

Racist sociological historical theories were born from sociodarvinism and with the development of genetics, one tired to explain the inferiority of the lower classes with the structure of DNA.
Of course, there is a struggle for resources, but the Malthus equation, which gives exponential population growth, is incomplete, so it is incorrect, the more accurate Verhulst equation does not give infinite growth, but the output of the population on a plateau.
Without a doubt, the biological side of a person plays an important role in social processes.
On the other hand, Lenin emphasized the difference between advanced and backward nations, and Crick, who discovered the spiral form of DNA, pointed out the difference between the genomes of the white and black races. However, two opposite conclusions can be drawn from the fact of the difference. Lenin offered preferences to backward nations, in some Soviet sports schools more attention was paid to the less able, while Hitler sent alcoholics or disabled people to the furnace.

Such "theories" as the Malthus-like explanation of the demographic catastrophe in modern Russia by the differential equation of population (S. Kapitsa), the explanation of the history of the world by the confrontation of the Rothschild and Rockefeller clans, as well as the plans of the secret world government, or cliodynamics (A. Korotaev, A. Malkov, D. Khalturina, etc.) with mathematical calculations of how many calories Caesar consumed for breakfast, are not worth considering.

History as a development

Until the 19th century, history was presented in the spirit of Herodotus, as the result of linear development according to the plan determined by the Creator. Hegel presented that the will of the Creator certain logic, by this logic, dialectic occurs the deployment of the spirit, this deployment is the history of mankind.
Solovyov writes: "...time held not only in the study of facts, as in Domani over them, because we have dominated philosophy: Hegel turned all heads."
Hegel did not reflect on history, he outlined patterns in it. That is, those objective connections in the nature of society that do not depend on the consciousness of individuals: "In world history, thanks to the actions of people in general, there are also slightly different results than those to which they aspire and which they achieve, than those results about which they are directly aware and which they desire" [3].

"Several people try, - Hegel describes the understanding of historical regularity, - to explain changes, revolutions, and destructions by accidents, awkwardness, and, above all, by frivolity and evil passions of people ..." [4].

Hegel and contemporary German philosophers presented history as a substance: "... by definition, substance is something self-sufficient, that is, it does not need anything else for its existence, is not conditioned by anything and does not interact with anything, defines itself, and is also identical, unchangeable" [5].
The history of mankind according to Hegel is a dialectical development, but when it comes to power, Hegel forgets about dialectics, the state is unshakable for him, like Cologne Cathedral.

The materialists removed the superfluous from the Hegelian model: "The first main task of materialism, which has risen above the level of primitive naturalistic concepts, is to identify its own laws of history. It is clear that materialism obliges us to look for them not in the consciousness of society (or the individual), but now not in nature. In society, it was necessary to identify and find a sphere of relations that is formed by people, but does not depend on their will and consciousness, the specific qualities of which are not only not determined by consciousness, but themselves determine it, because only on the basis of objective reality is the existence of objective and at the same time specific. The identification of such a reality is a logical prerequisite for the knowledge of the objective laws of history" [6].

As Lenin put it in his book "Materialism and empirio-criticism": "From the fact that you live and manage, give birth to children and produce products, exchange them, an objectively necessary chain of events, a chain of development, independent of your social consciousness, never fully covered by it" [7].

For Hegel, the history of mankind is the unfolding of the spirit in time. Nevertheless, the basis, the essence of history according to Hegel, is the conscious activity of individuals reproducing themselves in labor. Of course, with the caveat that the individual is a manifestation of the spirit of the people, and the spirit of the people is a manifestation of the world spirit, and the main role in social changes is played by the class of heroes-warriors, winners, timotic people, who are served by the class of "defeated", the class of those engaged in physical labor. But even the idealist Hegel sharply criticizes the romantic deification of heroes, leaders, and statesmen (Lenin refers to the "romantics" as follows: a lackey, a serf, a cad).

Among the laws of history, Hegel writes the struggle within society and between societies. The spirit overcomes itself by constantly fighting against itself. Hegel reveals dialectical laws in history: the negation of negation, the progressive movement. Thus, Hegel puts the development and progress of society as the basis of history.

It is necessary to note the point that follows from Hegel's dialectic, but Hegel himself missed-development is not only a progressive upward spiral, but also a regression as a moment of progress, which corresponds, for example, to the Dark Ages or civilization after 1991.
A. Cheshkovsky called the Hegelian concept of world history – "historiosophy", introducing the term into scientific use in his doctoral dissertation "Prolegomena to Historiosophy" (Berlin, 1838).

Hegel presents world history not as a change of socio-historical formations, but as a change of popular spirits. Thus, Hegel doubles the essences, doubles the world, complementing it with the mirror world of spirits. Hegel's dialectic ends with an assessment of the Prussian monarchy, which Hegel considers the end of the development of the spirit, the highest point.
A cut off understanding of Hegel's historiosophy is presented, for example, in the article by Gobozov [8]. Marx and Engels discard the double nonexistent world, replacing the history of heroic statesmen with the history of the struggle of classes, which are delimited not by the existence of timos, but by the social division of labor.

Before the World War

"In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, - Rusakova notes, - the Hegelian classical type of philosophy of history became the subject of criticism from Neo-Kantianism, Positivism, and the 'philosophy of life'. A significant role in the criticism of Hegel's historiosophy was played by the so-called critical philosophy of history, whose ideological leaders were G. Simmel, G. Rickert, and V. Dilthey. The critical philosophy of history defended a new type of philosophy of history, free from ontology and a priori metaphysical abstractions, from claims to comprehend the objective meanings of historical existence" [9].

"The modern philosophy of history, - writes Aron, - begins with the rejection of Hegelianism. The ideal is no longer to determine the meaning of the formation of humanity on the spot, and the philosopher no longer considers himself the keeper of the secrets of providence. Just as the "Critique of Pure Mind" did not allow the spirit to approach the truth of the intelligible world, the critical philosophy of history refuses to know the ultimate meaning of evolution. The analysis of historical knowledge relates to history in the same way as Kant's criticism relates to dogmatic metaphysics" [10].

The rejection of Hegelianism takes place long before "modern" philosophy.
"Our theories of the 1940s, - fan of a state K. D. Kavelin wrote, - were based on general principles taken from outside, from idealistic German philosophy or from the facts of Western European political and social life, so they were torn from the ground, were too a priori for Russian life". As a result, in the works of fans of a state of a later time, there was a rejection of "biased general ideas", which in line with this trend actually meant a transition to a neo-Kantian critique of Hegelian philosophy, positivism.

However, Aron commits a fraud: the critical philosophy of history does not revolt against Hegel, but against historical materialism.

Raymond Aron, the founder of the critical philosophy of history and supposedly a critic of its positivist interpretation, writes about "the philosophy of historical relativism, which was developed at the beginning of the century, especially after the war, and followed the period devoted to the analysis of science… Evolutionism became historicism on the day when the two values on which the faith of the nineteenth century was based - positive science and democracy, i.e., in essence, rationalism - lost their prestige and authority. Irrationalism has led to pessimism: history has no purpose, because a person has no purpose and, being always like himself, creates short-lived works in vain. In turn, this argument expresses a situation or situation. A German professor with pretensions to aristocracy (biological or spiritual) has an aversion to our mass civilizations, to industrialism, to all forms of socialism ... relativism is always associated with a certain metaphysics. In Trelch's teaching, becoming is the progressive unfolding through time of an inaccessible God. According to Scheler, relativity, moreover, transcended by the ever-valid hierarchy of values, expresses the necessary cooperation of individual or superindividual personalities.; the world of essences is shown fragmentally to each individual, hence the need for a temporary dispersion of lifestyles and thoughts in order to exhaust the intelligible world.

Manheim imagines as an absolute historical totality, which is both real and meaningful, as pure fate, which has neither a providential nor a democratic character. For French sociologists, societies represent the principle and the root cause of change, as well as moral imperatives, since they are confused with social imperatives, remain valid in spite of or because of their diversity. Relativism recognizes neither the accumulation of truths nor progress; it recognizes only dialectics without a goal. He reduces the philosophy of becoming (and not evolution) to anarchy of values, even if he does not destroy the independence of human creations... " [11]

In addition to the interjection about the rationality of democracy-it would seem to be a true, destroying criticism. But then the liberal, staunch anti-communist Aron actually joins relativism:
"The problem was posed by two series of papers, two groups of facts. Studies of primitive thinking have shown to what extent the manner of thinking, the ways of explanation are subject to change. On the other hand, sociology or the history of cultures have shown a pluralism of ideas about the world, conceptual possibilities, and the formal categories themselves. In this sense, today everyone recognizes the peculiarity of Chinese thinking, Indian thinking."
After Aron, Paul Feyerabend will repeat the same thing.
"...it is difficult for a professional intellectual not to accept democracy de jure, although in doing so he may further proclaim de facto aristocracy: his thought is accessible only to a minority, " Aron wrote in his 1955 book The Opium of Intellectuals. History as a class struggle has been discarded, the demiurge of history is an intellectual, thought is so old that it has managed to become moldy.

Neo-positivism

Positivism emerged as a reaction not so much to the crisis in science as to the crisis of capitalism.
Dugem, Helholtz, Hertz, Mach, Ostwald, Pearson, Poincare, and Verworn are outstanding scientists, however.
"Not a single one of these professors, who are able to give the most valuable works in the special fields of chemistry, history, and physics, can be trusted in a single word when it comes to philosophy. Why? For the same reason that no professor of political economy, who is capable of giving the most valuable works in the field of factual, special research, can be trusted in a single word when it comes to the general theory of political economy. For this latter is just as much a party science in modern society as epistemology", - Lenin writes in his book “Materialism and Empiriocriticism”.

A torn consciousness is characteristic of a society torn by hierarchy. A religious physicist is able to make scientific discoveries in line with the dialectical-materialistic culture, without resorting to the version of God. But as soon as he encounters something inexplicable in physics, the dialectical-materialistic method is discarded.
In a letter dated 10.12.1692 to the editor of Trinity College, Cambridge, Richard Bantley, Newton discusses models of the universe, how the Sun and other stars could have formed. "But how the substance could be divided into two parts, and the one that is suitable for this, merged into a luminous body, while the other remained dark or turned into a dark one, when the first remained unchanged-this, in my opinion, can not be explained by natural causes alone, and I must attribute this to the thought and act of the will of the Creator" [12].

In contrast to this type of thinking, the dialectical-materialistic method draws on the further study of nature, the question posed by Newton is resolved after the creation of nuclear physics, special relativity and quantum mechanics.
Lenin points out that because of the social hierarchy, scientists are biased by the ruling class. Lenin only loses sight of the fact that the social basis of positivism is not only a social hierarchy, but a social gap, a social division of labor, which generates a contradiction between the abstract and concrete content of labor, in a simplified formulation - a contradiction between mental and physical labor.
Moreover, the elimination of classes means the elimination not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the working class, that is, the disappearance of depersonalizing labor, and, secondly , the transformation of the labor of the intelligentsia, which is freer than the working class.

Philosophy arises every time a particular science within itself denies itself, taking a step towards new knowledge. Philosophy arises outside of a given science every time a new science arises at the intersection of sciences.

Does this mean that there is no independent content in philosophy at all, different from the totality of the sciences, and will philosophy not disappear when the gap between the sciences is bridged?
Lenin warns that the specialization of labor, and therefore scientific specialization, will never disappear, on the contrary, it will deepen. Therefore, philosophy in this sense will not disappear.
Of course, philosophy will not disappear in view of the complexity of the process of knowledge, and in view of the need to rethink it for new discoveries.
At the same time, philosophy, based on the totality of sciences, uses its own categorical apparatus, that is, it is at the operational level and has a predictive value. However, the exaltation of this value, as we have seen in the USSR, and now in numerous examples of bourgeois philosophy, turns philosophy into scholasticism, into a transfusion from empty to empty, into primitive agitation.

Positivism is a philosophical teaching that comes from the Stoics and Kant, which defines the only source of true, actual knowledge as empirical and theoretical natural science research and denies the cognitive value of philosophy.
German positivism was different from Comte's, it was called the second positivism or empiriocriticism, its representatives - Mach, Avenarius, in Russia – the Bolshevik A. Bogdanov (empiriomonist), in the United States – the pragmatist Ch. Pier.
Positivism was subjected to a scathing criticism in Lenin's book “Materialism and Empiriocriticism”.

In the late 1920s, neo-positivism emerged (M, Schlick, O. Neurath, B. Russell, D. Moore, L. Wittgenstein, etc.), after the war, its representatives emigrated, and neo-positivism ceased to exist as a philosophical trend.
In social terms, positivism became a defensive reaction both to the era of revolutions and to the blow inflicted on the church by science, as part of scientism, which represents scientific knowledge as the highest cultural value and the fundamental factor of human interaction with the world. That is, the social hierarchy produced an exaltation of the natural science worldview, which led back to idealism.

The epistemological roots of positivism were the latest discoveries in physics, which led to the destruction of the previous mechanistic ideas about nature.
Engels noted that with each epoch-making discovery, even in the natural history field, materialism must inevitably change its form (see [13]).

Until 1991, Soviet philosophy claimed that scientists in capitalist countries are able to make great discoveries because they are spontaneous materialists. Materialism, on the other hand, presupposes dialectics. Ilyenkov noted that scientists are at the same time spontaneous dialectics, since the logic of science reflects a part of nature, because it is part of dialectics. Thus, scientists, combining spontaneous materialism and spontaneous dialectics, according to the Soviet official philosophy, turn into Marxists.
Auguste Comte said that science is a philosophy in itself.

Of course, in their research, scientists act like dialectical materialists. But this does not mean that they are socially obliged to be Marxists. Thus, they face the problem of how to link their social idealism with the methodology of thinking that their own scientific research generates.
One can say that the positivism of most Soviet scientists was a reaction to the broad interpretation of the functions of philosophy since the reign of Stalin, who declared genetics a pseudoscience incompatible with dialectical materialism.
On the other hand, such areas of physics as quantum mechanics or general relativity are interpreted in such a way as to satisfy idealistic attitudes, which would seem to lead to dualism, but in later variations simply denies the objectivity of science, interpreting its provisions in the spirit of solipsism.
Thus, science (or its problems) becomes, according to the precepts of Thomas Aquinas, only a tool in proving the existence of God.

After the Second World War, neo-positivism (postpositivism) emerged, represented by Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Michael Polani, Karl Popper, Stephen Toulmin, and Paul Feyerabend. For example. Popper is an ardent opponent of the USSR, Feyerabend - turns Marxism into anarchism, the social bias of this trend is obvious.

Lenin

Fallibilism and Pierre Dugem

To see more clearly what neo-positivism is, it is necessary to recall Lenin's work "Materialism and Empirio-criticism". Lenin points out that the basis of empirio-criticism is sophism, the substitution of the content of concepts.

Man knows nature through the senses, the empiriocritics argue; therefore, we know only our senses and cannot break through our senses directly to nature.

Lenin points out that in the first part of the judgment, the word "feelings" refers to the connection between man and nature, in the second part this content is discarded and replaced with the meaning "the partition between the world and man".

However, if idealism could be refuted by verbal evidence, it would long ago have been refuted forever. But idealism arises every time with every new discovery in science, with every new social revolution.

The neo-positivists attribute Lenin's views to fallibilism, and quite in vain.

Fallibilism is the direction of postpositivism, according to which any scientific knowledge is not fundamentally final, but is only an intermediate interpretation of the truth, implying a subsequent replacement for a better interpretation. The principle of fallibilism intersects with Popper's principle of tolerance.

The concept of fallibilism was developed by C. S. Peirce, who argued that at any given time our knowledge of reality is partial and conjectural, there is a point in the continuum of unreliability and uncertainty: "Absolute infallibility may be inherent only in the Pope and economic advisers, but I am quite sure that it is not inherent in the multiplication table."

In fact, the term "fallibilism" is exclusively a service term, it is intended to replace the materialistic understanding of the dialectic of relative and absolute truths.

To. Popper, I. Lakatos, and P. Feyerabend considered Lenin one of the forerunners of fallibilism because of his alleged interpretation of P. Dugem's ideas.

First, Dugem has no ideas, but he has a lack of thought. Secondly, Lenin in this book does not interpret Dugem's "ideas" at all, he trampled it down (with the exception of trivialities): «Such works as P. Dugem's "Theory of Physics" or Stallo's "Concepts and Theories of Modern Physics", which Mach particularly recommends, show extremely clearly that these" physical " idealists attach the most importance to the proof of the relativity of our knowledge, fluctuating, in essence, between idealism and dialectical materialism. Both authors ... are at war most vigorously with the atomistic-mechanical understanding of nature. They prove the limitations of such an understanding, the impossibility of recognizing it as the limit of our knowledge, and the ossification of many concepts in writers who adhere to this understanding. And such a flaw in the old materialism is undeniable; the lack of understanding of the relativity of all scientific theories, the ignorance of dialectics, the exaggeration of the mechanical point of view — for this Engels reproached the former materialists. But Engels was able (unlike Stallo) to throw out Hegelian idealism and understand the genius of the true grain of Hegelian dialectics. Engels abandoned the old, metaphysical materialism in favor of dialectical materialism, and not in favor of relativism, sliding into subjectivism. "Mechanical theory, - says Stallo, for example, - together with all metaphysical theories, hypostases particular, ideal, and perhaps purely conditional groups of attributes or individual attributes and treats them as different types of objective reality" (p. 150). This is true if you do not renounce the recognition of objective reality and fight metaphysics as anti-dialectic… Dugem did the same. With an enormous expenditure of labor ... he proves that "every law of physics is temporary and relative, because it is approximate" (280). And a man is breaking through an open door! - thinks the Marxist… But the trouble with Dugem, Stallot, Mach, and Poincare is that they do not see the door opened by dialectical materialism. Not being able to give the correct formulation of relativism, they roll from it to idealism. "The law of physics, as a matter of fact, is neither true nor false, but approximate", - writes Dugem (p. 274). In this "a" there is already the beginning of falsehood, the beginning of the blurring of the line between

the theory of science, which approximately reflects the object, i.e., approaches objective truth, and the theory of arbitrary, fantastic, purely conditional, for example, the theory of religion or the theory of the chess game. This falseness goes so far as to declare the question of whether "material reality" corresponds to sensory phenomena as metaphysics (p. 10): down with the question of reality; our concepts and hypotheses are simple symbols (signes, p. 26), "arbitrary" (27) constructions, etc. From here one step is taken to idealism, to the "physics of the believer", such as G. P. Dugem. Peter Dugem is in the spirit of Kantianism and preaches (in Ray, p. 162; cf. p. 160). And good-natured Adler (Fritz) is also a Machist who wants to be a Marxist! — I have not found anything smarter than to "correct" Dugem in the following way: he removes " the realities hidden behind phenomena, only as objects of theory, and not as objects of reality."[282] This is a familiar critique of Kantianism from the point of view of Hume and Berkeley. But there can be no question of any conscious Kantianism in P. Dugem. He just wobbles, like Mach, not knowing what to rely on for his relativism. In a number of places, he comes close to dialectical materialism. We know sound "as it exists in relation to us, not as it is in itself, in the bodies that generate sound. This reality, from which our sensations reveal only the external and the superficial, gives us the opportunity to learn the theories of acoustics. They tell us that where our perceptions grasp only that appearance which we call sound, there really exists a movement periodic, miniature, very rapid", etc. (p. 7). Bodies are not symbols of sensations, but sensations are symbols (or rather, images) of bodies. "The development of physics causes a constant struggle between nature, which does not tire of giving material, and reason, which does not tire of knowing" (p. 32) - nature is infinite, just as its smallest particle (including the electron) is infinite, but reason also endlessly turns "things in itself" into "things for us".»

For Lenin, truth is not a judgment, but a contradictory process in which the content of knowledge does not depend on the subject. Cognition is the ascent of relative truths to absolute truths. Absolute truth does not exist, but at the same time it exists through relative truths.
"...Human thinking, "writes Lenin," is by its nature capable of giving and gives us absolute truth, which consists of the sum of relative truths. Each stage in the development of science adds new grains to this sum of absolute truth, but the limits of the truth of each scientific position are relative, being sometimes extended, sometimes narrowed by the further growth of knowledge" [14].
"The only conclusion from the opinion shared by Marxists that Marx's theory is objective truth," he writes further, "is this: if we follow the path of Marx's theory, we will approach objective truth more and more (never exhausting it); if we follow any other path, we can come to nothing but confusion and lies" [ibid., p. 146].

So Lakatos, Popper, Feyerabend are simply illiterate.

The crisis in physics at the beginning of the XX century
At the end of the XIX — beginning of the XX century, a revolution began in natural science: X – rays (1895), the phenomenon of radioactivity (1896), the electron (1897), when studying the properties of which they found the variability of its mass depending on the speed, radium (1898), the independence of the speed of light from the speed of the light source (the Michelson-Morley experiment), radio (Hertz, Popov, etc.), black body radiation, etc. Rutherford's planetary model of the atom, the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics were a step away from these discoveries.

Under the influence of empiriocriticism were some prominent scientists, A. Poincare, A. Einstein experienced the influence of empiriocriticism. One of the leaders of the German social-democracy K. Kautsky, the Austrian social-Democrat F. In Russia, the Social Revolutionaries V. V. Lesevich and V. M. Chernov, etc., the Menshevik N. Valentinov (who later became an anti-communist), P. S. Yushkevich, and the Bolsheviks A. Bogdanov, V. Bazarov, and A.V. Lunacharsky considered it possible to "supplement" Marxism with Machist epistemology. Lunacharsky proposed to combine scientific socialism with religion ("god-building"), believing that in a religious form socialism would be "closer and more understandable" to the Russian people.

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epistemology. Lunacharsky proposed to combine scientific socialism with religion ("god-building"), believing that in a religious form socialism would be "closer and more understandable" to the Russian people.

"Classical physics proceeded from the metaphysical identification of matter as a philosophical category with certain ideas about its structure. When these ideas radically changed, idealist philosophers, as well as individual physicists, began to talk about the" disappearance "of matter, to prove the" failure " of materialism... the law of conservation and transformation of energy was used in the twentieth century. Ostwald for the justification of "energetism", for the proof of the" disappearance "of matter and its transformation into energy," – one says in the collected works of Lenin in the preface to the book "Materialism and empirio-criticism".

In 1908, a joint book by Bazarov, Berman, Bogdanov, Gelfand, Lunacharsky, Suvorov, and Yushkevich “Essays on the Philosophy of Marxism” was published. Plekhanov criticized the book, and Lenin called it "Essays against the Philosophy of Marxism".

Although in 1899 Lebedev proved the existence of light pressure, and in 1900 he proved the existence of light pressure. Planck proposed the idea of a quantum of light. That is, matter passes from one form to another, there are no "energy particles" or energy in its pure form, without a material carrier.
Much less trivial is the attempt to substitute geometry for matter, when the mass (the momentum energy tensor) is assumed to be zero in the model problem of solving the Einstein equations. The equations give an empty Minkowski space as a solution. On the other hand, in the Higgs model, particles initially do not have a rest mass (inert), it is acquired only when interacting with the Higgs field.
It is not the mass that disappears, but our crude conception of it; it is not determinism that disappears, but our mechanistic conception of it.
It is not Einstein's equations that indicate the possibility of a form without matter, but the existence of a solution without matter that indicates the limitations of Einstein's equations.

"The crisis of physics, - wrote Lenin, - consists in the breaking of the old laws and basic principles, in the rejection of objective reality outside of consciousness, i.e., in the replacement of materialism with idealism and agnosticism" [ibid., pp. 272-273].
Lenin also criticizes the agnostic theory of symbols, or hieroglyphs, according to which sensations are only conventional signs, and not images of real things.

What does Popper write about Lenin's book? He admires the book because it is written "simply". This is all that the great philosopher of the twentieth century could understand from the book.
There is a natural question about the intellectual level of Popper, Feyerabend, Lakatos.

Ilyenkov writes: "For some time now, they began to seriously believe that everything written on this topic by Marx and Engels is a 'semantically inaccurate' expression of their own philosophy. All the statements of Marx and Engels are "outdated" because they are expressed in an outdated language, in the lexicon of the philosophical tradition in the atmosphere of which their thinking was formed in their youth. All this is simply a verbal garbage in their heritage - "verbal trinkets" of Hegelian-Feuerbachian nonsense, and no more. This is how they write about "matter" and "contradiction". The "real" philosophy of Marx and Engels must therefore be purged of all this verbal rubbish, and its "rational kernel" must be set forth in the language of modern science - in the terminology of Mach, Ostwald, Pearson, Poincare, and other luminaries of modern natural science.
Lenin scoffs at the positivists ' predilection for inventing "new words" - all these "introjections" and "principal co-ordinations", "transcendences" and "empirio-symbols", "notals", "securals" and "fidentials". At that time, this style was just coming into fashion (or rather, was being introduced), but Lenin considered it necessary to deal with it specifically. He showed that its only meaning is to give trivial idealistic platitudes the appearance of profundity and"scientific".
It would not be a sin to think about this for those current authors who persistently try to "enrich" the lexicon of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge and logic with the fruits of the philosophical verbiage of Carnap and Ayer, Schlick and Popper — "concepts" and "denotations", "extensions" and "explanandums", "epistemological postulates" and other "paradigms" — and even dream in the light (or rather, in the light of 2) such "precision-verified concepts" to clarify the theoretical definitions of the concepts of materialistic

dialectics, its categories, to make them "more effective and heuristic". It would be a good dialectic, presented with the help of this absurd mixture of Anglicized Latin with Upper-Bavarian and Nizhny Novgorod dialect!.. "They" no longer produce scientific knowledge, but only pseudo-scientific abstractions, which are presented as philosophical generalizations".

Lenin's mistakes

Lenin, as mentioned above, easily deals with the logical premise of positivism, borrowed from Hume, if we perceive the world with the help of our senses, then we can not claim that the world exists, because we can not break out of our senses.
Lenin notes sophism, the substitution of the content of the concept.

Ilyenkov explains very simply what mistakes of positivists Lenin points out:
"Philosophy" in its Machist-Bogdanov version... aims the thinking of man at the composition of "ultimate abstractions", in the "neutral" bosom of which all differences, all opposites, all contradictions are extinguished. And in matter, and in consciousness, and in the relation between matter and consciousness. And this is a direct consequence of the idealism of its epistemological axioms. After all, "elements of the world", and tectological "structures of organization", and "logical frameworks", and" abstract objects"," systems in general", and" God", and" absolute spirit " — all these are just different pseudonyms that hide the same — idealistic-mystified human consciousness. The main link in the entire strategy of the Machists ' campaign against the philosophy of Marxism was an attempt to dissect the living unity of materialist dialectics as a theory of development and as a theory of knowledge and logic, first to separate "ontology" from "epistemology", and then to oppose them to each other, thereby killing the essence of dialectics as a philosophical science. The calculation here was simple: with this dissection, the materialist worldview was most easily identified with a specific and historically limited natural-scientific" picture of the world", with the "physical", and on this basis attributed to all materialism the vices and failures of this "ontology". On the other hand, the same operation could be performed with materialistic "epistemology", identifying it with some new natural science concept of "the psychic". The identification of philosophy with a generalized summary of scientific data made it possible to portray the case as if natural science itself gives rise to idealism. To destroy the originality of philosophy, its approach to phenomena, its system of concepts-this meant attributing idealism to natural science itself" ("Militant materialism means dialectical").

But let us repeat: if it were possible to deal with idealism logically, it would not exist long ago. As Engels said: "To defeat the idea of private property, the idea of communism is enough. To defeat private property itself, communist action is necessary". Lenin said the same thing about religion: any logic opposed to theology would be powerless in the absence of a revolutionary movement.

At the same time, there are frankly weak points in Lenin's book.
Bogdanov was criticized by all Soviet philosophers, and Ilyenkov even agreed that the country's economy was harmed by the influence of Bogdanov's "theory of equilibrium". How the tectology developed by Bogdanov could cause harm is unknown. Bogdanov only tried to extend the principle of Le Chatelier to society, to some extent he is right when we see how the sharp increase in the process of globalization after the collapse of the USSR causes countries to resist the destruction of state borders by strengthening protectionist measures, etc.

In his answer to Lenin in the book "Faith and Science" Bogdanov confuses, he attributes to Lenin the understanding of absolute truth in the spirit of Hegel-Schelling-Berdyaev, although Lenin meant the correspondence of relative truth to nature, only in this sense relative, approximate truth is absolute. So Bogdanov clearly misidentifies Lenin's philosophy with religion.
But Bogdanov accurately captures Lenin's misunderstanding not of idealism, but of religion, and ignorance of its history. Bogdanov explains what religion is: this is a reflection in the public consciousness of the social hierarchy.

What is wrong with Lenin's book?

For example, Hume did not deny the existence of the real world. He just didn't want to see enough evidence of it. In fact, the question of the senses posed by Hume and Berkeley is not so simple.
Lenin speaks of objective reality, but leaves aside subjective reality. The imprint of the coin on the wax is only its image, it is ideal, because it has neither weight nor smell, but its designed carrier is no less material than the coin itself. In consciousness, not mythical information clumps interact, but it is the material carriers of images, through nerve impulses.
We are talking about the inability to go beyond the circle of these material interactions. Since man is an open system, the question of whether the logic of these interactions corresponds to the logic of the external world is solved within the framework of Marxism. But a person has something that does not belong to the outside world, even if the external world includes what comes from the human body. For example, the human "I". The logic of the interactions of these "internal ""impressions" is described by literature, in general, by culture. It is not difficult to learn to distinguish a dream from reality, but in general, the question of the correspondence of "impressions" to the outside world becomes far from trivial. For example, when it comes to the manipulation of mass consciousness due to the marginalization of the population, delirium tremens, narcotic, hypnotic, zombified or altered consciousness, as well as memory disorders, in particular, false memories.

The new postpositivism

It would seem that the highly appreciated works of Marx and Engels, the works of Nikolai Kareev, the primitive Danilevsky, Berdyaev, the left liberal Veniamin Khvostov, Nikolai Kareev, Ilin, who served Hitler, and the construction of opponents of Marxism, Klyuchevsky, Lev Karsavin, or Konstantin Leontiev, have been forever supplanted by the scholasticism of the Ersatz Marxism of the Stalinist and post-Stalinist USSR. However, in view of the inevitability of metabolism and reproduction of living matter, their work was continued by new intensively dividing colonies of microorganisms.

Soviet historiosophists can be typified into three strains: not perestroyed, perestroyed, and late (after 1991). The first strain can be attributed to the historian V. S. Lelchuk, his book "Where Communism Begins: the CPSU - the organizer and leader of the national movement for communist Labor" (1961) accurately characterizes his educational level. You could add the military historian V. D. Polikarpov, his level is higher, but he warmly welcomed the “perestroika”.
Peter Grechko belongs to the perestroika – he has ideas about the practical-theoretical continuality of social reality, about the inevitability of turning the criterion task of practice into the form and course of proving objective truths of knowledge, about the natural relationship of practice as a social norm with nature or basic human needs, about the archetypal role of equality in the historical existence of justice, about exploitation as a social utilization of natural inequality of people, about meta-patterns of the historical process and conceptual models of the science of history, about pluralism as a new social paradigm., replacing collectivism and individualism, about the foundations and future possibilities of cross-cultural interactions, about the pyramid of correctly understood interests as a functional analogue of civil society, about the humanistic and socio-optimistic implications of postmodern discourse…
It is not difficult to discern the standard primitive bourgeois ideology behind Grechko's scientology.
In contrast to the five-member scheme of changing formations, I. M. Diakonov unprovenly rejects slavery and feudalism, arbitrarily supplements the stages of development of society to eight, introducing, in addition, a post-capitalist stage.

Alexander Ivin, proponent of the axiological approach in history. Hakob of Nazareth, gravitating towards Toynbee and Wallerstein. Alexander Panarin, who transformed from a liberal dissident of the Soviet era into a Russian religious nationalist. Elgiz Pozdnyakov, considers Haushofer's pseudoscience of geopolitics a science. Anatoly Rakitov, Yeltsin's adviser, is an accurate description of his "scientific" achievements. Evgeny Rashkovsky, who wrote the book "Orthodox Holidays".
Vadim Yakovlev, a champion of pluralism. Nikolai Rozov, trained at the Fernand Braudel Center under Wallerstein.
Later: Leonid Grinin, A. Korotaev, A. I. Filyushkin, etc., whose works are not worth considering.

The discourse of the past postpositivism was continued in the translation to the Russian reality, it is strongly opposed to Marxism-Leninism and is based on the construction of historical myths. The mouthpiece of the historical exercises of Wallerstein, Attali, Fukuyama, Huntington, etc. there is a plagiarist Fursov, as if Igor Pykhalov, Alexander Kolpakidi and Elena Prudnikova act from opposite positions, from the third position Edward Radzinsky interprets history, from the fourth – Alexander Pyzhikov, before them Alexander Bushkov and two defectors, Grigory Klimov, a CIA employee, and Vladimir Rezun (Suvorov) were engaged in the distortion of history.

The main directions of the new mythology are liberal and Stalinist. The first includes myths about the extermination of Poles by NKVD officers in the Katyn forest (actually, this is an old myth of Goebbels), German money for Lenin, etc., Basically, its origins are old myths of Western propaganda, the writings of Autorkhanov, Bazhanov, Antonov-Ovseenko, Solonevich, Conquest, etc. The second includes myths about Stalin's leadership of the October Revolution, the Red Army in the Civil War, the "ten Stalinist blows", in the Patriotic War, the rehabilitation of victims of Stalinist repression etc. To these are added a whole heap of teachings: the teachings of Sulakshin, the teachings of the lunar conspiracy, the teachings of world programming and secret world government, usually Zionist, etc.
Earlier historians distorted certain facts and figures, as, for example, French historians underestimated the number of French troops in the battles of Borodino or Berezina and increased the number of Russian troops, German historians did the same with regard to the Rzhev operation, the battle of Prokhorovka, etc.

Modern historiosophists operate with huge amounts of data, replacing not the numbers, but the causes of historical phenomena.
Such regularities of the historical process as riots, uprisings, revolutions are passed off as the machinations of the special services, on the other hand, the organization of coups by the special services, paid mass actions – are passed off as revolutions, popular protests.

History is a science with objective laws that do not depend on the individual's consciousness. These laws are implemented, as Engels noted, through the will of people, but they are objective.
The difference between social and natural science laws is obvious, there is no fatalism of classical mechanics in history, but, as it turned out in the 80s, there is no fatalism in classical mechanics, not to mention quantum mechanics. There is also a significant difference between the variability of natural science and social laws. The latter change from epoch to epoch, their change is clearly an act of the will of the masses, the role of leaders is reduced to following the logic of this replacement, but within the epoch, social laws prevail over the will of the people.

The difference between idealism and materialism is that idealism exalts the activity of kings, military leaders, presidents, and general secretaries in changing the laws, while historical materialism puts the struggle of classes, that is, the "average" class (i.e., the unified) consciousness, which, in turn, is determined by the class (average) existence, at the forefront.

The former historical positivism (relativism) declares the laws of history to depend on the subject. The new postpositivism partially preserves relativism, declaring history to be the history of elites, in which it is identical with Stalinism. At the same time, he builds up the alleged laws of history, independent of the consciousness of people, but these laws, capturing particular facts, have nothing to do with reality.

"The philosophy of history," writes Lenin, " gives very, very little - this is understandable, for it is here, precisely in this field, in this science, that Marx and Engels made the greatest advance. Here Hegel is most outdated... " [15].
But it gave a lot to the historiosophists themselves!
The modern philosophy of history is neither history nor philosophy; it is a tool in the tools of bourgeois propaganda.

Conclusion

The main directions in the philosophy of history include the following: civilizational (N. Y. Danilevsky, O. Spengler, A. Toynbee, S. Eisenstadt, B. S. Erasov, D. M. Bondarenko, I. V. Sledzevsky, S. A. Nefedov, G. V. Aleksushin, etc.); world-system (A. G. Frank, I. Wallerstein, S. Amin, J. Arrigi, T. dos Santos, K. Chase-Dunn, J. Abu-Lugod, M. A. Cheshkov, A. V. Korotaev, L. E. Grinin, etc.); the school of "Annals" (M. Blok, L. Fevre, F. Braudel, J. Le Goff, A. Ya. Gurevich, etc.); relay-stadium or relay-formation (J. Bodin, L. Leroy, A. R. J. Turgot, G. B. de Mably, I. G. Herder, Kant, Fichte, etc.).
These areas were discussed above.
Have you noticed how many surnames there are? And all thanks to coitus, DNA replication, and, finally, childbirth.

Scientific approach, formational approsch: the driving force of social development is the same class struggle (K. Marx, F. Engels, G. V. Plekhanov, V. I. Lenin, Labriola, etc.
The scientific approach to history we can see in books of Thierry, Guizot, M. A. Barga ("Epochs and Ideas"), B. Porshnev ("On the beginning of human History").
The formational approach to criticizing Stalinist ideas was explored in [16].
One could add the ethnodynamics of Levi Strauss and L. Gumilyov (except for the theory of passionarity, which is not confirmed by history), but ethnodynamics is essential only in the early stages of the development of societies.

In history, there are no billiard balls, historical materialism is not eliminated from such a factor of history as the consciousness of people, their individuality: "... people make their own history, but they do it not arbitrarily, but in accordance with objective conditions and social laws" [17].
Engels emphasizes that historical laws are realized through the will of individuals. But historical materialism points out that both the consciousness and the will of people are not independent, they are determined by the relations of production, which, in turn, do not depend on their will. Marx emphasizes that the individual is a concrete set of social relations. Individuals may not act in accordance with the historical law, but their "average" action will be zero.

On the other hand, social laws, in contrast to natural science, change from epoch to epoch, the laws of the feudal mode of production change to the laws of capitalism, this change occurs through revolutions, that is, social laws are changed by people themselves. At the same time, with each revolution, the individual becomes freer in his actions, and his actions become more significant for society.
The German philosopher Hempel proposed to consider historical laws as "laws having a probabilistic-statistical form", which follow from the regularity of the repetition of the same causal relationships [18].
Kovalchenko agrees with him: historical necessity can be realized as a probabilistic process, as an inevitability, and as an accident [19].
That is, the law of history is similar to the statistical laws of Gauss or Boltzmann in physics.

However, history can suddenly deviate from the probabilistic path, in this its laws are closer to the laws of Whitney's theory of singularities and to the theory of catastrophes. But these laws are too general, too crude for a diverse history, and stochastic, synergetic laws are not applicable to history, they can only describe particular moments.
Every historical event is unique, and its causes and effects are blurred. On the other hand, laws are not deduced from the repeatability of events in repeatable situations, but repeatability is a necessary part of this deduction. The repeatability for most historical events is highly variable.

Any science operates with abstractions that eliminate the uniqueness of phenomena, but for history, uniqueness is essential. That is, the formalization of history, as it is represented, for example, by analytical Marxism, is impossible in principle.
"It is impossible to explain an individual event in the sense of taking into account all the characteristics with the help of universalist hypotheses, although the explanation of what happened in a certain place and at a certain point in time can gradually become more accurate and complete" - noted Hempel [20].

In the formulation of M. A. Barg, sociological laws are correlated with a pair of "possible – impossible", historical laws-a triplet of "probably-unlikely-improbable" [21].

Accordingly, there are trends in history, but the laws are extremely vague and relate only to the change of formations within the framework of dialectical development from simple to complex.

However, historical materialism and Marxist political economy proved to be the only theories with predictive value. Until 1991, Marxists predicted 11 Polish economic crises, the political situation in Somalia and Ethiopia in the 70s, the victory of Deng Xiaoping over Hua Guo Feng, the legalization of the CPSU elite as bourgeois, the victory of Yeltsin over the Armed Forces of the RSFSR, the war in Chechnya, the collapse of the USSR, the provocation of Georgia with the attack on Tskhinvali, Maidan 2014, etc.

Summing up.
In various mythologies and religions, history is understood fatalistically. In the constructions of non-positivists-relativistically. For Kant and Hegel, randomness is external, and fatalism is inevitable when the framework of the system is expanded, whereas randomness is natural, immanent in substance. The understanding of the immanence of chance for the historical process has not yet entered into the foundation of history as a science.

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OBJECTIVE REASONS OF DISINTEGRATION OF THE USSR

Foreword

The history of this work is strange to say the least. In it, the author used the fact of the deconcentration (the author's term) of labor in the USSR, the fictitious socialization of production, which he also discovered. The

magazine "Alternatives" published an article by Ikhlov, which points out this fact. Ten years passed, and MSU professor A. Buzgalin, in the next issue of the same magazine "Alternatives" in 2001, appropriated the authorship of the discovery and, accordingly, the term, which made Ikhlov publicly appear with the article "Globalization in Russian".
This article was first partially published in the materials of the interuniversity conference "National issue: history and modernity" (Perm, PSU, 1996). However, the university scientific community did not notice this work.
In 2001, the author presented this article at the international conference of the "Alternatives" movement in Moscow, organized by the Buzgalin group. But even after that, this article remained unknown to the general reader. It is understandable that scientists holding the positions of the CPSU or the CPRF "do not notice" the article: it crosses out all the works that have been written on this topic by S.G. Kara-Murza, S.V. Cheshko, M.G. Suslov and others who believe that the main reasons were either external or external, together with the activities of Khrushchev.
Liberal-democratic analysts do not see this work either.
It is even more surprising that Ikhlov's article is not accepted in an environment that considers itself Marxist-Leninist, even in circles close to the Samara Marxist philosopher E. V. Nikishina. Although the above principled position (in its modern form) was formulated by Nikishina (Ikhlov refers to her in the article). Moreover, this provision was formulated by Lenin, arguing that even 1000 Marx in the government will not be able to manage the country's economy.
Even after the author included this article in his book "Lessons of the Revolution", the scientific community tried not to notice either the article in the book or (with rare exceptions) the book itself.
To this day, there is not a single link to the article in the texts on the Internet, and various researchers continue to explain the collapse of the USSR either by the activity of the CIA and its agent Matthias Rust, or by the subjective moods of the population of the Union republics, or by the betrayal of the CPSU Secretary General, or by the Declaration of Sovereignty. signed by three people in Bialowieza.

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Part of the material is presented in [1].
Let us list the points of view on the collapse of the USSR.
1) Liberal democrats believe that the origins of national enmity and the collapse of the USSR are in totalitarianism, in the monopolization of the economy, in ideological pressure. It is widely believed that the basis of national enmity is Soviet poverty. The version is doubtful, since national, national-religious and racial conflicts have occurred and are occurring also in developed countries.
The continuation of conflicts after the collapse of the USSR-CPSU is viewed in official journalism as a residual phenomenon of the same totalitarianism.
The liberal point of view appeals to the myth that the USSR stood on the brink of an abyss, "sat on an oil needle," and oil prices collapsed, the external debt reached 80 billion dollars, with gold reserves of $ 20 billion, thus there is another way out. there was no way to destroy the USSR and bring down the economy.

They point to poverty, misery, unemployment, the war in Afghanistan, the decrepitude of the leadership, the cultural influence from outside, the lack of freedom of speech, free elections, the extensiveness of the economy; allegedly in the USSR, the economy was put in the service of the military.
However, in the USSR in 1986 there were only 1.7 million unemployed per 140 million active population, 1.2%, there was no talk of hunger, if workers received 3-4 times less on hand than in the West, they had subsidies from the factory, free medicine, education, owned country houses and land, etc. The decline in oil prices turned out to be a myth. The sale of oil and oil products accounted for only 6% of the USSR budget.

The wars in Vietnam or Iraq did not lead to the disintegration of the United States, the leadership in the person of Biden is just as decrepit, the cultural influence of the USSR was no less, the US military budget is now over 770 billion dollars (Russia is 42 billion), the US national debt has exceeded 20 trillion dollars, there is no freedom of speech and free elections either in the United States or in any other country in the world, in all countries of the world the actions of the authorities are contrary to their declarations. The economy of the USA, Germany or France is no less extensive - in view of the export of capital.

Disinterest in work, apathy are especially highlighted, as if the overwhelming majority of the population was in no way interested in the results of their work.
However, in any country in the world there is a time-based job, and it dominates in comparison with piece-work.
Former head of the Central Bank Gerashchenko claims that "the patient had just a slight runny nose."

2) Almost all the communist parties in the Russian Federation adhere to the position that the collapse of the USSR was due to the influence of the leading capitalist powers (the Zionist conspiracy), and to a greater extent ideological. It is believed that two people are guilty of liquidating the Union - Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Obviously, this point of view is traditional and is caused by the exaggeration of the role of the individual in history.
CPSU ideologists also point to external and internal reasons for the collapse of the USSR. External reasons are Western intelligence services.
Internal - these are agents of influence, "revisionists-anti-Stalinists" who "rocked the boat", the bourgeoisie of the CPSU (mainly under Khrushchev) and the bourgeois working class, betraying the ideals of socialism for the sake of Western goods, the shadow economy (shopkeepers, black-market speculators and others, accumulated capital). In addition, by 1991, ordinary citizens had over 5 billion rubles “in stockings” and on savings books, which played a role in voucherisation and corporatization.
However, in developed countries, instead of the "hand of the CIA" there are much more powerful agents of influence, the Communist Party.

Without a doubt, the influence of Western intelligence services played a large role. But, as the representatives of these special services themselves noted, in order for the provocation to be successful, the ground, the prerequisite underlying the basis, is needed. Moreover, this applies to such an independent state as the USSR.
Of course, it is impossible to ignore external influence and the presence of a "fifth column" in the USSR. However, the influence of the Soviet special services in the "capitalist camp" was no less.

The shadow economy also played a role. But in the collapse of the industry, the young elite of the CPSU played a major role. Thus, one member of the Perm regional committee of the CPSU privatized 4 large stores on the central street of the city, Komsomolsky Prospect, for 50 thousand rubles, at a price of 1 million rubles for each store.
The sons of the leaders of the aircraft industry, the Mikrodin firm, by unknown means acquired 32% of the shares of Perm Motors. In general, the shares fell into the hands of the management of the factories, the general directors - 5% by the order of Yeltsin, the heads of the shops were given privileges for the purchase of shares. Then the workers were delayed in wages and shares were bought for nothing.

) Many left-wing groups believe that the main reason for the "collapse of the empire" is the class struggle, and specifically the working class, against oppression by the CPSU elite.
Anarchists and Trotskyists put the main emphasis on Stalin's undemocratic character and say that there was a workers' state in the USSR under Lenin, but it was reborn, Stalin with his national policy created the basis for disintegration, as Trotsky had predicted.

However, Argentina and the United States are also multinational states, Argentina is dominated by the Spaniards. In the USA, Negroes and Indians are oppressed.
In 1987, subsidies from the budget of the USSR for one Georgian, Armenian accounted for about 700 rubles, for a resident of the Baltic republics - 1000-1200 rubles, for a resident of the RSFSR - 89 rubles 67 kopecks. About the same for a Ukrainian, a Belarusian, a Tajik, a Kyrgyz, a Turkmen, a Kazakh. At the same time, anti-Russian activity was mainly in Georgia and the Baltic States (however, the demonstrations of the 60s-70s under the slogan "get the Russians out" soon faded away). At the same time, the RSFSR dominated the CPSU leadership in percentage terms.

Undoubtedly, the Stalinist policy of indigenization (including Ukrainization) served as one of the powerful pushing springs, like the Stalinist plan for autonomization, carried out by Stalin after the death of the enemy of this plan, Lenin, the plan implied strengthening the subordination of the republics to the center, in particular,

the mandatory presence of Russians at the very top of the republican administrative apparatus. By the time of the collapse of the USSR, Russians were despised and even hated by the Udmurts, Komi, Tuvinians.
However, the centrifugal tendency that Trotsky highlighted worked only after the sectoral chains within each of the republics and between the republics disintegrated - in view of the liberalization of prices, the invasion of the dollar and a sharp depreciation of the ruble. All three moments were planned even before Yeltsin and Gaidar. But not in the Politburo (after Gorbachev became president, it lost its second role), but in the government document (which received this second role), signed by Petrakov in April 1990.

During the war, relations with Chechnya were extremely tense, the rebels tried to reunite with the Wehrmacht. Crimean Tatars fought on Hitler's side. According to the directive of the State Committee for Defense, men from the Turkic republics were not called up in the Red Army, that is, relations with the center of these republics were also tense.
After Stalin's death, Khrushchev returned the evicted Chechens and Tatars to their homeland and continued the “divide and rule” policy, populating the Stavropol region with Chechens. "Autonomization" continued to operate: for every 1st secretary of the CPSU Republic Committee, a Russian was to be his deputy.
By the time of the collapse of the USSR, Russians were despised and even hated by the Udmurts, Komi, Tuvinians.

Of course, the provocation of foreign special services with a television center in Vilnius, the organization of the conflict by the Georgian KGB with the use of sapper shovels, and the participation of the MOSSAD in the Moscow events in October 1993 also played a role.
The influence of such factors as the dominance of the Russian nationality in the governing bodies of the CPSU and in the CPSU as a whole (see GSE, article "CPSU"), whipping up anti-Russian sentiments in Georgia or the Baltic states, etc. - was secondary. Thus, conflicts on ethnic grounds did not spill over into broad popular movements; the national Popular Fronts, RUKH, Sayudis and others were too weak and almost disappeared immediately after the collapse of the USSR.
Rallies of many thousands, agents of influence, informal groups, etc. almost did not influence the course of events. It was foam for water, information support, extras. The rallies soon came to naught, and the informals were not supported by their actions either by labor collectives or by the population as a whole.
Likewise, it is difficult to call the division of property across the republics the result of the struggle of the working class: the national theme barely affected workers 'associations, and the national Workers' Unions disappeared even faster than the Fronts. Although the labor movement for some time went side by side with the democratic movement, until the developed class conflict within a republic, the movement did not grow until the collapse of the USSR.

4) Engineers and scientists believe that the key role was played by the artificial freezing of technologies, agreed by the top leadership of the United States, Europe and the USSR.

The technology freeze did indeed take place: the world's first computers (first analog) were created in the USSR. However, one can hardly believe that Stalin reached an agreement with Roosevelt and Daladier that genetics would be oppressed in the USSR, and Khrushchev - with Kennedy and De Gaulle on the oppression of cybernetics. In addition, by 1985, in one of the institutes of Moscow State University, a method for creating large integrated circuits, LSI, was discovered by the method of sputtering with a laser, which made it possible to overcome the 15-year lag behind Japan. But perestroika prevented its implementation.
The specificity of the USSR, expressed in the size of the area, of course, leaves an imprint on management, but it cannot be an essential reason. In North America, attempts by several states to secede led to the Civil War. Tibet's desire to secede prompted military action. Centrifugal forces operate in the EU as well, Great Britain left the union, Greece left the union even before the introduction of the euro currency. Scotland tried to secede from Great Britain, Catalonia voted to secede from Spain.

There were also subjective reasons. If it were not for the actions of the top of the SEC, the USSR might have followed the path of China.

The SEC arose long before 19.8.1991, and at the meetings of Yeltsin's team, people asked for time off: "Now the SEC is in session, I want to listen!" Conversely, people from the SEC were present at the meetings of Yeltsin's team.
Even in 1993 there was an opportunity to prevent the collapse of the economy, if Yeltsin had not dissolved the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation.
On July 4, a joint meeting was held in Moscow, organized by the government and the RF Armed Forces, at which the head of the Armed Forces, Khasbulatov, announced: “Everyone must obey the laws. We write the laws. So we need to obey. "
Among the documents of the Meeting was the Agreement on Cooperation, signed behind Yeltsin's back by Travkin, Gaidar, Yavlinsky, Gerashchenko and others, that is, representatives of both opposing sides, which could not please Yeltsin.
In 1993, Yeltsin fired Zakharov as head of the Pension Fund (PFR), Berezovsky became his treasurer, an association of 6 Solidarity banks arose on the basis of the PFR (Mamut, Khodorkovsky, Abramovich, etc.) Chernomyrdin took 21 billion rubles from the PFR, returned only 6 billion rubles. Komsomol leader Chubais became the head of the State Property Committee, the young party-industrial elite seized oil and gas.
However, all subjective reasons are due to the objective, which was the administrative apparatus of the USSR.
Thus, all of the above reasons operate in many countries of the world without causing disintegration.

Competition

Nevertheless, the external impact on the USSR was significant.
Obviously, developed countries could exert a direct influence of a massive nature, and by no means through special services, samizdat or Radio Liberty, on the humanitarian and scientific and technical intelligentsia, which had much greater access to legal information about the West than the working class. Why is information so scary?
"Capitalist production," writes E. Preobrazhensky, "is not scary for subsistence farming when the latter has no points of contact with it ... Subsistence farming simply does not accept battle, since it is not involved in monetary exchange ... And only when this weaker enemy is being dragged out into the capitalist arena by the development of commodity exchange, it is being put on both shoulder blades in the process of free competition. ... For the victory of the capitalist mode of production over the natural or petty-bourgeois mode of production, those economic advantages that each capitalist enterprise had over more primitive forms of economy were quite enough. Violence played mainly an auxiliary role ... The outcome of the battle was decided by the consumer, who, buying a cheaper (or higher quality, B.I.) product, thereby voted for the capitalist mode of production (or for a more developed production, B.I.) and supported it against the craft (or against less developed production), becoming a buyer (or appraiser, B.I.) of capitalist products" [2].

That is, a similar conclusion about the collision of a developed capitalist economy with a less developed one is quite legitimate. The fact that production from the USSR was less developed than in the USA, Europe or Japan is indicated not only by the level of GDP per capita [3], but also by the weak development of computer technologies as the basis of modern production, and the quality of consumer goods, and quality of vehicles. For example, the export of aircraft to the USA in 1985 exceeded the analogous export of the USSR by more than 20 times (see, for example, [4]).
Secondly, we are talking about the comparison of working conditions and wages - as you know, in developed countries the ratio of the incomes of clerks and engineers is inverse than in the CMEA countries (see, for example, [5]).

Third, on the direct exchange of scientific and technical information. Suffice it to mention that the once scientific direction of creating high-temperature superconductors in the USSR was criticized from a high rostrum, at the same time Ronald Reagan declared in his first presidential term: "High-temperature superconductors are the nails with which we will hammer the coffin of socialism."
So, it is obvious that the points of contact between Western-level industry and the so-called "closed society" were mostly in the sphere of intellectual work. Thus, the debates, unfolded in due time by the Communist Parties, about the "betrayal of the ideas of socialism by the intelligentsia" are doubtful.

Thus, it was worth introducing greater independence of factories in the "Law on State Enterprise" and then abolishing the state monopoly on foreign trade introduced by Lenin, as more developed countries began to oust local producers from the market.

Three main reasons

In fact, each republic disintegrated even before the Belovezhskaya Agreement. The latter was only a legal confirmation of the actual disintegration. For example, the textile workers of Ivanovo, "polarized" by the external dollar field, are tearing up the technological chain, selling textiles abroad and leaving Glazov's weavers without raw materials. Short-term interest realized - profit; the rate of profit (reduction in price, modernization of the means of production), as well as long-term interests, remained in the shadows.
It is not common, but the IDENTITY of the reaction to the “field” on the part of managers, intelligentsia, and workers. Why is this happening? In order for the "field" to work, there must be a "charge". Namely.

The construction of the economic system by the state-owner included the centralization of financial capital and management. Thus, the state has "expropriated" all planning functions. Consequently, together with them, it concentrated all long-term interests in itself, removing them from the consciousness of ordinary workers. The exclusion of art workers, workers of creative (dominant concrete) labor, who are both performers and planners of their own labor during the labor process, is not significant, because they are embroiled in a dominant alienation from general management.
At the same time, the concentration of labor was only extensive, quantitative in nature, with the internal fragmentation of production ("atomization of the proletariat"). Since not only technological chains instantly disintegrated, but in the absence of closed cycles fell apart into separate workshops and giant factories, inside the workshops, various forms of payment provoked a confrontation between pieceworkers and time workers, and capitalist leveling, i.e. payment for materialized labor, created tension between the members of the labor collective within the brigades.

That is, socialization was fictitious. As an example, we can cite the implementation of the synthesis of a certain chemical compound in Perm, for which components were supplied from a dozen cities of the USSR up to Khabarovsk in the presence of the same components in Perm itself. Or the supply for the Perm "bicycle" defense plant (JSC "Velta") steel grades from 35 cities of the USSR, including distant Yerevan, Krasnoyarsk, etc., when metallurgical plants in the Perm region are not loaded (Lysvensky, Chusovsky, Nytvensky), in the presence of metallurgical plants in Perm itself at the factories named after Lenin and named after Sverdlov.
To this must be added the oncoming traffic, the supply of timber from the Baltics to Siberia, cement to Gornozavodsk, where the cement plant is located, etc.

That is, roughly speaking, the Baltic nuts were "socialized" with Khabarovsk bolts, the extensive consolidation of production was accompanied by the deconcentration of labor [6].
Thus, the privatization process is PRIMARY in relation to the process of the collapse of the USSR.
Why does the administrative apparatus need such a structure of the economic system? It is obvious that the transfer of the chief executive to the center from the provinces makes it difficult to strike. Secondly, the unification of workers according to professional interests, according to the "interests" of the technological chain is also difficult due to the scattered production. This means that if the manager loses on the increase in production costs, he gains due to the absence of workers 'performances and, consequently, the absence of redistribution of profits to the workers' wages.
The same method of organizing production is observed in the developed capitalist countries [7]. So, the exorbitant costs of production in fictitious socialization are one of the main political and economic springs of the collapse of the USSR.
The second objective reason is the growth of productive forces.
As already mentioned, planning functions, management functions are concentrated in the capital. That is, the management apparatus mediates all intra-economic ties. As indicated by Nikishina in 1988 [8] and in 1992 by Fukuyama [9], the development of production leads to an increase in the number of economic ties, and hence to the growth of the administrative apparatus. In the end, the administrative apparatus is faced with a dilemma - either to increase its size even more and lose its privileged position (with Lenin, to make EVERYONE

bureaucrats), or to maintain the status quo. That is, a situation when the apparatus is no longer able to cover the entire wealth of economic ties. This means that it is not able to manage.
Therefore, in the conditions of suppression of the economic "creativity of the masses", attempts to form a plan "from below", the administrative apparatus collapses regardless of the desire of the layer of managers, ceases its functions, entrusts them to the capitalist class, where property relations have been reduced from management to ownership (hence the rentier and the export of capital abroad), but, for the most part, forms this class itself.

A number of smaller-scale administrative apparatus are emerging in accordance with the scale of economic structures that each specific apparatus is able to control.
Since the common interest in the newly formed class has not matured, the bourgeoisie appears as a class-in-itself, but not a class-for-itself, insofar as each economic structure declares only a short-term interest, and not a long-term one (previously "expropriated" by the capital). Consequently, these structures do not need the state as a tool for realizing a common interest. Therefore, state property is disintegrating. Because even 1000 Marxes couldn't manage the entire economy.
The same tendencies are valid in the United States, the collapse of which was predicted by Harriman back in the 40s. In the process of the third round of globalization (if we consider the 1st world war as the first, the 2nd world war as the second, and the USSR as a relatively peaceful globalization of the economy in a limited space). Centrifugal trends are being detected today not only by Texas, but also by 17 states that voted for Trump.

As has been shown, centralization of management and the concentration of financial capital has nothing to do with the socialization of production. Thus, globalization cannot be the basis for uniting workers and, as Savas titled his article, "The Transition to Socialism" [10]. There is nothing to applaud for in globalization. On the contrary, instead of uniting the workers, it leads to their disunity.
Thus, the contradiction of capitalism, expressed in the social nature of production and the private form of appropriation, is only a side of the contradiction between the growth of production and the usurpation of production management by a narrow social stratum, no matter if it is a bourgeois class or a class of state officials.

Consequently, the contradiction between labor and capital is not reduced to the withdrawal of surplus value, since the owner does not use the lion's share for his personal consumption, for luxury goods, etc., he is obliged to pay taxes, invest in depreciation and development of production: as in the USA or Germany, and in the USSR. This contradiction mainly lies in the usurpation of the management of this surplus value (development fund or accumulation fund).
Consequently, the content of the oppression of the class by the class is not so much a cut in income, as the reduction of the worker to the role of a cog in the mechanism, his depersonalization through alienation from management.

The basis for such alienation is the social division of labor, first of all, into physical and mental labor. Monotonous, hard, depersonalizing (dominant abstract) labor is oppressive, and not just low wages to restore the workforce. The hired character of labor is generated by the abstract content of labor.
The third objective reason for the collapse is the contradiction between the bourgeois content and the socialist form of classes in the USSR.
Indeed, the working class cannot be both socialist and "bourgeois" at the same time.
On the other hand, management, disposal is the essence of property relations, the manager of the means of production is a capitalist by definition.
A higher place in the social hierarchy, in the production management system, also determines a higher share of social wealth, in accordance with the definition of classes given by Lenin in the article "The Great Initiative".
Since social existence determines social consciousness, the privileged social existence of the managerial class gave rise to their bourgeois consciousness, of course, not in 1956, but immediately after 1917. Therefore, it makes no sense to involve conspiracy theories of the leadership's "betrayal".
Thus, the driving force behind the reforms that led to the collapse of the USSR was the interest of the managerial elite to legalize their position as owners (to "convert" power into money).

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